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Prior research shows that family firms are generally less likely to diversify, but it
remains unclear which mode of diversification in terms of internal versus external
diversification family firms are more likely to choose once they decide to diversify.
Similarly, it is unclear which type of diversification in terms of product versus
international diversification family firms are more likely to focus on in comparison to
nonfamily firms. Based on insights drawn from the goals, governance, and resources
framework, this dissertation investigates the modes/types of diversification in family and
nonfamily firms, as well as among various types of family firms. Specifically, I propose
that family firms will prefer internal to external diversification to a larger extent than
nonfamily firms. I further propose the strength of preference for internal to external
diversification is likely to vary among different types of family firms manifested in the
level of family ownership, family participation in the top management team and board,
and generation of family members owning and controlling the family firm. Likewise, I
theorize that family firms would prefer product to international diversification to a larger
extent than nonfamily firms and that the strength of preference for product diversification
is likely to vary among different types of family firms. A sample of 573 firms drawn

from the S&P 1500 index was used to examine the difference between family and
nonfamily firms, and 136 family firms to test the heterogeneity hypotheses. No
significant differences were found between family and nonfamily firms in their relative
choice on internal over external diversification (Essay 1) and product over international
diversification (Essay 2). Consistent with my prediction, I found family representation in
the top management team has a significantly positive effect on a firm’s tendency to
engage in product rather than international diversification. However, in both Essay 1 and
Essay 2, I did not find significant effects of the other heterogeneous variables on a family
firm’s tendency to engage in one mode/type of diversification over the other. A rationale
for these non-significant relationships is provided. Contributions and implications of this
study are also discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Family firms represent the most prevalent form of business organization around
the world (Chang, Chrisman, Chua, & Kellermanns, 2008; Villalonga, Amit, Trujillo, &
Guzmán, 2015). Studies show that family firms account for over 33% of large publicly
listed US firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and the ownership structures of large
corporations in 27 wealthy countries are typically controlled by families. These statistics
highlight the prevalence of large-scale family firms in the world and indicate that like
nonfamily firms, family firms seek to expand the scope of their activities through
corporate diversification.
However, prior research has shown that family firms usually invest less in
diversification (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2010). For example,
Chrisman and Patel (2012) found that family firms invest less in R&D, or internal
development, in comparison to nonfamily firm. Miller and colleagues (2010) also found
family firms are less likely to engage in external acquisition activities. In addition, family
firms are found to have lower levels of product diversification (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2010) and international diversification (Fang, Memili, Chrisman, & De Massis, 2018). As
the statistics above highlight, large-scale family firms are prevalent around the world and
that family firms do, indeed, engage in diversification albeit at a potentially lesser scale,
although they are more reluctant to do so than nonfamily firms.
1

However, a question remaining in the extant literature is how family firms
diversify once they decide to do so. Family business researchers have recognized that the
nature of the goals followed (Chrisman, Chua et al., 2012), the governance system
enacted (Carney, 2005), and the resources available through family involvement
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999) appear to lead to differences in behaviors between
family and nonfamily firms, as well as among various types of family firms. Thus, based
on the insights drawn from the goals, governance, and resources framework, this
dissertation investigates how the modes of diversification (internal versus external
diversification) and dimensions of diversification (product versus international
diversification) differ in family and nonfamily firms, as well as among various types of
family firms. Specifically, I theorize that family firms will exhibit a stronger preference
for internal to external diversification than nonfamily firms in Essay 1 and family firms
have a stronger preference for product to international diversification than nonfamily
firms in Essay 2.
Research further suggests that family firms are largely a heterogeneous group
(Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012). An
important source of heterogeneity of family firms arise from family involvement in
governance through their ownership, management, and board participation (Chrisman,
Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chrisman & Holt, 2016), and heterogeneity in governance is
likely to be associated with differences in goals and resource configurations (Chua et al.,
2012). I therefore further theorize and test that the strength of preference for internal
diversification to external diversification (Essay 1) and the strength of product to
international diversification (Essay 2) will vary among different types of family firms
2

represented by the level of family ownership in the firm, the presence of a family CEO,
the representation of family executives in the TMT, the presence of a family board chair,
the representation of family directors on the board, and the presence of the founding
generation family members in the firm.
An empirical analysis of 573 manufacturing firms drawn from the S&P 1500
index for the fiscal years 1998 to 2017 shows no significant differences between family
and nonfamily firms in their relative emphasis on internal and external diversification.
Likewise, no differences were found among various types of family firms. These results
provide no empirical support for the theoretical model proposed in Essay 1. In Essay 2, I
did not find significant difference between family and nonfamily firms in their relative
emphasis on product versus international diversification. Consistent with my prediction,
family representation in the top management team (H11) was found to have a
significantly positive effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than
international diversification. This finding is robust across different tests. A rationale for
the non-significant relationships in Essay 1 and Essay 2 is provided.
This dissertation makes several important contributions to the family business and
diversification literatures. First, this dissertation extends our knowledge of diversification
behavior in family firms. By investigating how family firms diversify in terms of modes
and types of diversification, this dissertation enhances our knowledge of a firm’s
diversification behavior. Second, our knowledge of the variance among family firms
regarding their propensity towards modes/types of diversification remains limited. By
investigating diversification preference among various types of family firms, this
dissertation contributes to our knowledge of heterogeneity across family firms. Third, by
3

introducing the roles of goals, governance, and resources of the dominant coalition in
affecting a firm’s diversification, specifically in family firms, this dissertation helps
provide a finer-grained understanding of the antecedents of a firm’s diversification.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The following two
sections provide detailed accounts of Essay 1 and Essay 2. This dissertation ends with a
conclusion chapter summarizing the important results and implications.
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ESSAY 1: AN INVESTIGATION OF DIVERSIFICATION MODES IN FAMILY
FIRMS
Introduction
Family firms are the most prevalent form of business organization in the world
(Chang, Chrisman, Chua, & Kellermanns, 2008; Daspit, Chrisman, Sharma, Pearson, &
Long, 2017; La Porta, López de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999)1. It is estimated that family
firms represent over 33% of large publicly listed US firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b;
Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and about 90% of all businesses in the US economy, including
privately held firms (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Villalonga, Amit, Trujillo, & Guzman,
2015). Corporate diversification decisions, i.e., decisions on the entry into new lines of
activity, are of key importance to a firm’s new business development strategy. An entrant
firm is concerned not only about what markets to enter but also about how to enter them.
Internal direct development and external acquisition represent two vehicles of corporate
diversification2. An established firm can enter a new product market internally through
investments in R&D or externally by acquiring an existing entity or both.

In this essay, family firms are defined by a family’s involvement in a firm, which allows it to pursue
family-centered goals as well as utilize family-based resources in its strategic initiatives (Bennedsen et al.,
2010; Chua et al., 1999).
2
I recognize that a mix of entry modes such as joint ventures is also possible (Lamont & Anderson, 1985).
However, firms are more likely to utilize internal direct development or acquisition for domestic market
entries, although joint ventures are common for entries into foreign markets (Lee & Lieberman, 2010).
1
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Family business studies show that family firms usually invest less in R&D than
nonfamily firms (e.g., Chen & Hsu, 2009; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; De Massis, Frattini,
& Lichtenthaler, 2013; Patel & Chrisman, 2014). Likewise, family firms are found to be
less likely to engage in acquisition activities (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, Patel, & Zellweger,
2015; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010). However, this does not mean family
firms do not make such investments but it may mean they are more reluctant in the
investments they make. Given the prevalence of family firms, especially the existence of
large-scale family firms (Miller & Le Breton-Miller 2005), our knowledge related to how
family firms grow and diversify with respect to internal versus external diversification
remains limited. It seems reasonable that we need to not only understand the levels of
diversification in family firms but also how they diversify. In particular, we need to
understand the conditions that may lead family firms to pursue one diversification mode
over the other.
Thus, the purpose of this essay is to investigate family firms’ choice of entry
mode for diversification in terms of internal development from R&D investments and
external acquisitions3. Specifically, I address the following two questions: how do the
goals, governance, and resources of family firms affect their choice of entry mode in
comparison to nonfamily firms? How do different goals, governance systems, and
idiosyncratic resources among family firms affect the choice of entry mode? Based on the
literature that family firms are distinct from nonfamily firms with regard to the
importance attached to the pursuit of noneconomic goals, idiosyncratic resources, and

3

It is important to note that the focus of this essay is to look at the relative preference for these two modes
of diversification (i.e., internal diversification and external diversification) in family and nonfamily firms,
as well as among various types of family firms.

6

unique governance systems (Chrisman, Sharma, Steier, & Chua, 2013), I theorize that
family firms will exhibit a stronger preference for internal diversification to external
diversification in comparison to nonfamily firms. However, family firms are not a
homogeneous group (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Chua, Chrisman, Steier,
& Rau, 2012). An important source of heterogeneity of family firms arises from family
involvement in governance through their ownership, management, and board
participation (Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012; Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005;
Chrisman & Holt, 2016; Chrisman et al., 2013), and heterogeneity in governance is likely
to be associated with differences in goals and resource configurations (Chua et al., 2012).
I therefore further theorize and test that the strength of preference for internal
diversification to external diversification will vary among different types of family firms.
This study makes several important theoretical contributions to the literature,
primarily to the family business literature. First, while prior research shows that family
firms differ from nonfamily firms in the level of diversification (Anderson & Reeb,
2003a; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010), the question regarding how family firms
diversify in terms of internal versus external remains unanswered. By studying entry
modes in family firms as well as various types of family firms, this study enhances our
knowledge of diversification in general and diversification modes in particular in family
firms. Moreover, there is a growing body of research that investigates R&D investments
(e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012; De Massis et al., 2013) and corporate acquisitions (e.g.,
Miller et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2015) in family firms. However, most of these
studies investigate these two entry modes independently. The present study represents the
first attempt to investigate internal and external diversification simultaneously in family
7

firms, thus providing a more comprehensive understanding of how family firms diversify
and grow.
Second, while diversification is one of the most studied topics in the strategic
management literature (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Wan,
Hoskisson, Short, & Yiu, 2011), the effects of behavioral motives of the dominant
coalition on a firm’s diversification has not been adequately investigated, with most of
the studies focusing on the amount of diversification (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003a;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). By introducing the roles of the goals, governance, and
resources of the dominant coalition in affecting a firm’s choice of entry mode,
specifically in family firms, as a key explanatory variable in understanding an entrant’s
choice of mode, this study helps provide a finer-grained understanding of the antecedents
of a diversifying firm’s mode of entry.
Third, I find that there is no significant difference between family and nonfamily
firms in their relative emphasis on internal over external diversification. Likewise, no
significant differences have been shown among various types of family firms in terms of
their relative emphasis on these two modes of diversification. These insignificant findings
highlight that the combined influence of goals, governance systems, and idiosyncratic
resources on a family firm’s behavior is more complicated than we expected. Future
research can further examine how goals, governance, and resources are interrelated to one
another and how such interrelationships affect a family firm’s diversification behavior.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
The literature on diversification can be traced back to the pioneering works of
Chandler (1962), Ansoff (1965), and Rumelt (1974), who established the motivations for
8

diversification and the general nature of the diversified firms. Since then, diversification
remains one of the most explored topics in the literature (e.g., Ahuja et al., 2017;
Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Anjos & Fracassi, 2015; Arikan & Stulz, 2016; Busija, O’Neill,
& Zeithaml, 1997; Chen, 1996; Hofer & Chrisman, 1989; Hoskisson et al., 1990; Wan et
al., 2011; Wiersema & Bowen, 2008). Within the diversification literature, there is a
major body of research investigating how the entry is made for a diversifying firm (e.g.,
Lee & Lieberman, 2010; Lieberman, Lee & Folta, 2016; Sharma, 1998; Speckbacher,
Neumann & Hoffmann, 2015; Yip, 1982). Entry mode can be defined as a decision on the
means of accessing a new market or the investment of resources in a new target market.
(Chatterjee, 1990; Lee et al., 2010; Speckbacher et al., 2015). Internal direct development
and external acquisition are two alternatives firms can use to access a new market.
Internal entry mode is a firm’s decision to expand the scope of its business into new lines
of activity and grow organically through internal development, whereas external entry
mode is a firm’s decision to enter new markets by acquiring a firm or business unit that is
already established (Lee et al., 2010).
Prior literature has identified various factors that help entrant firms choose the
mode of entry (e.g., Bigelow & Argyres, 2008; Jacobides & Hitt, 2005; Leiblein &
Miller, 2003; Qian, Agarwal, & Hoetker, 2012). For example, from a knowledge
perspective, previous studies have shown that mode of entry is determined by the focal
firm’s efficiency in transferring knowledge relative to other firms and the attributes of the
knowledge to be transferred (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Speckbacher et al., 2015).
Specifically, prior studies show that the higher the transferability of an established firm’s
resources to the new business segment, the more likely a firm will choose internal
9

development (Speckbacher et al., 2015). High transferability of existing resources
provides the firm with immediate opportunities to build up and accumulate the required
resources internally and can thus significantly reduce the costs and risks of entry (Qian et
al., 2012; Speckbacher et al., 2015). Conversely, if the transferability of a firm’s
resources is low, it will become more advantageous to acquire resources in the market via
acquisition.
Similarly, a firm’s mode of entry into the new market can also be predicted by the
availability of the firm’s human capital (Beaumont, Hebert, & Lyonnet, 2017). Beaumont
et al. (2017) show that firms are more likely to enter a new market externally if, prior to
entry, their human capital is not adapted to operate in the new business segment.
Moreover, their study shows that the link between human capital and diversification
mode is more pronounced for larger firms, for which acquisitions represent a presumably
more affordable alternative (Beaumont et al., 2017). This literature suggests that firms
diversify externally in order to acquire human capital, whereas firms diversify internally
because they have the ability to redeploy preexisting human capital in the new business
segment. These studies highlight the relevance and importance of a firm’s initial bundle
of resources and capabilities in affecting a firm’s choice of entry mode (Jacobides et al.,
2005; Qian et al., 2012).
Further, from a resource-based view, research has suggested when the required
resources to enter a target market are highly related to the firm’s existing set of resources
and capabilities, the firm would favor direct entry through internal development (Busija
et al., 1997; Lee et al., 2010; Penrose, 1959; Qian et al., 2012). This is because internal
development enables the entering firm to leverage existing resources into the new
10

business and allow the firm to exploit their organizational and technical expertise
(Chatterjee & Singh, 1999; Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992; Speckbacher et al., 2015). On
the other hand, acquisitions allow the firm to extend its resource base and offer the
opportunities to acquire complementary resources and capabilities in the context of a new
business area (Capron & Mitchell, 2009; Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002; Karim &
Mitchell, 2000; Kaul, 2012; Lee et al., 2010). In other words, an acquisition would give
the firm access to proven resources in a new and unfamiliar area where its own ability to
develop these resources may be uncertain (Hennart & Reddy, 1997). For example, Lee
and Lieberman (2010) show that inside a firm’s primary business domain, acquisitions
are used to fill persistent gaps near the firm’s existing products, whereas, outside that
domain, acquisitions are used to extend the enterprise in new directions. Thus,
acquisitions are argued to be particularly valuable for a firm looking to exploit its
technological innovation in an unfamiliar market (Capron, 1999; Capron, Dussauge, &
Mitchell, 1998).
Lastly, the literature on international entry mode choice also sheds some light on
factors determining a firm’s choice of entry, specifically to a foreign market (Brouthers &
Brouthers, 2000; Harzing, 2002; Martin, 2013; Slangen & Hennart, 2007). For example,
prior research suggests that internal uncertainty that occurs when a firm cannot accurately
assess its agents’ performance by objective, readily available output measures (Anderson
& Gatignon, 1986; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009) is an important factor
determining a firm’s choice of entry mode. When the level of internal uncertainty is high,
firms need to impose subjective judgment to monitor behavior (Meyer et al., 2009). In
this case, external acquisitions may make it more challenging to develop goal congruence
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and loyalty in the acquired firm. As such, firms may prefer direct Greenfield entry to
acquisition entry when the level of internal uncertainty is high.
Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of These Two Entry Modes
Acquisition and internal development are likely to differ from one another in
terms of costs, speed, and risks of entry (Clarysse, Bruneel, & Wright, 2011; Lee et al.,
2010). Acquisitions usually require payments of a significant financial premium. At the
same time, acquisitions incur non-trivial costs of integrating the acquired firm with the
acquiring company (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011;
Lakshman, 2011; Sharma, 1998). Post-acquisition integration is considered a complicated
process, which involves the integration of culture and strategy between the acquiring and
acquired firms (Ellis, Reus, & Lamont, 2009; Lakshman, 2011). Indeed, most
acquisitions fail to create synergy through integration (Birkinshaw, Bresman, &
Hakanson, 2000). While internal development usually does not have to bear the costs of
integrating an acquired firm into the acquiring firm’s corporate structure and systems,
internal development may also face high development costs (Teng, 2007), which can be
related to experiments with new technological opportunities inside the firm.
Internal development and acquisition also differ in the speed of entry. Most
acquisitions are consummated relatively quickly (Capron et al., 2009; Pettus, Kor,
Mahoney, & Michael, 2017), whereas internal development normally takes a relatively
long period of time which can be many months or years (Lee et al., 2010). When speed is
important, acquisitions are more likely to be used as the entry mode for quick growth
(Clarysse et al., 2011; Kaul, 2012; Kim et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2010). Research drawn
from multinational enterprises entering foreign countries suggests that firms will use
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acquisitions when they need to make speedy entry (Hennart, 2009; Slangen et al., 2007).
For example, studies of firms in the computing and communication industry show that
firms would acquire other firms in order to gain access to their streams of innovative
activity more quickly (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002).
Both acquisition and internal development carry risks. Acquisitive entry involves
a large one-time investment. While it is possible that firms make ‘toe-hold’ acquisitions
to evaluate the potential of a new product-market and then make full commitment if the
opportunity looks promising, it usually entails great risk when a firm makes an
acquisition of another ongoing entity, whether small or large, because the acquiring firm
invests in all aspects of business operations up front. The possibility of overpaying is also
high because of the asymmetry of information regarding the true value of the target firm.
The seller usually has better knowledge about the target firm than the buyer does, thus
increasing the possibility of purchasing a firm with serious but previously unknown
problems (i.e., a lemon) (Akerlof, 1970).
On the other hand, while internal development usually involves periodic
incremental investments by the parent firm and provides a firm with the opportunity
before fully committing itself to test its capabilities against those of competition (Sharma,
1998), internal development also entails great risk (Verbeke, Chrisman, & Yuan, 2007).
The process whereby firms engage in diversification through internal development is also
known as corporate entrepreneurship (CE, Burgelman, 1983; Covin & Slevin, 1991;
Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). Corporate entrepreneurship literature suggests that CE
embodies renewal activities that enhance a corporation’s ability to compete and take risks
(Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, & Tan, 2009; Zahra, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2009). Thus, risk13

taking is an important attribute of corporate entrepreneurship or internal diversification
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Srivastava & Lee, 2005).
Specifically, based on the literature that entrepreneurship is defined as “carrying
out new combinations” (Schumpeter, 1934: 66), CE requires changes in the pattern of
resource deployment and the infusion of resources and new knowledge into the firm’s
operations (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990; Zahra et al., 2009). CE is also considered the result
of the interlocking entrepreneurial activities of multiple participants (Burgelman, 1983).
Thus, the risk associated with CE, specifically, the risk in developing new products,
technologies, and capabilities, is usually high (Kelley, Peters, & O’Connor, 2009; Teng,
2007). This suggests internal diversification in the form of developing new technologies
and new ways of doing business and entering new markets in new organizational forms
carries great risk (Shepherd, Covin, & Kuratko, 2009; Zahra, 1995).
While both internal diversification and external diversification entail great risks
for the firm, the potential to manage the downside risks of internal diversification would
be greater than those of external diversification. As mentioned earlier, external
diversification involves a large one-time investment, whereas internal development
involves periodic incremental investments. Relative to an acquired entity, the internal
business is usually a great deal more compatible with the firm in terms of systems,
culture, and procedures (Sharma, 1998). It is plausible that internally developed
businesses would be more likely than acquired businesses to be able to leverage the
resources of the parent firm into the entered industry. Managers leading the internal
business are likely to be more effective in drawing upon relevant resources because they
are likely to have connections through work and social networks with their counterparts
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in other operating divisions of the firm (Sharma, 1998). This is in contrast to the
difficulty associated with the post-acquisition integration process due to lack of history
between managers of the acquired business and those of the parent firm. Moreover,
operations of acquired businesses usually are disrupted as the new parent firm tries to
integrate them within the corporate context. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that it is
more difficult to manage the downside risks of external acquisitive entry, as is manifested
in the high odds of failure of acquisitions (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004).
In sum, internal diversification and external diversification are likely to differ
from one another in the aspects of costs, speed, and risks of entry. The characteristics of
internal diversification and external diversification are captured and shown in Table 1.
While in choosing between these two modes of entry, a firm must consider their
relative advantages and disadvantages with respect to costs, speed, and risks of entry, the
roles of goals, governance, and resources of the dominant coalition in affecting a firm’s
choice of entry mode, specifically in family firms, also need to be considered. Recent
advancement in the field of family firms has highlighted the importance of the
combination of goals, governance, and resources in influencing a family firm’s strategic
behavior and outcomes (Chrisman et al., 2016; Chrisman et al., 2013; Daspit et al., 2017).
Goals, governance, and resources are regarded as the three pillars that capture the nature
of family firms and the essence of family influence on a firm’s behaviors and strategies
(Chrisman et al., 2013).
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The Goals, Governance, and Resources Framework
Goals
The importance of goals including economic and noneconomic goals in affecting
a firm’s strategies and behaviors has long been emphasized in the behavioral theory of
the firm (Cyert & March, 1963). According to the behavioral theory of the firm, firms
have economic goals as well as a variety of noneconomic ones that are reflected in the
behaviors and strategies of the firm (Argote & Greve, 2007; Cyert et al., 1963). In family
firms where the dominant coalition is controlled by family members, it seems likely that
noneconomic goals related to the family would be especially important (Chrisman, Chua,
& Sharma, 2005; Westhead & Howorth, 2007). Indeed, a greater emphasis on
noneconomic goals is argued to be an important characteristic that differentiates family
from nonfamily firms (Chrisman, Chua, et al., 2012; Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005;
Debicki, Kellermanns, Chrisman, Pearson, & Spencer, 2016). Noneconomic goals may
include goals related to maintaining family control over the firm (Gomez-Mejia, Haynes,
Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), perpetuation of the family dynasty
and legacy (Casson, 1999; Chrisman, Chua et al., 2012; Daspit, Holt, Chrisman, & Long,
2016; Hammond, Pearson, & Holt, 2016), providing jobs for family members (Chrisman,
Memili, & Misra, 2014), and maintaining the family’s identity and reputation (Zellweger,
Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012), among others. Berrone and colleagues (2012:
259) coin these unique noneconomic goals as the FIBER model, which stands for Family
control and influence, Identification of family members with the firm, Binding social ties,
Emotional attachment of family members, and Renewal of family bonds to the firm
through dynastic succession. These noneconomic goals will guide family firms’ decision16

making that may satisfy the preferences of the dominant controlling family (Chrisman,
Kellermanns, Chan, & Liano, 2010; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999).
There is a growing number of studies in the family business literature that
recognize differences between family and nonfamily firms and among various types of
family firms due to the presence of family-centered noneconomic goals of the owing
families (Chrisman, Chua et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2010). Family firms are
argued to favor strategies that can help achieve these goals (Chrisman, Chua et al., 2012)
and be averse to strategies that may potentially hinder the achievement of these goals
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). For example, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) show that family
firms are willing to risk financial losses and bear a greater probability of failure in order
to maintain family control of the firm.
While there may be a number of goals that can be related to a family firm’s choice
of entry mode, two goals are especially important, including goals related to exercising
family control and maintaining the family’s identity and reputation. Because of the
intimate connection between the family and the business, the desire to maintain family
control is an important goal in family firms’ strategic decision-making (Chrisman, Chua
et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Moreover, family firm members are likely to
view their business as an extension of their family (Dyer & Whetten, 2006), and they
strive to create and maintain a strong family identity and reputation (Patel et al., 2014;
Zellweger & Nason, 2008). The importance attached to the pursuit of these goals has
important implications for our understanding of a family firm’s preference for internal to
external diversification in comparison to nonfamily firms.
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The importance attached to the pursuit of noneconomic goals may also vary
among different types of family firms. For example, family firms under the leadership of
a family CEO are likely to have a stronger desire to maintain close family control of the
firm than family firms led by a nonfamily CEO (Chrisman et al., 2014; Minichilli,
Nordqvist, Corbetta, & Amore, 2014). Further, the goals of founding generation family
owner-managers may differ from those of later generation family owners (Fang, Kotlar,
Memili, Chrisman, & De Massis, 2018; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Due to their strong
personal attachment and commitment to the firm, founding family owners are argued to
be more likely to pursue non-economic goals than later generation family owners (Fang
et al., 2018). For example, prior research shows that economic goals associated with
reducing business risk are found to hold greater sway when the family firm is under the
control of later generation of family owners (Gomze-Mejia et al., 2007).
Governance
The family business literature suggests that the governance structure of family
firms may be different from that of nonfamily firms (Carney, 2005). The distinctive
governance system of family firms occurs because family members have controlling
ownership and often hold prominent positions in the top management team (TMT) and/or
the board of directors, which gives the family firm owners power and legitimacy to make
rapid and particularistic decisions and favors the parsimonious use of resources (Carney,
2005). Personalized heuristics of top managers and directors will be used in the planning
and strategic decisions of family firms (Fang, 2016; Gedajlovic, Lubatkin & Schulze,
2004). In addition, these dominant positions in corporate governance allow decisionmakers to transmit their goals into strategic actions of the firm (Cyert et al., 1963; Fang,
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2016; Tang, Crossan, & Rowe 2011). This suggests governance not only ensures
decision-makers’ goals influence the formulation of strategic decisions but also facilitates
the spread of such a decision throughout the organization (Hofer & Schendel, 1978).
Specifically, Carney (2005) suggests —personalization, particularism, and
parsimony, characterize the unique governance structure of family firms. The unification
of ownership and control concentrates and incorporates organizational authority in the
family. The concentrated family ownership provides the controlling family owners with
the power and discretion to make decisions in idiosyncratic ways. Indeed, it is this
personalization of authority in the family firm that allows the family to project its own
vision onto the business (Chua et al., 1999). Particularism indicates that family firms
view the firm as “our business” (Carney, 2005; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Thus, the extent
to which family-centered goals can be transmitted into firm decision-making is dependent
upon the power and legitimacy of the dominant coalition (Carney, 2005). Since family
firms make decisions with the family’s personal wealth, family firms have the tendency
toward careful resource conservation and allocation (Carney, 2005). Indeed, family firms
are argued to “possess a strong incentive to assure capital is deployed sparingly and used
intensively and that indirect production costs are tightly managed” (Carney, 2005: 254).
Parsimony is expected to determine the formulation of strategic choices in family firms
(Carney, 2005). However, this would not suggest that having a personalized,
particularized governance structure and making parsimonious use of resources
automatically ensure certain strategic decisions. Decisions in family firms are made when
the governance aligns with goals mentioned above.
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Further, family firms may differ from one another in their governance structures,
which may be reflected in the amount of family ownership, the level of family
representation in the TMT and/or the board in the firm, the generation of family members
owning and controlling the family firm. These different governance structures are likely
to give these various family firms different levels of power and discretion to make
decisions that are consistent with the goals of family owners. For example, the increased
control through ownership can heighten both the legitimacy and importance of the
family’s pursuit of noneconomic goals (Carney, 2005; Zellweger et al., 2010).
Resources
Goals and governance also require resources if strategic intentions are to be
successfully realized through the firm’s actions (Hofer et al., 1978). Resources are the
essential building block of a firm because a firm achieving above-normal returns will be a
function of the strategy used to leverage those resources to pursue environmental
opportunities (cf. Barney, 1996; Hofer et al., 1978; Chrisman, Chua, & Zahra, 2003).
Family business literature suggests that the family’s aspirations and values would be
reflected in the resources managed and the opportunities pursued (Chrisman, Chua, &
Zahra, 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Family involvement may bring in distinctive
resources unique to family firms (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Habbershon &
Williams, 1999; Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; Sirmon et al., 2003). Such
distinctive and synergistic bundles of resources created by the interaction of family and
business was coined as “familiness” (Habbershon et al., 1999), which reflects the vision
and intention constituting the essence of a family business (Chua et al., 1999;
Habbershon et al., 2003; Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). Familiness is argued to
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positively influence the use of resource enrichment processes that are intended to
elaborate and recombine the firm’s capabilities and resource stabilization processes
which are activities designed to maintain the firm’s current strategy (Carnes & Ireland,
2013). Family governance is also argued to have an advantage over nonfamily firm
governance in the process of creating, accumulating, and managing resources (Sirmon et
al., 2003). For example, prior research suggests that family firms are more efficient in
transferring and orchestrating resources than nonfamily firms (Duran, Kammerlander,
Van Essen, & Zellweger, 2016; Li, 2017). Specifically, Duran and colleagues (2016)
argue that tacit knowledge among employees in family firms can facilitate the transfer of
valuable knowledge and ideas across departments and thereby support resource
orchestration within the firm.
Further, resource stocks may differ among different types of family firms. For
example, family firms under the leadership of a family CEO are likely to have different
bundles of resources from those under the leadership of a nonfamily CEO (Duran et al.,
2016; Li, 2017). In comparison to nonfamily CEOs, family CEOs are expected to possess
valuable individual-level human capital, particularly knowledge about the internal affairs
of their firm because they have often started getting involved in the business as early as
their childhood (Cabrera-Suarez, De Saa-Perez, & Garcia-Almeida, 2001). As such,
family CEOs are argued to be more efficient in orchestrating and transferring resources
due to their tacit knowledge and idiosyncratic managerial capabilities (Li, 2017).
Modes of Entry in Family and Nonfamily Diversifying Firms
The fact that family firms have distinctive goals, in combination with the unique
governance structure and idiosyncratic resources (Chrisman, Chua, et al., 2012; Chrisman
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et al., 2013), suggests that the strength of the preference for internal to external entry may
vary between family and nonfamily firms. Specifically, I propose that family-specific
goals, governance, and idiosyncratic resources should impose an additional incentive that
will strengthen the tendency to choose internal entry (vs. external entry) in family firms.
Several reasons can support this line of argument.
First, prior literature suggests that an entry through internal diversification is
likely to be more compatible with the parent firm in terms of culture, systems, and
procedures than an entry through external diversification (Dierickx & Cool, 1989;
Sharma, 1998). Since family firms are argued to have highly idiosyncratic assortment of
resources (Chua et al., 2012; Habbershon et al., 1999; 2003; Sirmon et al., 2003), I argue
that family firms will be particularly motivated to use internal diversification because
their distinctive resources would make the compatibility with the parent firm extra
difficult should diversification be conducted via the external mode. Indeed, the existence
of highly specific human assets and knowledge that are developed over a long period of
time (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Sirmon et al., 2003) motivates family firms to use
internal activities for governing their production and operations (Memili, Chrisman, &
Chua, 2011). Moreover, as discussed earlier, high level of transferability of the existing
resources also enables a firm to develop the required target segment resources internally
(Speckbacher et al., 2015). Family business scholars suggest that high level of tacit
knowledge among employees in family firms facilitates the transfer of ideas and
resources across departments in the firm (Bammens, Notelaers, & Van Gils, 2015;
Sirmon et al., 2003) and thereby supports more efficient resource orchestration within the
family firm (Duran et al., 2016; Li, 2017). The high transferability of resources in family
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firms also supports the argument that family firms will be more likely to rely on internal
rather than external diversification in comparison to nonfamily firms.
Second, acquisitions often involve stock swaps, which can dilute the family
ownership of the firm. On the other hand, internal development can provide a firm with
continued control (Teng, 2007). Unlike nonfamily firms, family firms are often driven by
the goal of maintaining family control of the firm (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et
al., 2007). This suggests that family firms would prefer internal to external diversification
relative to nonfamily firms. Moreover, acquisition research has highlighted great
uncertainty associated with the post-acquisition process (Homburg & Bucerius, 2006).
Acquisitions involve organizational restructuring and changes in both the acquired and
acquiring firms (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Buono & Bowditch, 2003; Kim et al.,
2011). Indeed, achieving the necessary level of organizational integration is a
fundamental challenge after an acquisition (Datta, 1991; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Such
challenges may arise from the retention of employees in the acquired firm (Cannella &
Hambrick, 1993), knowledge transfer between the acquiring and acquired companies
(Ranft, 1997), and the potential incompatibility of organizational routines between the
acquired and acquiring firms (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001). The poor performance of the
acquiring and acquired firms after the acquisition is associated with the challenges of the
post-acquisition integration (Ahuja et al., 2017). Based on the family business literature
suggesting family firms are likely to avoid the reconfiguration of organizational
structures (König, Kammerlander, & Enders, 2013) and exhibit a high level of similarity
and persistency in strategy implementation (Fang, 2016), I expect that family firms may
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show greater reluctance to use external acquisition to enter a new market due to the
possibility of reconfiguring organizational structures after an acquisition.
Third, relative to acquisition, internal development provides stronger safeguards
to protect the value of the existing resources and capabilities and thus prevent undesired
resource leakage to external parties (Chi, 1994; Gulati & Singh, 1998). Empirical studies
on the sources of R&D projects have shown that fear of capability leakage leads to a
greater use of internal entry as a source of new skills development (Pisano, 1990). Family
business literature suggests that family firms often have strong emotional ties to the
existing resources within their firms and are likely to maintain intense, personal
relationships within their organizations and with other actors in the environment (Berrone
et al., 2012; Chrisman, Chua, & Kellermanns, 2009). I argue that these rich “community”
and “connections” resources (Miller et al., 2005) will serve as extra incentives for family
firms to choose internal entry, which can help to achieve the goal of safeguarding the
value of the existing resources and keeping control of the assets of the firm, and thus
avoid leakage to external parties that might otherwise be caused via acquisitions. This
would suggest that family firms are likely to have stronger incentives to use internal
rather than external diversification in comparison to nonfamily firms. Conversely,
acquisition raises appropriation concerns that may be associated with the difficulties in
screening and transferring capabilities into the firm (Williamson, 1975), as well as the
possibility of purchasing a “lemon” (Akerlof, 1970) due to asymmetric information about
the quality of the target assets (Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993). Because family firms are
characterized as parsimonious in utilizing resources, I argue that family firms have a
stronger preference for internal to external diversification relative to nonfamily firms.
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Fourth, the notion of “local search” drawn from the behavioral theory of the firm
(Cyert et al., 1963) also offers important insights on why firms might prefer internal to
external diversification and this tendency is likely to be stronger in family than nonfamily
firms. According to the behavioral theory of the firm, organizational decision makers
conduct a local search by “searching in the neighborhood of the problem symptom and
current alternatives” (Cyert et al., 1963: 121) for relevant and new capabilities when they
face a problem. In other words, firms have the tendency to engage in local searches and
the exploitation of what is already known (Martin & Mitchell, 1998). Local search
suggests that firms would focus on exploiting old routines rather than on developing new
ones (Levinthal, 1997; Levinthal & March, 1993; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) and it
would also allow firms to avoid large upfront development costs (Basu, Sahaym,
Howard, & Boeker, 2015; Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Winter, Cattani, & Dorsch, 2007).
Following this “local search” logic, I would expect that firms are more likely to
use internally generated developments than external acquisitions (Rosenkopf et al., 2001)
and this “local search” tendency by choosing internal entry is more likely to be
manifested in family firms because of family firms’ “inward orientation” (Kelly,
Athanassiou, & Crittenden, 2000: 36) and their parsimonious use of resources. Family
firms are argued to be inwardly oriented and the focus of the decision makers is more
oriented toward internal issues such as efficiency than to the external conditions of the
market (Kelly et al., 2000). Indeed, prior family business research suggests that family
firms tend to engage in local search by searching in the neighborhood of existing
knowledge (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; Winter et al., 2007). The local search tendency,
especially by investing in exploitative R&D, can strengthen the firm’s core businesses
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and thus augment the reputation and identity of the firm due to the firm’s historic
linkages with those business activities (Patel et al., 2014). These arguments also suggest
that family firms are likely to have a stronger preference for internal to external
diversification relative to nonfamily firms.
Fifth, while insights drawn from the corporate entrepreneurship literature suggest
that internal development also entails great development and operating costs (Teng,
2007), operating costs associated with internal development are likely to be lower than
those of external acquisitions (Lee et al., 2010), especially when the resource
requirements of the target industry are highly related to those of the existing industry.
The leveraging of these existing resource bases via internal development can help
overcome barriers to entry and reduce operating costs in comparison to external
acquisitions (Chang & Singh, 1999; Chatterjee, 1990; Lee et al., 2010). In contrast,
acquisitions involve a large amount of lump-sum expense as well as non-trivial
integration costs (Sharma, 1998). Family business research suggests that family firms are
parsimonious in utilizing resources and tend to minimize operating costs (Carney, 2005;
Chrisman, Chua, & Steier, 2005; De Massis, Kotlar, Frattini, Chrisman, & Nordqvist,
2016). Thus, I argue that the relative cost advantage associated with an internal entry will
be more appealing to family firms than nonfamily firms and family firms would be more
likely to choose internal versus external diversification than nonfamily firms. Thus,
Hypothesis 1: Family firms will rely more on internal than external diversification
in comparison to nonfamily firms.
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Heterogeneity within Family Firms
Although I expect the strength of preference of internal to external diversification
to vary in family and nonfamily entrant firms (as per Hypothesis 1), I must account for
family business heterogeneity (Chrisman, Chua et al., 2012; Chrisman, Fang, Kotlar, &
De Massis, 2015; Chua et al., 2012; Melin & Nordqvist, 2007). Differences in goals and
resource configurations can arise from family involvement in governance through their
ownership, management, and board participation (Chua et al., 2012). Specifically, these
differences may be manifested in the level of family ownership (Fang, 2016; Zellweger et
al., 2012), the identity of the CEO of the firm (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & LarrazaKintana, 2010; Duran et al., 2016; Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2016; Li, 2017), the
representation of family members in the top management team and/or the board of
directors (e.g., Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013), as well as the generation of the
family owning and managing the family business (Fang et al., 2018; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2007). Heterogeneity in governance is likely to drive heterogeneity in goals and
resources. For example, family firms with a large percentage of family ownership
heighten both the legitimacy and importance of the family’s pursuit of noneconomic
goals. A family CEO is more likely to pursue family-centered noneconomic goals such as
maintaining ownership control within the hands of the family because the family CEO
typically has his or her personal wealth concentrated in the firm (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz,
2004; Duran et al., 2016). Likewise, personal attachment and self-identification with the
firm are likely to be stronger in the founding-family-controlled firms than family firms
controlled by other generation family members (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Further,
different types and amounts of resource stocks may exist in various types of family firms.
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For example, resource flows in family firms that place greater weight on noneconomic
goals might be different in type or amount from family firms that place greater weight on
wealth creation (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Dierickx & Cool, 1989).
The Effect of Family Ownership on the Mode of Entry
I argue that family firms where the controlling family holds a large percentage of
shares would be more likely to prefer internal to external entry than other family firms.
The family’s control of the firm through ownership is critical, because it provides the
controlling family owners with the power and legitimacy to make decisions in
idiosyncratic ways and pursue its interests through the firm (Carney, 2005; Chrisman,
Fang, et al., 2015; De Massis, Kotlar, Chua, & Chrisman, 2014). Such decisions mainly
reflect the values and aspirations of the owners. In other words, when family members
are the large shareholders, they are likely to have the discretion and disposition to
allocate, direct, and dispose of a firm’s resources and shape the firm’s strategy
(Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, Frattini, & Wright, 2015). As such, a higher percentage of
family ownership is likely to be associated with higher discretion and power to act in
ways that tend to the needs of the family (Carney, 2005; Fang, Randolph, Memili, &
Chrisman, 2016). Consistent with the arguments used in the development of Hypothesis 1
(H1), I expect that family firms with a large percentage of family ownership are more
likely to prefer internal to external diversification than other family firms.
For example, the larger percentage of shares the dominant family owns, the more
the cost of particular behavior will be borne by the family (Zellweger et al., 2012).
Further, according to the corporate entrepreneurship literature, while internal
development also incurs great development costs, the costs associated with internal
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development would be lower in most cases because of the accumulative nature of internal
development. Relative to acquired businesses, internally developed businesses would be
more likely to leverage the resources of the parent firm to the entered industry (Sharma,
1998). As such, I argue that family firms with a large percentage of family ownership are
more likely to be cognizant of the relative cost and resource leveraging advantages
associated with internal development. Thus, as the percentage of family ownership
increases, I expect that the tendency to use internal rather than external diversification
should become stronger. Thus,
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of shares held by the family is positively related to
the extent of using internal rather than external diversification.
The Effect of a Family CEO
Firm leaders usually have substantial say in decisions related to the allocation of
firm resources and the monitoring and direct usage of those resources (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984). The CEO, in particular, is argued to most important in shaping the firm’s
strategy and resource-allocation process (Jung, Chow, & Wu, 2003). Family firms with a
family CEO are likely to exhibit goals and resource idiosyncrasies that are different from
those without a family CEO (e.g., Duran et al., 2016). For example, family CEOs are
likely to have more tacit knowledge about the family firm (Duran et al., 2016). Prior
research has shown that the family identity of the CEO can influence a firm’s strategies
such as corporate divestitures (Feldman et al., 2016), innovation inputs and outputs
(Duran et al., 2016; Li, 2017), environmental practices (Berrone et al., 2010), and
strategic conformity (Miller et al., 2013). I propose that family firms where a family CEO
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is at the helm of the company would prefer internal to external diversification to a larger
extent than other family firms.
A family CEO is likely to give the family firm power and discretion to make
decisions that favor the pursuit of the goals of the family (Berrone et al., 2010; Duran et
al., 2016), specifically, retaining family control of the firm and maintaining the family’s
identity. Moreover, since acquisitions often involve stock swaps that can dilute family
ownership, I argue that family firms led by a family CEO, who is likely to have a
stronger desire to maintain close control of the operations, will select the internal entry
mode. On the other hand, while a nonfamily CEO may be influenced by the presence of
family executives, there may be an incongruity between the goals of the nonfamily CEO
and the family (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). Moreover, due to
bounded rationality, nonfamily CEOs are unlikely to fully understand the importance of
pursuing noneconomic goals for the family even if they had previous family firm
experience (Chrisman et al., 2014; Minichilli et al., 2014; Stewart & Hitt, 2012). As a
result, the investment preferences of CEOs who are not family members are likely to
deviate from the investment preferences of the dominant family coalition (Singla,
Veliyath, & George, 2014), because they do not possess substantial ownership rights and
do not have the same non-financial goals as family firm owners do.
Furthermore, unlike family CEOs who are endowed with superior knowledge,
particularly tacit knowledge about their firm’s processes and systems (Duran et al.,
2016), nonfamily CEOs are less likely to have deep knowledge about the family firm.
This may suggest the transferability of knowledge and resources will be higher in family
firms under the leadership of family CEOs because family CEOs possess valuable human
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capital and knowledge about the internal affairs of their firm (Duran et al., 2016; Li,
2017), thus facilitating diversification through internal entry mode. Indeed, compared to
nonfamily outside professionals, family CEOs are argued to undertake fewer shortsighted acquisitions and engage in more long-term R&D and capital expenditures
projects and develop more distinctive capabilities (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006;
Minichilli, Corbetta, & MacMillan, 2010). Thus,
Hypothesis 3: Family firms with a family CEO will rely more on internal than
external diversification in comparison to family firms without a family CEO.
The Effect of Family Representation in the TMT
Family influence on a firm’s behavior is also through the representation of family
members in the TMT. I argue that family firms where there is a large representation of
family members in the TMT are more likely to prefer internal to external diversification
in comparison to other family firms. A large representation of family members in the
TMT gives the family firm power and discretion to make idiosyncratic decisions. The
concept of “dominant logic” of the top managers (Grant, 1988; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986)
will provide some insights to support the argument that the percentage of family
executives is positively associated with the extent of internal to external diversification.
Dominant logic is a cognitive concept that is defined as a “mindset or a worldview or a
conceptualization of the business” among the dominant coalition (Prahalad et al., 1986:
491). Dominant logic is typically reflected in the administrative tools to accomplish goals
and make decisions (Grant, 1988; Prahalad et al., 1986), and it is often rooted in the
problems the top managers have encountered and the skills they have acquired over time
while managing the firm’s businesses. I argue that a large representation of family
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executives in a family firm suggests that the “dominant logic” of family executives is
more likely to be salient and these family managers are more likely to have a shared view
on the business at the strategic level. Indeed, “top management teams (of family firms)
become more homogeneous as family influence increases and such homogeneity is
associated with…local search” (Konig et al., 2013: 426). This would suggest that family
firms with a large representation of family executives are likely to have a stronger
preference for internal to external diversification in comparison to other family firms.
Moreover, family executives are likely to have more experience and deep
knowledge related to product and market (Chua et al., 2012; Sirmon et al., 2003), which
will allow them to deploy valuable, firm-specific tacit knowledge in an efficient manner
and result in efficient “resource orchestration” (Duran et al., 2016: 1225). Put differently,
the particularistic and long-term socialization process of these top family executives
within the firm also facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge and social capital in family
firms (Bammens et al., 2015; Verbeke & Kano, 2012). The greater compatibility of the
skills required for the critical tasks in the new segment and the existing firm via internal
development permits greater sharing of management expertise between the parent and the
entrant (Harrison, Hall, & Nargundkar, 1993; Sharma & Kesner, 1996). The high level of
transferability of resources (Speckbacher et al., 2015) and greater compatibility would
provide extra incentives for choosing internal entry in family firms with a large
representation of family executives in the TMT. Thus,
Hypothesis 4: The percentage of family members in the top management team is
positively related to the extent of using internal rather than external
diversification.
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The Effect of a Family Board Chair
I argue that family firms with a family board chair are more likely to prefer
internal to external diversification than other family firms. Although the chair of the
board is not directly involved in a firm’s strategic decision-making, prior studies show
that the board chair plays an important role in influencing firm strategies and outcomes
(Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). This is especially true in family firms where
a family can exert influence on a firm’s strategic decision-making by assuming the board
chair position of the firm (Berrone et al., 2012). From a governance perspective, a family
board chair is likely to grant the controlling family power and discretion to make
decisions that favor their pursuit of family-centered noneconomic goals. This would
suggest the interests of a family board chair are likely to be in line with those of the
dominant family coalition. Thus, the reasons for a stronger preference for internal to
external diversification argued above, including safeguarding benefits associated with
internal diversification, as well as the importance attached to goals related to maintaining
family control of the firm and the family’s identity via internal entry can help justify the
argument that family firms with a family board chair are likely to have a stronger
preference for internal to external diversification in comparison to other family firms.
Thus,
Hypothesis 5: Family firms with a family board chair will rely more on internal
than external diversification in comparison to family firms without a family board
chair.
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The Effect of Family Representation on the Board
I argue that family firms with a large representation of family members on the
board of directors would prefer internal to external diversification to a larger extent than
other family firms. As discussed above, a greater proportion of family members on the
board increases their power to pursue strategies consistent with the goal of family owners
who the family board members represent. Indeed, prior research shows that a high family
representation on the board will increase disproportionally the attention on family needs
(Minichilli et al., 2014). Therefore, in comparison to other family firms, family firms
with a large representation of family directors are more likely to have the power and
discretion to pursue internal diversification, which is consistent with the goal of retaining
family control of the firm and maintaining family’s identity discussed above. Thus,
Hypothesis 6: The percentage of family members on the board is positively
related to the extent of using internal rather than external diversification.
The Effect of Founding Generation Family Owners
The importance of generation in affecting a family firm behaviors and strategies
has received growing recognition (Chirico & Salvato, 2016; Fang et al., 2018). The
interests of succeeding family generations may be different from those of the founding
generation (Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997; Miller & Le Breton-Miller,
2006). The founding generation is typically believed to be interested in maintaining
control over the firm and be more averse to decentralization of power (Gomez-Mejia et
al., 2007). The founding generation family owners tend to share the common goal of
keeping the family together in the business and perceive the business as an extension of
the family (Berrone et al., 2012). Later generations of family owners are believed to be
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less attached to the family firm and less concern about the pursuit of noneconomic goals
for the family (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Le BretonMiller & Miller, 2013). Therefore, consistent with my previous arguments regarding the
relationship between family firms’ goals, governance, and resources and diversification
preference, I expect family firms under the leadership of the founding generation would
exhibit a stronger preference for internal diversification to external diversification relative
to other family firms.
Prior research suggests that the family’s social capital that resides in the business
in terms of shared language and network ties is higher when the family firm is at the
founding-family-controlled and managed stage (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Sirmon et al.,
2003). Social capital is expected to have a positive influence on a family’s commitment
and attachment to the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Thus, founding generation family
firms would be more reluctant to relinquish control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Since
external acquisitions may involve stock swaps and thus dilute family control of the firm, I
expect that in comparison to other family firms, founding-family-controlled and managed
firms would be more reluctant to use acquisitions for diversification due to their high
level of attachment to the firm and the possibility of relinquishing control of the firm
associated with external entry.
Since the founding generation often acts with future generations in mind and
engage in future-oriented investments to assure the firm’s continued viability for future
generations (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010), they have greater motivation to explore
alternative uses of knowledge-based resources and are likely to be more entrepreneurial
(Fang et al., 2018). Internal development is often associated with entrepreneurial activity
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and innovation (Burgelman, 1983; Srivastava et al., 2005). I expect that family firms
under the leadership of the founding generation will be more likely to prefer internal to
external diversification relative to other family firms. Founding generation family owners
are also likely to attach more importance to long-term family goals and willing to make
risky long-term R&D investments (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). In addition, founding
generation family owners are argued to possess implicit and tacit knowledge because they
have typically known the business since its inception (Duran et al., 2016). Such
knowledge is crucial for innovation and internal development. For example, founder
CEOs who possess the unique tacit knowledge and human capital are the “focal points”
of their organization (Gimmon & Levie, 2010; Kaplan, Sensoy, & Stromberg, 2009).
Given that internal ability is important for a firm to develop new technologies internally
(Teng, 2007), I argue that founding generation family owners are likely to prefer internal
to external entry compared to other family firms. On the other hand, unlike founding
generation family owners, later generation family members would have more limited
knowledge about the family firm (Memili, Fang, & Welsh, 2015), which might impede
their choice of internal development. Research also suggests founding generations are
likely to have more patient capital (Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008; Sirmon et al.,
2003). Such patient capital can facilitate founding generation family owners with internal
diversification, which takes a relatively long period of time (Lee et al. 2010).
In sum, founding generation family members’ entrepreneurial tendency and
internal ability to coordinate and integrate knowledge from different tasks and routines
will form as extra incentives for founding generations to use internal rather than external
diversification in comparison to other family firms. Thus,
36

Hypothesis 7: Family firms run by founding generation family members will rely
more on internal than external diversification in comparison to other family firms.
In sum, these relationships are depicted in the theoretical model in Figure 1.
Methodology
Sample and Data Collection
To test these hypotheses, I drew my sample from several sources including
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) Compustat, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),
Mergent Online, company proxy statements (DEF 14A), company annual reports (10-K),
and company Web sites. My sample consists of 573 manufacturing firms drawn from the
S&P 1500 index for the fiscal years 1998 to 2017. Due to the differences in reporting
information about operating segments of a firm pre- and post-1998 (Kumar, 2009;
Jiraporn, Kim, & Davidson, 2008), I chose 1998 as the cutting-off year.
I have manually collected data on firm characteristics including ownership
structure of the firm, family management, and governance from firms’ proxy statements
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)4. Where the proxies contained
insufficient information on the familial relationships between owners, executives, and
board members, I visited Mergent Online and company Web site for more information.
Special attention was given to situations where personal name changes were brought
about by marriage and the possibility that some families controlled their firms via their
ownership of other organizations. Consistent with prior literature (Chrisman & Patel,
2012; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007; Villalonga et al., 2006), I

4

SEC is accessed via https://www.sec.gov/. This data collection process involved several hundred hours of
work over a period of six months.
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consider the focal family as the one with the largest voting power in the firm. Data on
diversification and accounting information was drawn from Compustat, and market
performance data was obtained from the CRSP. To offset the limitation that R&D data is
largely missing in Compustat5, I also manually collected R&D information from firms’
annual reports for my sampled firms from 1998 to 2017.
To keep the industry background consistent, I focus on manufacturing firms of
S&P 1500 with 4-digit SIC codes ranging from 2000 to 3999. I exclude utility and
service firms, because these firms are subject to specific government regulations
compared to other firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Chrisman & Patel, 2012). Such
exclusion ensures greater homogeneity in my sample. To ensure the direction of
causality, one-year lags between the dependent and other variables are used. Specifically,
the independent and control variables are measured from 1998 to 2016, whereas the
dependent variable is measured from 1999 to 2017. Due to the longitudinal nature of
data, this essay uses fixed-effect longitudinal regression models to test all hypotheses6.
In total, initial data collection generates 578 firms representing 11,560 firm-year
observations from 1998 to 2017 for further cleaning and analysis. Within this sample, I
carried out an initial cleaning of the data. Following a practice commonly used in the
current literature (Miller et al., 2007), I replace missing values associated with research
and development expenditures with zero. Likewise, I replace missing values associated
with acquisition expenditures with zero. The final sample yielded an unbalanced panel
dataset consisting of 573 firms representing 9,491 firm-year observations used to analyze

5
6

Approx. 55.9% of R&D values are missing in Compustat, compared to 21.4% in my sample.
Hausman test also confirmed the superiority of fixed effects model over random effects (p<0.001).
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the difference between family and nonfamily firms (H1), and 136 family firms
representing 1,811 firm-year observations used to analyze the heterogeneity hypotheses
(H2 - H7). The actual sample size varies for each model due to the difference in the
inclusion of variables and missing data associated with the variables.
Measures
Dependent Variable
In this study, I am interested in examining the relative emphasis on these two
modes of diversification (i.e., internal and external diversification) in family and
nonfamily firms, as well as in various types of family firms. Past studies have generally
utilized a dichotomous measure of internal and external diversification (e.g., Lee et al.,
2010)7. This measure has limitations because of its “all or nothing” bias, that is, this
measure arbitrarily assigns all diversification moves of a firm to either acquisition or
internal development. In this study, I use a continuous measure of the mode of entry that
captures the degree of emphasis on internal or external expansion across a series of
diversification moves (Chatterjee et al., 1999). Specifically, I measure internal
diversification using the ratio of a firm’s R&D expenditures to sales in year t adjusted by
subtracting median industry-level R&D expenditures to sales in the same year (Chrisman
& Patel, 2012). Likewise, I measure external diversification using the ratio of a firm’s
acquisition expenditures to sales in year t adjusted by subtracting median industry-level
acquisition expenditures to sales in the same year. Thus, the relative emphasis on internal

7

I have also used dichotomous approach to measure internal and external diversification. Given the
dichotomous measure (0 or 1), I have used the difference between internal and external to capture the
relative emphasis on these two modes of diversification. I then use xtlogit STATA command to run the
logistic regression. Similar results were obtained.
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over external diversification is calculated by taking the difference between these two
ratios8, specifically,
Difference between internal and external diversification =
𝑅&𝐷 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 (
) − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 (
)
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠

Ideally, I would have liked to construct measures that directly captured the extent
of internal diversification. One alternative was to measure internal diversification using
the amount of increase in sales due to internal product development. But such detailed
data were not available. From a theoretical standpoint, the fact that the measures may be
capturing the investment in R&D and acquisitions is consistent with my arguments. Apart
from this issue, my choice of the above two measures was also motivated by other
important theoretical considerations. In this study, my purpose is to understand
differences in the strength of preference for internal diversification (versus external
diversification) between family and nonfamily firms, as well as among different types of
family firms. Addressing this question calls for measures that reflect the level of internal
development from investment in R&D versus external investment in terms of
acquisitions.
Independent Variables
Family firms. Consistent with prior literature (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman
& Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Gomez-Mejia, Patel, &
Zellweger, 2015; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), I use a binary measure of family firms. The
binary family firm measure distinguishes family firms (=1) from nonfamily firms (=0) on

8

I also took the ratio of these two industry-adjusted values as an alternative measure for the relative
emphasis on internal over external diversification.
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the basis of ownership and family involvement in management and board of directors. I
classify firms as family firms when the following two conditions are met: 1) at least 5%
of shares held by the controlling family; 2) at least two family members who are or have
been employed as significant owners, top managers, or directors in the firm’s history9.
The advantage of this operationalization is that it signals intra-family succession
intention, which is considered the essence in the definition of a family firm (Chua et al.,
1999).
This operationalization of the definition of family firms also allows me to separate
“real” family firms from lone founder firms. Lone founder firms are those in which an
individual is one of the company’s founders with no other family members involved, and
is also a large owner (5% or more of the firm’s equity) or an insider (director or executive
officer). Firms where the founder is present alongside other family members are
categorized as family firms. Thus, a lone founder firm, by my definition, cannot be a
family firm, nor vice versa. This distinction is important because these two groups of
firms might display differences in their strategies and outcomes (Miller et al., 2007).
Following these operationalizations, firms such as PDF Solutions Inc. that are considered
first generation family firms by other scholars (Villalonga et al., 2006) are not
categorized as family firms in my sample since there is no family involvement in the
firm. Rather I count them as lone founder businesses. Firms such as NIKE Inc. and

9

Family member is a person who is related by blood or by marriage to the owning family. To further test if
my results hold at various ownership threshold levels, I also used a more conservative definition of family
control by using a measure of ownership where the family owns at least 10% or 20% of the equity and at
least two family members who are or have been involved in the top management team or the board or as
significant owners. Results obtained are largely consistent with those obtained when 5% ownership
threshold was used.
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Brown Forman Corp are considered family businesses as there are multiple members of
the Knight and Brown families, respectively, serving as major owners, directors, or
officers of the firm.
Family ownership. Although family ownership has been used to classify family
and nonfamily firms, it still significantly varies among family firms. Some family firms
may have large family ownership compared to others. Family ownership is measured as a
continuous variable based on the overall percentage of shares owned by the controlling
family (Anderson et al., 2003a; Fang et al., 2016). Since I am interested in the variation
of family ownership in the family business population only to test heterogeneity
hypotheses, any firm with less than 5% of family ownership is not included in the
analysis.
Family CEO. I define family CEO as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1
when the CEO of the family firm is a family member and 0 otherwise10.
Family board chair. I define family board chair as a dummy variable that takes a value of
1 when the chair of the board is a family member and 0 otherwise11.
Representation of family members in the TMT. This variable is measured using the
number of family executives divided by the total number of executives in the TMT12.

10

Since part of my theoretical arguments are made from a resource perspective, I also used the duration of
the CEO working in the firm as an alternative measure for the presence of a family CEO in the firm.
Similar results were obtained.
11
I also used the duration of the chair working in the firm as an alternative measure for the presence of a
family chair in the firm. Similar results were obtained.
12
As a robustness check, I also used count variable as an alternative measure to capture family
representation in the TMT. Similar results were obtained.
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Representation of family members on the board. This variable is measured based
on the number of family directors divided by the total number of directors on the board13.
Founding generation family members. This variable is defined as a dummy
variable and takes the value of 1 when there is a founding generation family member
involved in the ownership of the firm, the TMT and/or the board and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
I include a number of control variables in my analysis to account for alternative
explanations of the relationship between family firms and the strength of the preference
for internal to external diversification. My selection of these control variables follows
Chrisman and Patel (2012), Fang (2016), and Miller et al. (2007). I first control for
influence of firm age and firm size, because these variables can affect a firm’s choice of
entry mode (Beaumont et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2010). Firm age is calculated using the
number of years since the firm was founded. Firm size is measured using the natural
logarithm of total number of employees of the firm. I also control for debt to equity ratio
using the total debt divided by the market value of common equity (Dean & Sharfman,
1996; Miller et al., 2007). In addition, I control for past performance of the firm, because
performance may affect a firm’s strategic decisions (McNamara, Vaaler, & Devers,
2003). A firm’s past performance is measured as industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q in t-1 term,
which is calculated as firm Tobin’s Q minus median industry Tobin’s Q, at a 2 digit
SIC14. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the firm’s market value to book value (Chung & Pruitt,
13

As a robustness check, I also used count variable as an alternative measure to capture family
representation on the board. Similar results were obtained.
14
Industry-adjusted Return on Assets (ROA) in t-1 term is used for a robustness test of a firm’s
performance. ROA is measured as income before extraordinary items divided by total assets (Miller et al.,
2007).
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1994; Miller et al., 2007). Industry dummies measured at the two-digit SIC level and year
dummies were also used to control for differences in diversification behavior across
industries and years, respectively.
Moreover, consistent with prior literature (Miller et al., 2007), I control for
advertising to sales ratio and new investment in plant and equipment. Advertising is
calculated using advertising expense divided by total sales of the firm. Investment is
calculated as capital expenditures divided by plant property and equipment. In addition,
internationalization is argued and found to be associated with a firm’s product
diversification (Mayer, Stadler, & Hautz, 2014; Wiersema et al., 2008). Hence, I also
control for internationalization, which is measured using the amount of sales generated
from foreign markets divided by the total sales of the firm (Tallman & Li, 1996). Lastly,
firms are often path dependent and “a firm’s current position is often shaped by the path
it has traveled” (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997: 522). I thus also control for a firm’s
extent of internal versus external diversification in t-1. Specifically, I took the difference
between the two industry-adjusted ratios (i.e., R&D cost /sales and acquisition cost/sales)
in t-115.
I have argued there will be differences in the strength of the preference for
internal to external diversification between family and nonfamily firms as well as among
different types of family firms. It was important to ensure that my findings were not
caused by other types of concentrated ownership. Therefore, I also include non-family
blockholder ownership as another control variable. Non-family blockholder ownership is

15

I also took the ratio of these two industry-adjusted values in year t-1 as an alternative measure. I have
also used industry-adjusted ID and industry-adjusted ED as two separate controls. Similar results were
obtained.
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measured based on the total percentage of shares hold by all nonfamily block holders
which are individuals or institutions listed in the firm proxy statements as beneficial
owners of at least 5% of the firm. I also control for family CEO duality (when both the
CEO and the chair positions are assumed by a family member who may or may not be the
same person). This dual position might particularly enable the dominant family to pursue
strategies that attend to the needs of the dominant family (Duran et al., 2016) and
strenghten the family influence on a firm’s diversification behavior. Family CEO duality
is measured as a binary variable and takes the value of 1 when both the CEO and the
board chair positions are assumed by a member from the dominant family. Finally, the
inverse Mills ratio calculated to control for endogeneity is added as an additional control
in all models16.
Controlling for Endogeneity
Self-selection bias may be present among firms reporting internal and external
diversification. I therefore employed the Heckman selection model, a two-stage
procedure that corrects for self-selection bias in regression analysis (Heckman, 1979;
Lee, Maddala, & Trost (1980). I adopted two instrumental variables that are highly
related to the independent variables but are not related to the dependent variable to
control for alternative explanations. I included family trust holdings affiliated with the
largest owners of the firm in a given year as an instrumental variable (Fang, 2016).
Family trust or foundations are often used by family firms as means to take care of the

16

Inverse Mills ratio, a probability density function that corrects for the estimation bias as a result of the
truncated observations, is included in the second-stage analysis as an instrumental variable to correct for
any selection bias.
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needs of their family members. Thus, family trust holdings are likely to be highly related
to family business variables but should not be related to the dependent variable (i.e., the
relative emphasis on internal over external diversification). Family trust holdings are
measured as a binary variable in which 1 denotes the situation where the owner holds
either trusts or foundations associated with family members and 0 otherwise. Data related
to family trust holdings was manually collected from firms’ proxy statements. I also
included family firms’ fraction of sales by industry as an instrumental variable (Amit,
Ding, Villalonga, & Zhang, 2015; Fang, 2016)17. This variable is naturally correlated
with the probability that a firm in the industry is a family firm, however, it should not be
correlated with the second-stage dependent variable. Family firms’ fraction of sales by
industry is measured using the amount of sales by family firms in a particular industry
divided by the total amount of sales in this industry.
STATA package (version 13.0) was used for data analysis. Using Heckman’s
two-stage procedure, I ran a probit analysis that regresses the family firm variable against
variables that predict family firms in the first stage of the procedure. These predictors
include nonfamily block holder ownership, firm age, firm size, debt to equity ratio, firm
performance, advertising to sales ratio, new investment in plant and equipment,
internationalization, family trust holdings, family firms’ fraction of sales by industry, and
firm prior diversification experience (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Fang, 2016; Miller et al.,

Initially, I included family firms’ fraction of capital expenditure by industry and family firms’ fraction of
advertisement expenditure by industry as other instrumental variables. After running analyses, these
variables were found not to significantly predict family firms, and thus were not included in my subsequent
analyses.
17
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2007). Based on the first-stage regression, I calculated the inverse Mills ratio and
included it in my second-stage models, which are used to test my hypotheses.
Analyses
I took a number of steps to address important methodological issues that are
common in panel data analysis. First, I employed a firm fixed effects model to attend to
the potential issue of unobserved heterogeneity that might arise out of multiple
observations per firm (Certo & Semadeni, 2006; Hsiao, 1985). The fixed effects model
focuses on within-firm variation over time, so the coefficients are not biased by timeinvariant firm heterogeneity (Greene, 2003). I conducted Hausman tests and the results
confirmed the superiority of fixed effects model over random effects (p<0.001)
(Hausman & Taylor, 1981). Accordingly, all analyses were estimated using the xtreg
STATA command with fixed-effects option (fe). Second, a Woolridge test (Woolridge,
2002) and a Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979) provide evidence of serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity in my panel dataset. To control for these problems, I
estimated robust standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimator clustered at
the firm level (White, 1980). Specifically, I used the vce(robust) STATA command to
obtain robust standard errors. Third, I also controlled for multicollinearity by examining
correlation matrix of coefficient of xtreg model using the estate vce, corr STATA
command18. I followed the threshold of 0.6 correlation recommended by Allison (1999).
The results obtained were well below 0.6 except for the correlation between family CEO

18

Variance inflation factor (VIF) is designed to check for multicollinearity for pooled OLS regression.
Since I used fixed effects models, I checked multicollinearity by examining correlation matrix of
coefficient (Allison, 1999).
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and family CEO duality and the correlation between family board chair and family CEO
duality. As such, family CEO duality was not included as a control in several models
related to testing H3 (family CEO) and H5 (family board chair). Finally, all variables
were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile in response to extreme outliers in the data
set19.
Empirical Results
Variables included in my analysis are listed and defined in Table 2, along with
their sources. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the variables are presented
in Table 320. In general, family firms represent 19.3% of my sample, while lone-founder
firms represent 7.9%. These numbers are comparable to other studies exploring
publically traded family firms and lone-founder firms (Fang, 2016; Miller et al., 2007).
Consistent with prior literature, family firms are found to be significantly and negatively
related to a firm’s R&D investment and acquisition activities (e.g., Chrisman & Patel,
2012; Miller et al., 2010).
As mentioned above, this study uses Heckman’s two-stage approach to partially
control for endogeneity. Model 1 in Table 4 is the first-stage probit treatment model in
which family business as a binary variable is regressed against instrumental variables and
other controls. Lone founder firms are not included as a control, because lone founder
firms are mutually exclusive from family firms. Overall, family trust holdings and family
firms’ fraction of sales by industry are positively and significantly related to the family

19

I have also run all of the analyses with the full sample. Similar results were obtained.
Comparison of the means, standard deviations, and ranges of all variables for family and nonfamily
firms, as well as among various types of family firms are also provided and shown in Table 24, 25, 26, and
27.
20
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business variable, suggesting that the selection of these instrumental variables is
reasonable. Model 2 of Table 4 tests H1, which predicted that family firms will rely more
on internal than external diversification in comparison to nonfamily firms. Results show
that debt to equity ratio (B=0.047, p<0.001) and a firm’s diversification experience in the
previous year (B=0.592, p<0.001) have a significantly positive effect on a firm’s
tendency to engage more in internal rather than external diversification. The effect of
family firms on a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than external diversification
is positive, however, this effect is not significant (B=0.106, p>0.1). Hence, H1 is not
supported.
Model 3-9 (Table 5, 6, and 7) test heterogeneity hypotheses (H2 - H7) concerning
the effects of the level of family ownership, family CEO, family representation in the
TMT, family board chair, family representation on the board, and founding generation
family members on a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than external
diversification. Model 3 (Table 5) tests the hypothesis that whether the percentage of
shares held by the family is positively related to the extent of using internal rather than
external diversification. The result shows that family ownership is positively related to a
firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than external diversification, however, the
coefficient is not significantly different from zero (B=0.0001, p>0.1). Thus, H2 is not
supported. Model 4 (Table 5) tests the effect of a family CEO on a family firm’s
tendency to engage in internal rather than external diversification. Family CEO is found
to be negatively related to a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than external
diversification, and this effect is not significant (B=−0.020, p>0.1). Thus, H3 is not
supported. Model 5 (Table 5) tests the percentage of family members in the top
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management team is positively related to the extent of using internal rather than external
diversification. Family representation in the TMT was also found to be negatively related
to a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than external diversification and this
effect is not significant (B=−0.029, p>0.1). Thus, H4 is not supported.
Model 6 (Table 6) tests H5 that predicts family firms with a family board chair
will rely more on internal than external diversification in comparison to family firms
without a family board chair. The result shows that the presence of a family board chair
has a non-significant positive effect on a firm’s tendency to use internal rather than
external diversification (B=0.027, p>0.1). Thus, H5 is not supported. Regarding the effect
of family directors, it is shown that family representation on the board is negatively
related to a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than external diversification and
this relationship is not significant (B=−0.112, p>0.1). H6 is not supported. This finding is
shown in Model 7 (Table 6). Lastly, Model 8 (Table 6) captures the effect of founding
generation family member on a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than external
diversification. The result shows that founding generation family is positively associated
with a firm’s tendency to use internal rather than external diversification, however, this
relationship is not significant (B=0.026, p>0.1). Thus, H7 is not supported. Model 9
(Table 7) shows the regression that tests all the heterogeneity hypotheses simultaneously.
The results are largely consistent with those obtained when these variables are analyzed
separately; no significant relationships emerge.
Robustness and Post-hoc Tests
A number of measures were employed to establish the robustness of my results.
First, in my analyses above, I have used the difference between internal and external
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diversification to capture a firm’s relative emphasis on internal over external
diversification. As a robustness check, I have also used the ratio of internal to external
diversification as an alternative measure to capture a firm’s relative emphasis on these
two modes of diversification. Results obtained are largely consistent with those obtained
when the difference measure was used. These results are reported in Models 10-18 (Table
8, 9, 10, and 11). Specifically, family firms were found to have a non-significant positive
effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in these two modes of diversification (B=0.760,
p>0.1) (Model 11 of Table 8). In addition, the results for testing the heterogeneity
hypotheses are as follows: family ownership (B=0.039, p>0.1) (Model 12 in Table 9),
family CEO (B=0.960, p>0.1) (Model 13 of Table 9), family representation in the TMT
(B=7.038, p>0.1) (Model 14 of Table 9), family board chair (B=3.719, p>0.1) (Model 15
of Table 10), family representation on the board (B=10.140, p>0.1) (Model 16 of Table
10), and founding generation family (B=−10.665, p<0.05) (Model 17 of Table 10). In
addition, when all heterogeneity variables are included in the regression, the results are
largely consistent with those obtained when these variables are examined separately
(Model 18 of Table 11). It is worth noting that founding generation family is found to
have a significantly negative effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than
external diversification when the dependent variable is measured using the ratio of
internal to external diversification. Further analyses show that this finding is not robust.
Specifically, the effect of founding generation is not significant when family firms are
defined using 5% family ownership and the DV is measured using the difference
approach (B=0.026, p>0.1) (Model 8 of Table 6), or 10% family ownership and the DV is
measured using the difference approach (B=0.046, p>0.1) (Model 26 of Table 14), or
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20% family ownership and the difference approach is used to define the DV (B=0.070,
p>0.1) (Model 35 of Table 18).
Second, in my analyses above, I have used the threshold of 5% family ownership
to define family firms. As a post-hoc analysis, I have also used 10% family ownership
threshold to define family firms. Results obtained are largely consistent with those
obtained when 5% family ownership threshold is used. These results are shown in Model
19-27 of Table 12-1521. It is worth noting that family CEO was found to have a
significantly negative effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than
external diversification (B=−0.026, p<0.1) when family firms are defined using 10%
family ownership threshold. However, a further robustness check shows this finding is
not robust. The effect of family CEO on a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather
than external diversification is not significant when family firms are measured using 5%
family ownership threshold (B=−0.020, p>0.1) (Model 4 of Table 5), or 20% family
ownership threshold (B=−0.007, p>0.1) (Model 31 of Table 17).
As a further robustness check, I have also used the threshold of 20% family
ownership to define family firms. Results obtained are largely consistent with those
obtained when a 5% or 10% family ownership is used. These results are reported in
Model 28-36 of Table 16-1922. Specifically, the effect of family business is not
significant (B=0.026, p>0.1) (Model 29 of Table 16). The results for testing the
heterogeneity hypotheses are as follows: family ownership (B=0.0004, p>0.1) (Model 30
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The analysis reported herein is based on that the DV is measured using the difference approach. Similar
results were obtained when the ratio approach is used. These results are available upon request.
22
The analysis reported herein is based on that the DV is measured using the difference approach. Similar
results were obtained when the ratio approach is used. These results are available upon request.

52

of Table 17), family CEO (B=−0.007, p>0.1) (Model 31 of Table 17), family
representation in the TMT (B=0.022, p>0.1) (Model 32 of Table 17), family board chair
(B=0.041, p>0.1) (Model 33 of Table 18), family representation on the board (B=−0.096,
p>0.1) (Model 34 of Table 18), and founding generation family (B=0.070, p>0.1) (Model
35 of Table 18). In addition, when all heterogeneity variables are included in the
regression, the results are largely consistent with those obtained when these variables are
examined separately (Model 36 of Table 19).
Third, in my data cleaning process above, I have replaced missing values
associated with R&D and acquisition expenditures with zero. As a further check on the
robustness of my results, I have dropped observations with R&D and acquisition
expenditures missing values. This process leads to a sample of 7,539 firm-year
observations and 493 firms for testing H1 and 1,317 firm-year observations and 108 firms
for testing heterogeneity hypotheses. Results obtained are largely consistent with those
obtained when the full sample was used. These results are shown in Model 37-45 in
Table 20-23.
Fourth, given that few significant results were obtained in my study, it is
important to calculate the power of my statistical tests to further strength confidence in
my results. As such, I did a post hoc power analyses to verify whether the non-significant
result is due to really no relation in the sample or due to lack of statistical power. I use
G*Power (3.1.9.4) program to calculate the power of my statistical tests 23. G*Power is a
power analysis program commonly used in the social, behavioral, and biomedical
sciences (Carbonell, Rodríguez‐Escudero, & Pujari, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, &

23

G*Power is a free power analysis program, which can be downloaded at http://www.gpower.hhu.de.
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Lang, 2009; Minichilli et al., 2010). Statistical power, 1−β, is computed as a function of
significance level α, sample size, and population effect size (Cohen, 1988). Based on
inputs related to α error probability, total sample size, effect size, and number of
predictors, a post hoc power is computed. An illustration of the power calculation using
G*Power is attached in Figure 2. The post-hoc power test revealed that statistical power
of each regression model was well above the commonly accepted threshold of 0.8
(Cohen, 1992). Specifically, the statistical power of the regression model testing the
effect of family firm on a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than external
diversification is close to 1. The power of the regression models testing the heterogeneity
family business variables range from 0.88 and 1. The powers of these models are
presented with the regression results in each of the attached tables. These results provide
greater confidence in my results.
Lastly, both internal and external diversification are considered risky behaviors
(Lee et al., 2010). Family business scholars have argued that family firms are more likely
than nonfamily firms to diversify risk when making multiple decisions (Berrone et al.,
2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). As such, I have also tested
whether there is any difference between family and nonfamily firms in diversifying risk
when they make multiple decisions. In the new model, I included external diversification
as the dependent variable, internal diversification as an independent variable, the
interaction between family firms and internal diversification as another independent
variable, as well as other control variables. The finding shows that a firm’s internal
diversification has a significantly positive effect on a firm’s external diversification
(B=0.143, p<0.05), confirming that a firm’s engaging in one risky behavior will affect
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their subsequent risky behavior (Bromiley, McShane, Nair, & Rustambekov, 2015).
However, the interaction effect between family firms and internal diversification is not
significant (B=0.034, p>0.1), suggesting there is no significant difference between family
and nonfamily firms in the influence of one risky decision on another24.
In addition, I have checked whether there is any performance implication of a
firm’s strong tendency to engage in one mode of diversification over the other, as well as
the interaction effect between family firms and this tendency on a firm’s performance. As
such, in the new model, I have included firm performance as the dependent variable, the
emphasis of internal over external diversification as an independent variable, the
interaction between family businesses and the relative emphasis on these two modes of
diversification as another independent variable, as well as other control variables. The
results show that the emphasis on internal over external diversification is negatively
associated with a firm’s performance although this effect is not significant (B=−0.039,
p>0.1). The interaction effect between family firms and the emphasis on internal over
external diversification is positively related to a firm’s performance, however, this effect
is not significant (B=0.065, p>0.1). This result suggests that there is no significant
difference between family and nonfamily firms in terms of the performance outcome of a
firm’s relative emphasis on internal over external diversification25.
Discussion and Conclusions
Diversification is one of the most studied topics in the strategic management
literature. Firms are concerned about what market to enter, at the same time, they are also

24
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These results are available upon request.
Results to these tests are available upon request.
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concerned about how to enter a market. Internal diversification and external acquisitions
are two alternatives firms can use to diversify. Prior research has shown that the choice of
entry mode depends on the characteristics of the firm (Beaumont et al., 2017;
Speckbacher et al., 2015), the characteristics of the entered industry (Lee et al., 2010;
Sharma, 1998), and the relation between the existing industry and the entered industry
(Busija et al., 1997). But how the unique goals, governance, resources embedded in a
firm may affect a firm’s choice of entry mode has not been addressed in terms of the
relative emphasis on one entry mode over the other.
Based on the literature that family firms differ from nonfamily firms in the goals,
resources and governance structure (Chrisman et al., 2013), I argue that the tendency to
choose internal (vs. external diversification) is likely to be stronger in family than
nonfamily firms (H1). Due to the heterogeneous nature of family firms that is likely to be
manifested in different configurations of family ownership, family involvement in the
TMT and/or the board, I further examine the strength of preference for internal (vs.
external diversification) in various types of family firms. Specifically, I propose the
stronger preference for internal to external diversification is likely to be shown in family
firms with a large percentage of family ownership (H2), the presence of a family CEO
(H3), a large representation of family executives (H4), the presence of a family board
chair (H5), and a large representation of family directors (H6), and the presence of
founding generation family members in the firm (H7).
An empirical assessment of 573 manufacturing firms drawn from the S&P 1500
index provides no support for the proposed theoretical model. While prior research has
shown family firms invest less in both internal (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012) and
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external diversification (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2018; Miller et al., 2007), I did not find
any significant difference between family and nonfamily firms in terms of their relative
emphasis on these two modes of diversification. There are a number of alternative
explanations for the non-significant relationships. First, from a resource perspective, I
have argued that family firms’ highly idiosyncratic assortment of resources may motivate
family firms to use internal activities for governing their operations and production
(Memili et al., 2011) and thus family firms are likely to show a stronger tendency
towards internal rather than external diversification. In addition, these idiosyncratic
resources would make the compatibility of an acquisition with the parent firm extra
difficult should diversification be conducted via the external mode. On the other hand,
prior research also suggests that like nonfamily firms, family firms often face the
difficulty of managing the process of coordinating resources associated with making
R&D investments due to their constrained managerial capacity and limited ability to
manage the R&D process (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). Indeed, research has shown that the
advantage associated with family firms’ high levels of tacit knowledge among employees
is likely to be manifested in innovation output (i.e., patent creation) rather than
innovation input (i.e., R&D investment) (Duran et al., 2016). According to Duran and
colleagues (2016), tacit knowledge among employees and idiosyncratic assortment of
resources in family firms can foster the transfer of valuable ideas across departments and
support the resource orchestration within the firm and thus result in higher innovation
output (Duran et al., 2016). However, such advantage associated with idiosyncratic
resources is unlikely to be observed during the innovation inputs or R&D investment
process (Duran et al., 2016). These literatures, to a certain extent, may explain why
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family firms have no particular preference for internal to external diversification in
comparison to nonfamily firms.
Second, from a goals perspective, I have argued that family firms may show
greater reluctance to use external acquisition to enter a new market because acquisitions
often involve stock swaps and thus dilute the family ownership control of the firm. The
finding that family firms have no particular preference for internal or external
diversification compared to nonfamily firms indicates that both internal and external
diversification may impose great risks on relinquishing a family firm’s ownership control
of the firm. Indeed, internal diversification often requires external capital and increases
the possibility of family firms to raise money from the stock market and thus increases
their debt level (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). This will ultimately lead to the diluting
of family ownership control of the firm. This suggests the goal of retaining family control
over the firm will render family firms’ internal diversification limited (Duran et al.,
2016).
Further, both external and internal diversification incur non-trivial costs. On one
hand, external diversification requires payments of a significant financial premium
(Lakshman, 2011). On the other hand, internal diversification faces high development
costs. The average level of firms’ investment in R&D can exceed 10% of their revenues
(European Commission, 2013). Both internal and external diversification are considered
risky decisions (Lee et al., 2010). While external diversification entails great risk
associated with the post-acquisition integration process, internal diversification also
entails great risk and embodies renewal activities as well as risk associated with corporate
entrepreneurship (Sharma et al., 1999). These literatures suggest both internal and
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external diversification entail risks and benefits. The finding that family firms have no
particular preference for internal diversification to external suggests that neither type of
risk and goal systems plays a more dominant role in affecting a family firm’s
diversification behavior. Indeed, family firm decision-making are influenced by a diverse
set of goals (Chua, Chrisman, De Massis, & Wang, 2018; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013).
How these different goals interact with one another and together affect family firms’
strategic decisions represents a promising area for future research.
Lastly, it is also worth discussing the two significant findings observed in the
robustness tests. First, founding generation family members was found to have a
significant negative effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in internal rather than external
diversification when the dependent variable is measured using the ratio of internal to
external diversification and when the family firms are measured using 5% family
ownership threshold. However, this significant effect was not observed in further
robustness tests, specifically, when the dependent variable is measured using the ratio
approach and when family firms are defined using 10% or 20% family ownership
threshold. In addition, the significant effect of founding generation family members was
not observed when family firms are defined using 5% or 10% or 20% family ownership
threshold and when the dependent variable is measured using the difference approach.
This significant effect was also not observed when the hypothesis was tested using a
sample with observations that R&D and acquisition costs are missing and deleted. Thus,
it is likely that the observed significant negative effect of founding generation may be due
to chance.
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The second significant finding shown in the robustness test is related to the effect
of family CEO. Family CEO was found to have a significantly negative effect on a firm’s
tendency to engage in internal rather than external diversification when family firms are
defined using 10% family ownership threshold and the DV is measured using the
difference approach. However, the significant effect of family CEO was not observed
when family firms are defined using 5% family ownership or 20% family ownership and
the DV is measured using the difference approach. However, the effect of family CEO is
not significant when the DV is measured using the ratio approach and family firms are
defined using either 5% or 10% or 20% family ownership threshold. The effect of family
CEO is not significant when I used a sample with observations that R&D and acquisition
costs are missing and deleted and defined family firms using 10% family threshold.
Likewise, when I use the number of years the CEO has worked in the firm as an
alternative measure for family CEO, the significant negative effect is not observed. While
the significant negative effect of family CEO is not observed in these further robustness
tests, the significant negative effect of family CEO observed when family firms are
defined using 10% family ownership shows that findings may be sensitive to the way in
which family businesses are defined. This finding confirms the argument that the varying
levels of family ownership and control can serve as an important contingency in firm’s
strategic decisions (Chrisman et al., 2005; Melin et al., 2007). Although 5% family
ownership was widely used as a cutting-off point in the study of family influence on a
firm’s behavior, such an arbitrary dichotomous definition of family firms is receiving a
growing criticism (Chrisman et al., 2012; Villalonga et al., 2006). Future research was
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recommended to run robustness checks for the results using different threshold family
ownership.
By introducing the importance of unique goals, governance structure,
idiosyncratic resources of the firm in understanding a diversifying firm’s entry mode, this
study has several theoretical implications. First, empirical studies show that family
ownership is negatively related to the level of diversification (Anderson et al., 2003a;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) found family firms
exhibit about 15% less corporate diversification than nonfamily firms. But how family
firms diversify (internal versus external diversification) once they decide to diversify has
not been addressed. Using the goals, governance, and resources framework, this study
provides an integrated understanding of the influence of the three elements in a family
firm’s decision-making related to the choice of entry mode and thus helps advance a
theory of the family firm (Chrisman et al., 2016). In so doing, this study contributes to
our knowledge of the antecedents of diversification and diversification mode in
particular.
Moreover, goals, governance, and resources are the essence to understand the
fundamental differences between family and nonfamily firms as well as among different
types of family firms (Chrisman et al., 2013). However, most of the current research
using this framework has used proxies to capture such influence. This study represents
one of the first few attempts to capture the different dimensions of the framework,
specifically, the resource and governance dimensions. In this study, I used the number of
years the CEO has worked in the firm as an alternative measures to capture their superior
knowledge of the firm. Likewise, I have used the number of years the board chair has
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worked in the firm as another measure for the presence of a family board chair in the
firm. These measures generated results that are consistent with those obtained using the
proxy measures. These consistent findings suggest the validity of using the presence of a
family CEO and a family board chair to capture their influence on a firm’s behavior
(Berrone et al., 2010; Duran et al., 2016).
There are several limitations to the current research. These limitations suggest a
number of promising research directions. A major limitation of this study is the
operationalization of the family firm variable. In this study, consistent with prior
literature (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Miller et al., 2007), family firms are
operationalized using two conditions related to the percentage of family ownership and
the family involvement in the TMT and/or the board. Although the inclusion of the
second condition―at least two family members are or have been involved in the firm, to
a certain extent, helps capture the family’s transgenerational succession intention
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012), this operationalization is unlikely to fully capture the essence
of family influence on a firm’s behavior (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chua et al.,
1999). Future research is recommended to use other research designs such as surveys to
directly capture the essence of the family influence and their relation with a firm’s
strategy related to diversification modes.
Second, the measure of the dependent variable, i.e., relative emphasis on internal
over external diversification may represent another limitation. Internal diversification was
measured using industry-adjusted value of R&D expenditures divided by the total sales of
the firm, whereas external diversification was based on industry-adjusted value of
acquisition costs divided by the total sales of the firm. The relative emphasis on internal
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over external diversification was calculated using the difference between these two
industry-adjusted ratios. The ratio of these two values was used as an alternative
measure. While results obtained using the difference and ratio approaches are largely
similar, future research is recommended to measure internal and external diversification
directly. For example, future research can measure internal entry using the amount of
increase in sales due to internal product development and external entry using the amount
of increase in sales due to external acquisitions. More research based on a variety of
measures shall help us gain a better understanding of a firm’s diversification behavior.
In conclusion, this study investigates diversification modes in terms of internal
versus external diversification in family firms. Drawing upon the goals, governance, and
resources framework, this study proposes that family firms and nonfamily firms exhibit
differences in their choice of mode for diversification, specifically, family firms are more
likely to prefer internal to external diversification than nonfamily firms. This stronger
preference for internal to external diversification is also proposed to be shown in family
firms with a large percentage of family ownership, a family CEO, a large representation
of family executives, a family board chair, a large representation of family directors, and
the founding generation of family members in the firm. An empirical analysis of 573
manufacturing firms drawn from the S&P 1500 index shows there is no significant
difference between family and nonfamily firms in their strength of preference for internal
to external diversification, as well as among different types of family firms. These
insignificant findings drawn from this study highlight the complexity of family firm
behavior and the influence of the combination of goals, governance, and resources on a
family firm’s behavior is more complicated than we expected.
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Table 1

The characteristics of internal diversification and external diversification
Internal diversification

Costs

Speed

Risks

External diversification

- faces high development costs, which can be
related to experiments with new technological
opportunities inside the firm

- requires payments of a significant financial premium

- takes a relatively long period of time which
can be many months or years

- most acquisitions are consummated relatively quickly

- involves periodic incremental investments,
however, internal development also entails great
risk

- carries risk because acquisitions entry involves a large
one-time investment; usually entails great risk when a
firm makes an acquisition of another ongoing entity,
because the acquiring firm invests in all aspects of
business operations up front

- incurs non-trivial costs of integrating the acquired firm
with the acquiring firm

- acquisitions are more likely to be used as the entry
mode for quick growth

- the risk associated with corporate
entrepreneurship, specifically, the risk in
developing new products, technologies, and
capabilities, is usually high
- the potential to manage the downside risks of
internal diversification would be greater
- the internal business is usually a great deal
more compatible with the firm in terms of
systems, culture, and procedures

- high possibility of overpaying because of the
asymmetry of information regarding the true value of the
target firm
- great difficulty associated with the post-acquisition
integration process due to lack of history between
managers of acquired business and those of the parent
firm
- more difficult to manage the downside risks of external
acquisitive entry
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Table 2

Summary of variables and measures – Essay 1

Variable
Dependent Variable
Industry-adjusted relative
emphasis on internal
diversification over
external diversification

Definition/Measure

Difference between industry-adjusted internal diversification (i.e.,
R&D cost/total sales) and industry-adjusted external
diversification (i.e., acquisition cost/total sales);
Ratio of industry-adjusted internal diversification to industryadjusted external diversification as an alternative measure;
Source: R&D cost manually collected from Firm annual reports;
Acquisition cost downloaded from Compustat.

Independent Variables
Family Firm

Family Ownership

Family CEO

Family Board Chair

Family firm is a binary variable; 1 indicates presence of family.
Two conditions are required to be considered a family firm: 1) at
least 5% of the firm's equity hold by the family; 2) at least two
family members involved in the firm as insiders (officers or
directors) or large owners; 10% and 20% of the firm’s equity hold
by the family as alternative measures;
Source: Firm Proxy Statements; Mergent Online; Company Web
Site.
The total voting share expressed as a percentage of total
outstanding shares owned by the controlling family;
Source: Firm Proxy; Company Web Site.
Family CEO is a binary variable; 1 indicates that any family
member holds the title of chief executive officer (CEO);
The duration of the CEO working in the firm as an alternative
measure;
Source: Firm Proxy Statements.
Family board chair is a binary variable; 1 indicates that any family
member holds the title of chairman of the board;
The duration of the board chair working in the firm as an
alternative measure; Source: Firm Proxy Statements.

Family Representation in
the TMT

The number of family executives in the TMT as a percentage of
total number of executive members;
Count variable as an alternative measure;
Source: Firm Proxy Statements.

Family Representation on
the Board

The number of family directors on the board as a percentage of
total number of directors;
Count variable as an alternative measure;
Source: Firm Proxy Statements.

Founding Generation
Family

A binary variable; 1 indicates a family firm with family
member(s) present from the founding generation.
Source: Firm Proxy Statements; Company Web Site; Other public
web source.
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Table 2 (continued)
Control Variables

Definition/Measure

Firm Age

Calculated in years as the difference between the data year and
the firm's founding year;
Source: Firm Proxy Statements; Mergent Online; Company Web
Site; Other public web source.

Firm Size

Debt to Equity Ratio
Tobin's Q
Industry Adjusted Tobin's
Q
Return on Assets (ROA)
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification
Experience
Advertising

Investment

Internationalization
Nonfamily Block Holder
Ownership

Family CEO Duality

Lone Founder

Family Trust Holdings
Family Firm's Fraction of
Sale by Industry

The natural log of total number of employees of the firm;
Source: Compustat.
Calculated as the values of total debt divided by the market value
of common equity; Source: Compustat.
Tobin's Q is the ratio of the firm's market value to book value;
Source: Compustat.
Calculated as firm Tobin's Q minus median industry Tobin's Q at
a two digit SIC; Source: Compustat.
ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided
by total assets of the firm. Source: Compustat.
Industry-adjusted relative emphasis on internal over external
diversification in year t-1; Source: Compustat.
Advertising expense ratio is calculated as advertising expense
divided by total sales. Firms with missing data were coded =0.
Source: Compustat.
Investment ratio is calculated as capital expenditures divided by
plant property and equipment. Firms with missing data were
coded =0. Source: Compustat.
Calculated as the total amount of sales generated from foreign
markets divided by total sales of the firm; Source: Compustat.
Calculated as the total percentage of shares hold by all nonfamily
block holders. Block holders are individuals or institutions listed
in the firm proxy statement as beneficial owners of at least 5% of
the firm. Source: Firm Proxy Statements.
A binary variable; 1 indicates when both the CEO and the board
chair positions are assumed by a family member. Source: Firm
Proxy Statements; Company Web Site; Other public source.
Lone founder firm is a binary variable; 1 indicates a lone
founder's involvement. Lone founder firms are defined as those in
which an individual is one of the company's founders with no
other family members involved, and is also an insider (officer or
director) or a large owner (5% or more of the firm's equity).
Source: Firm Proxy; Company Web Site; Other public sources.
A binary variable; 1 indicates family trust or foundations are set
up in the family firm. Source: Firm Proxy Statements.
Calculated as the amount of sales by family firms in a particular
industry divided by the total amount of sales in that industry;
Source: Compustat.
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Table 3

Descriptive statistics and correlation – Essay 1

1. Difference between ID and
ED
2. Ratio of ID to ED
3. Industry Adjusted ID
4. Industry Adjusted ED
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO
9. Family Rep in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Rep on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Internationalization
21. Advertising
22. Investment
23. FFs’ Sale by Industry

Mean

S.D.

1

0.061

0.518

1.000

-5.752

43.371

-0.183***

0.099
0.039
0.193
6.600
0.079
0.114

0.502
0.106
0.394
17.496
0.269
0.318

0.892

2

3

4

5

-0.172***

***

***

0.110***

0.035

**

-0.050

***

-0.050***

0.032

**

-0.041

***

***

-0.022
-0.017
0.009
-0.009

8

1.000

***

-0.346

7

6

0.068

-0.036

**

0.026

*

1.000

0.009
-0.044

-0.044

-0.003

***

-0.036

1.000

**

-0.068

***

-0.057

***

1.000
0.780***

1.000

***

-0.105***

0.684

***

0.565

***

-0.041***

0.712

***

0.609

***

***

0.821***

-0.135

1.000

0.039

0.105

-0.007

0.019

0.152

0.359

-0.019

0.032**

-0.049***

-0.057***

0.800***

0.665***

-0.043***

0.807***

0.040

0.093

-0.017

0.029*

-0.042***

-0.048***

0.845***

0.726***

-0.080***

0.717***

***

***

***

0.005

0.600***

*

0.096

0.294

-0.006

0.010

-0.028

0.107

0.309

-0.009

0.028*

-0.043***

-0.067***

0.673***

0.555***

-0.060***

0.941***

4.148

9.726

-0.030

*

***

**

***

***

***

0.443***

0.176

0.381

-0.019

0.032**

-0.044***

-0.047***

0.903***

0.751***

-0.059***

0.613***

50.805

40.302

-0.068***

0.075***

-0.102***

-0.056***

0.061***

0.070***

-0.191***

-0.048***

1.493

1.710

-0.161***

0.142***

-0.203***

-0.057***

-0.068***

-0.026*

-0.229***

-0.144***

0.269

0.413

-0.108***

0.050***

-0.075***

0.091***

0.020

0.032**

-0.065***

0.022

1.512

***

***

***

-0.023

*

-0.020

***

-0.022

*

***

-0.048***

0.392

0.126

0.040

***

-0.067

-0.050

0.126

-0.043

-0.035

0.047

0.329

-0.008

0.013

-0.022

-0.028

0.012

0.028

-0.012

0.013

-0.027*

-0.029*

0.107

0.084

0.145

0.136

0.120

***

-0.015

-0.065

***

0.018

67

0.128

***

-0.035**

0.596
0.588

-0.030

*

0.428

-0.059

1.000

0.311

-0.015

0.013

0.166***

0.254***

-0.009

0.002

0.003

-0.038**

0.197***

0.181***

-0.048

0.082

-0.091

-0.024*

0.148***

***

0.057***

0.034**

0.135***

0.154

Table 3 (continued)
9
1.000
0.806***
0.785***
0.667***
0.799***
0.401***
0.645***
-0.054***
-0.150***
0.012
-0.011
-0.039***
0.174***
0.057***
0.117***

9. Family Rep in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Rep on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Internationalization
21. Advertising
22. Investment
23. FFs’ Sale by Industry
15
1.000
0.062***
-0.055***
-0.003
-0.017
0.004
0.191***
0.013
0.203***

15. Family Trust
16.
Firm Age
holdings
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity
19.
Tobin’s Q
Ratio
20. Internationalization
21. Advertising
22. Investment
23. FFs’ Sale by
*Industry **
p < 0.05; p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

10

11

12

13

14

1.000
0.818***
0.664***
0.811***
0.485***
0.748***
0.006
-0.102***
0.020
-0.040***
-0.005
0.177***
0.032**
0.173***

1.000
0.633***
0.703***
0.485***
0.811***
0.047***
-0.092***
0.017
-0.028*
0.006
0.167***
0.030*
0.173***

1.000
0.607***
0.421***
0.575***
-0.173***
-0.146***
-0.018
0.042***
-0.023*
0.047***
0.072***
0.142***

1.000
0.422***
0.602***
-0.043***
-0.140***
0.026*
-0.016
-0.047***
0.135***
0.056***
0.141***

1.000
0.504***
0.031**
-0.117***
0.017
-0.056***
-0.042***
0.053***
-0.011
0.103***

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1.000
0.406***
0.061***
-0.135***
0.076***
0.099***
-0.260***
0.039***

1.000
0.193***
-0.158***
0.218***
0.065***
-0.251***
0.050***

1.000
-0.283***
0.011
-0.059***
-0.155***
0.107***

1.000
-0.039***
0.102***
0.351***
-0.002

1.000
0.078***
-0.016
-0.002

1.000
0.105***
0.085***

1.000
0.093***

1.000
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Table 4

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: H1
Model 1

Dependent Variable
Sample

Family Firm
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Business (H1)
Lone Founder Firm

Model 2
Difference between ID
and ED
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms
0.106
0.029

Nonfamily Block Holder Ownership

0.044

Firm Age

***

0.001

−0.001
−0.0002

Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.059

Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q

0.202**
−0.058**

0.047***
−0.010

Advertising
Investment
Internationalization
Family Trust Holding

0.540
−0.091
−0.133
3.127***

−0.989*
0.087
−0.003

Family Sales Ratio by Industry

0.664***

Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Absolute Log Likelihood

**

0.021

−2.285
Yes
Yes
9,491
573
1174.123***
***

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.008

0.592***
0.044
−0.113
Yes
Yes
9,490
573
0.417
19.11***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 5

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: H2, H3, and H4

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Ownership (H2)

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Difference
between ID and
ED

Difference
between ID and
ED

Difference
between ID and
ED

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Firms

0.0001
−0.020

Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT
(H4)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

−0.002

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.029
−0.002

−0.002

−0.015
0.012
0.004

0.012
0.004

−0.014
0.011
0.003

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.067***

0.067***

0.067***

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.004
−0.007

−0.004
0.006

−0.004
0.028

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience
Inverse Mills Ratio

0.060
−0.008
0.707***

0.057
−0.008
0.706***

0.059
−0.009
0.707**

−0.007

−0.009

−0.008

Constant

−0.583

−0.574

−0.545

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,811
136

1,811
136

1,811
136

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.568
65.54***
1.00

0.568
64.26***
1.00

0.568
64.98***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 6

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: H5, H6, and H7
Model 6

Dependent Variable

Sample
Family Board Chair (H5)

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

Model 7

Model 8

Difference
between ID and
ED

Difference
between ID and
ED

Family Firms

Family Firms

0.027
−0.112

Family Representation on the Board
(H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)

0.026
−0.002

−0.002

−0.002

0.014
0.004

−0.016
0.010
0.001

−0.016
0.016
0.003

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.067***

0.066***

0.066***

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.003
0.017

−0.004
0.015

−0.004
−0.005

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

0.055
−0.009
0.709***

0.062
−0.007
0.707**

0.063
−0.008
0.707**

−0.009

−0.009

−0.007

Constant

−0.713

−0.439

−0.784

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,811
136

1,811
136

1,811
136

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.568
61.86***
1.00

0.568
65.44***
1.00

0.568
73.48***
1.00

Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 7

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis testing all the heterogeneity
hypotheses simultaneously
Model 9
Difference between ID
and ED
Family Firms
0.0002
−0.016
−0.031
0.045
−0.143
0.034
−0.002
−0.012
0.014
0.003
0.065***
−0.003
0.004
0.064
−0.007
0.706***
−0.007
−0.675
Yes
Yes
1,811
136
0.569
70.90***

Dependent Variable

Sample
Family Ownership (H2)
Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT (H4)
Family Board Chair (H5)
Family Representation on the Board (H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification Experience
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Within R-Square
F-statistics
1.00
Power (1- β error prob)
Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 8

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H1
Model 10

Model 11

Family Firm

Ratio of ID to ED

Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms
0.760

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Business (H1)

−2.709

Lone Founder Firm
Nonfamily Block Holder Ownership

0.048

***

−0.024

Firm Age

0.001

1.327*

Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.041

1.247

Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q

0.191*
−0.039

−0.263
2.865**

Advertising
Investment
Internationalization
Family Trust Holding

1.812
−0.205
−0.146
3.081***

−179.048
−14.486
7.604*

Family Sales Ratio by Industry

0.826***

Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Ratio Measure)

0.0005

0.021***

Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

−2.367

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

6,864
533
830.831***

5,940
533

Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

***

0.423
−67.526*

0.031
1.84**
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the ratio between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 10
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Table 9

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H2, H3,
and H4
Model 12

Model 13

Model 14

Dependent Variable

Ratio of ID to
ED

Ratio of ID to
ED

Ratio of ID to
ED

Sample

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Ownership (H2)

0.039

Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT
(H4)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

0.079

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio

0.960
7.038
0.073

0.069

2.625
3.625
−1.128

3.553
−1.403

2.007
3.782
−1.367

9.743*

9.817*

9.911*

3.480***
−171.787†

3.472**
−172.787†

3.463***
−175.490†

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience (Ratio
Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

−35.209
3.539
−0.026

−35.395
3.343
−0.025

−35.633
3.379
−0.025

1.875

1.721

1.699

Constant

−179.111

−172.658

−186.052

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,055
118

1,055
118

1,055
118

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.034
1.78*
0.88

0.033
1.89**
0.88

0.034
1.88*
0.88

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the ratio between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 10
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Table 10

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H5, H6,
and H7
Model 15

Model 16

Model 17

Dependent Variable

Ratio of ID to
ED

Ratio of ID to
ED

Ratio of ID to
ED

Sample

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Board Chair (H5)

3.719

Family Representation on the Board
(H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)

10.140
−10.665*

Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

0.072

0.072

0.061

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

1.121
3.568
−1.305

2.507
3.781
−1.226

3.077
1.395
−1.511

Debt to Equity Ratio

9.825*

9.799*

10.298*

3.487***
−170.017†

3.470***
−171.824†

3.461***
−162.827

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Ratio Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

−36.002
3.348
−0.025

−35.817
3.148
−0.026

−39.114
3.446
−0.025

1.781

1.869

1.356

Constant

−176.101

−187.298

−61.618

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,055
118

1,055
118

1,055
118

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.034
1.83*
0.88

0.034
1.92*
0.88

0.036
1.86*
0.88

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the ratio between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 10
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Table 11

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check testing all the
heterogeneity hypotheses simultaneously
Model 18

Dependent Variable

Ratio of ID to ED

Sample
Family Ownership (H2)
Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT (H4)
Family Board Chair (H5)
Family Representation on the Board (H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification Experience (Ratio
Measure)

Family Firms
0.043
−2.797
14.010
2.382
9.990
−12.629*
0.068
3.027
0.998
−1.310
10.528*
3.445***
−178.136†
−39.392
3.486
−0.027

Inverse Mills Ratio
1.926
Constant
−48.586
Industry Dummies
Yes
Year Dummies
Yes
Number of Observations
1,055
Number of Firms
118
Within R-Square
0.037
F-statistics
2.04**
0.90
Power (1- β error prob)
Notes:
1. DV is measured using the ratio between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 10
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Table 12

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H1
Model 19

Dependent Variable
Sample

Family Firm
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Business (H1)
Lone Founder Firm

Model 20
Difference between ID
and ED
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms
0.025
0.015

Nonfamily Block Holder Ownership
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

0.021***

−0.001†

0.001

−0.0003

−0.062***

0.010

Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q

**

0.153
−0.039*

0.040***
−0.008

Advertising
Investment
Internationalization
Family Trust Holding

2.834***
−0.572†
−0.086
2.690***

−1.009*
0.091
0.001

Family Sales Ratio by Industry

0.675***

Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

−0.008

−2.202

***

0.593***
−0.001
0.008

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

9,491
573
1491.143***

9,490
573

Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.416
19.54***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 10% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 19
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Table 13

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H2, H3,
and H4

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Ownership (H2)

Model 21

Model 22

Model 23

Difference
between ID and
ED

Difference
between ID and
ED

Difference
between ID and
ED

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Firms

0.0001
−0.026†

Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT
(H4)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

−0.002

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.038
−0.002

−0.002

−0.020
0.007
0.013

0.007
0.013

−0.018
0.007
0.012

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.077***

0.077***

0.077***

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.007
−0.027

−0.007
−0.027

−0.007
0.006

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience
(Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

0.201*
−0.008
0.717***

0.201*
−0.009
0.716***

0.202*
−0.009
0.717***

−0.031

−0.036

−0.032

Constant

−0.373

−0.326

−0.322

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,536
129

1,536
129

1,536
129

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.551
98.65***
1.00

0.551
103.94***
1.00

0.551
99.23***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 10% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 19
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Table 14

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H5, H6,
and H7

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Board Chair (H5)

Model 24

Model 25

Model 26

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

0.029
−0.135

Family Representation on the Board
(H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)

0.046

Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

−0.002

−0.002

−0.002

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

0.009
0.014

−0.020
0.005
0.011

−0.020
0.006
0.013

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.078***

0.077***

0.077***

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.007
0.007

−0.007
−0.002

−0.007
−0.037

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

0.195*
−0.009
0.720***

0.206*
−0.008
0.716***

0.210*
−0.009
0.718***

−0.035
−0.478

−0.030
−0.212

−0.031
−0.355

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,536
129

1,536
129

1,536
129

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.551
102.88***
1.00

0.552
103.42***
1.00

0.552
117.53***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 10% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 19
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Table 15

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check testing all the
heterogeneity hypotheses simultaneously
Model 27

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Ownership (H2)
Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT (H4)
Family Board Chair (H5)
Family Representation on the Board (H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification Experience

Difference between ID
and ED
Family Firms
0.0001
−0.020
−0.040
0.051
−0.169
0.054
−0.002
−0.014
0.005
0.013
0.076***
−0.007
0.004
0.210*
−0.008
0.716***

Inverse Mills Ratio
−0.028
Constant
−0.254
Industry Dummies
Yes
Year Dummies
Yes
Number of Observations
1,536
Number of Firms
129
Within R-Square
0.553
F-statistics
110.08***
1.00
Power (1- β error prob)
Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 10% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 19
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Table 16

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H1
Model 28

Dependent Variable
Sample

Family Firm
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Business (H1)
Lone Founder Firm

Model 29
Difference between ID
and ED
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms
0.026
0.014

Nonfamily Block Holder Ownership

−0.006**

−0.001

Firm Age

−0.0004

−0.0003

Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.057**

0.010

†

Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q

0.094
−0.014**

0.040***
−0.008

Advertising
Investment
Internationalization
Family Trust Holding

4.224***
−0.520
−0.204*
2.549***

−1.035*
0.093
0.001

Family Sales Ratio by Industry

0.805***

Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

−0.029

−2.328

***

0.593***
−0.005
0.018

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

9,491
573
1560.069***

9,490
573

Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.416
19.45***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 20% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 28
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Table 17

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H2, H3,
and H4

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Ownership (H2)

Model 30

Model 31

Model 32

Difference
between ID and
ED

Difference
between ID and
ED

Difference
between ID and
ED

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Firms

0.0004
−0.007

Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT
(H4)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

−0.001

−0.001

−0.001

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.001
−0.031
0.018

−0.019
0.013

−0.004
−0.032
0.016

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.090***

0.088***

0.091***

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.001
0.048

0.001
0.125

−0.001
0.048

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience
(Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies

0.184†
−0.007
0.786***

0.057
−0.005
0.784***

0.187†
−0.008
0.786***

−0.011
1.426
Yes
Yes

−0.004
0.886
Yes
Yes

−0.017†
1.534
Yes
Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,096
105

1,096
105

1,096
105

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.651
124.16***
1.00

0.650
101.87***
1.00

0.651
126.65***
1.00

0.022

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 20% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 28
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Table 18

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H5, H6,
and H7

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Board Chair (H5)

Model 33

Model 34

Model 35

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

0.041
−0.096

Family Representation on the Board
(H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)

0.070
−0.001

−0.001

−0.001

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.031
0.018

−0.003
−0.035
0.015

−0.002
−0.033
0.015

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.091***

0.090***

0.088***

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.001
0.100

−0.001
0.072

−0.001
0.009

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

0.184†
−0.009
0.787***

0.189†
−0.008
0.786***

0.194†
−0.009
0.788***

−0.016†

−0.016

−0.016†

1.442

1.678

1.537

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,096
105

1,096
105

1,096
105

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.651
112.77***
1.00

0.651
142.12***
1.00

0.651
139.96***
1.00

Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

Constant

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 20% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 28
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Table 19

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check testing all the
heterogeneity hypotheses simultaneously
Model 36
Difference between
ID and ED
Family Firms
0.0004
0.001

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Ownership (H2)
Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT (H4)

0.001

Family Board Chair (H5)
Family Representation on the Board (H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

0.062
−0.144
0.076
−0.001

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.018
−0.034
0.017
0.087**
−0.0005
0.039

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification Experience

0.192†
−0.008
0.787***

Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

−0.010
1.543

Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Number of Observations
Number of Firms

Yes
Yes
1,096
105

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.653
129.36***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 20% family ownership threshold
2. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 28
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Table 20

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H1
Model 37

Dependent Variable
Sample

Family Firm
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Business (H1)
Lone Founder Firm

Model 38
Difference between ID
and ED
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms
0.150
0.030

Nonfamily Block Holder Ownership
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

0.047***

−0.002

0.001

−0.003

−0.077***

0.006

Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q

***

0.277
−0.038†

0.058*
−0.015†

Advertising
Investment
Internationalization
Family Trust Holding

1.858
0.168
−0.103
3.182***

−1.813*
0.101
−0.001

Family Sales Ratio by Industry

0.234***

Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

−0.028

−2.267

***

0.610***
0.057
−0.029

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

7,539
493
922.651***

7,538
493

Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.449
20.91***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. Using a sample with observations that R&D and acquisition costs are missing and
deleted
3. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
4. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
5. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
6. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 37
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Table 21

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H2, H3,
and H4

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Ownership (H2)

Model 39

Model 40

Model 41

Difference
between ID and
ED

Difference
between ID and
ED

Difference
between ID and
ED

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Firms

−0.0001
−0.040

Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT
(H4)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.002
−0.028
0.072
−0.018

−0.002
0.072
−0.016

−0.002
−0.025
0.071
−0.017

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.129**

0.130**

0.129**

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.002
−0.246

−0.003
−0.261

−0.002
−0.202

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience
(Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

0.189
−0.019
0.680***

0.184
−0.019
0.679***

0.188
−0.019
0.680***

−0.017

−0.020

−0.016

Constant
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies

−3.407
Yes
Yes

−3.427
Yes
Yes

−3.363
Yes
Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,317
108

1,317
108

1,317
108

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.530
61.76***
1.00

0.531
57.26***
1.00

0.530
64.01***
1.00

−0.046

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. Using a sample with observations that R&D and acquisition costs are missing and
deleted
3. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
4. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
5. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
6. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 37
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Table 22

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H5, H6,
and H7

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Board Chair (H5)

Model 42

Model 43

Model 44

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

Difference
between ID and
ED
Family Firms

0.073
−0.178

Family Representation on the Board
(H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)

0.093

Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

−0.002

−0.002

−0.002

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

0.077†
−0.015

−0.027
0.067
−0.022

−0.034
0.088†
−0.020

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.129**

0.128**

0.127**

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.002
−0.138

−0.003
−0.227

−0.003
−0.299

Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

0.176
−0.019
0.683***

0.188
−0.016
0.680***

0.197
−0.020
0.681***

−0.020

−0.017

−0.012

†

−3.752

−3.126

−4.235†

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

Yes
1,317
108

Yes
1,317
108

Yes
1,317
108

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.531
62.45***
1.00

0.531
60.70***
1.00

0.531
64.12***
1.00

Constant

Industry Dummies
Year Dummies

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. Using a sample with observations that R&D and acquisition costs are missing and
deleted
3. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
4. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
5. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
6. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 37
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Table 23

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check testing all the
heterogeneity hypotheses simultaneously

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Ownership (H2)
Family CEO (H3)
Family Representation in the TMT (H4)
Family Board Chair (H5)
Family Representation on the Board (H6)
Founding Generation Family (H7)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Internationalization
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification Experience

Model 45
Difference between ID
and ED
Family Firms
−0.0001
−0.014
−0.078
0.118
−0.263
0.116
−0.002
−0.044
0.083
−0.028
0.127**
−0.002
−0.145
0.180
−0.021
0.678***

Inverse Mills Ratio
−0.011
Constant
−3.976
Industry Dummies
Yes
Year Dummies
Yes
Number of Observations
1,317
Number of Firms
108
Within R-Square
0.533
F-statistics
63.31***
1.00
Power (1- β error prob)
Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between ID and ED and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. Using a sample with observations that R&D and acquisition costs are missing and
deleted
3. ID refers to internal diversification; ED refers to external diversification
4. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
5. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
6. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 37
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Table 24

Descriptive data of family firms and nonfamily firms

Variable
1. Difference between ID and ED
2. Ratio of ID to ED
3. Industry Adjusted ID
4. Industry Adjusted ED
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO
9. Family Representation in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Representation on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Internationalization
21. Advertising
22. Investment
23. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry

Mean
0.063
-2.552
0.091
0.029
1
34.249
0
0.566
0.195
0.752
0.203
0.461
0.54
15.84
0.881
56.471
1.287
0.302
0.253
0.039
0.021
0.105
0.201

Family Firms
S.D.
Min
0.546
-0.632
38.197
-307.28
0.536
-0.066
0.081
-0.019
0
1
25.332
5
0
0
0.496
0
0.16
0
0.432
0
0.106
0
0.499
0
0.499
0
13.482
0
0.324
0
37.057
1
1.546
-2.865
0.502
0
1.503
-1.45
0.319
-0.632
0.04
0
0.081
0.013
0.148
0.01
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Max
4.155
117.961
4.151
0.681
1
88.1
0
1
0.5
1
0.429
1
1
42.357
1
160
5.05
2.604
8.483
1.162
0.153
0.489
0.547

Mean
0.06
-6.475
0.101
0.042
0
0
0.097
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
49.452
1.542
0.261
0.425
0.049
0.009
0.108
0.132

Nonfamily Firms
S.D.
Min
0.51
-0.632
44.428
-307.28
0.494
-0.066
0.111
-0.019
0
0
0
0
0.296
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40.925
1
1.743
-2.865
0.388
0
1.512
-1.45
0.331
-0.632
0.024
0
0.084
0.013
0.129
0

Max
4.155
117.961
4.151
0.681
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
163
5.05
2.604
8.483
1.162
0.153
0.489
0.547

Table 25

Descriptive data of family firms with a family CEO and family firms without a family CEO

Variable
1. Difference between ID and ED
2. Ratio of ID to ED
3. Industry Adjusted ID
4. Industry Adjusted ED
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO
9. Family Representation in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Representation on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Internationalization
21. Advertising
22. Investment
23. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry

Family Firms with a Family CEO
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
0.042
0.426
-0.632
4.155
-2.713
38.807
-307.28 117.961
0.062
0.417
-0.066
4.151
0.021
0.069
-0.019
0.681
1
0
1
1
35.951
24.893
0
88.1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0.286
0.118
0
0.5
0.977
0.149
0
1
0.233
0.101
0
0.429
0.578
0.494
0
1
0.94
0.238
0
1
16.263
13.544
0
42.357
0.856
0.351
0
1
48.485
31.551
1
140
0.917
1.456
-2.865
5.05
0.329
0.557
0
2.604
0.17
1.597
-1.45
8.483
0.006
0.296
-0.632
1.162
0.019
0.037
0
0.153
0.111
0.089
0.013
0.489
0.194
0.142
0.013
0.547
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Family Firms without a Family CEO
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
0.09
0.671
-0.632
4.155
-2.352
37.459 -307.28 117.961
0.128
0.657
-0.066
4.151
0.039
0.094
-0.019
0.681
1
0
1
1
32.032
25.74
0
88.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.077
0.128
0
0.5
0.457
0.498
0
1
0.163
0.099
0
0.429
0.308
0.462
0
1
0.019
0.136
0
1
15.289
13.39
0
42.357
0.914
0.281
0
1
66.88
40.935
1
160
1.77
1.526
-2.865
5.05
0.266
0.418
0
2.604
0.362
1.365
-1.45
8.483
0.081
0.341
-0.632
1.162
0.023
0.042
0
0.153
0.097
0.068
0.013
0.489
0.21
0.156
0.01
0.547

Table 26

Descriptive data of family firms with a family board chair and family firms without a family board chair

Variable
1. Difference between ID and ED
2. Ratio of ID to ED
3. Industry Adjusted ID
4. Industry Adjusted ED
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO
9. Family Representation in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Representation on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Internationalization
21. Advertising
22. Investment
23. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry

Family Firms with a Family Board Chair
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
0.05
0.502
-0.632
4.155
-2.513
39.206 -307.28 117.961
0.075
0.492
-0.066
4.151
0.025
0.08
-0.019
0.681
1
0
1
1
36.613
25.697
0
88.1
0
0
0
0
0.736
0.441
0
1
0.246
0.141
0
0.5
1
0
1
1
0.226
0.098
0
0.429
0.542
0.498
0
1
0.713
0.452
0
1
15.384
13.328
0
42.357
0.873
0.333
0
1
53.654
34.503
1
160
1.166
1.577
-2.865
5.05
0.323
0.546
0
2.604
0.161
1.493
-1.45
8.483
0.041
0.319
-0.632
1.162
0.023
0.043
0
0.153
0.107
0.084
0.013
0.489
0.198
0.141
0.01
0.547
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Family Firms without a Family Board
Mean
S.D. Chair Min
Max
0.1
-2.657
0.139
0.039
1
27.098
0
0.052
0.041
0
0.13
0.215
0.017
17.219
0.907
64.992
1.656
0.24
0.532
0.032
0.014
0.098
0.21

0.662
35.376
0.649
0.084
0
22.772
0
0.222
0.107
0
0.097
0.411
0.128
13.862
0.291
42.813
1.385
0.327
1.5
0.318
0.027
0.07
0.169

-0.632
-307.28
-0.066
-0.019
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
-2.865
0
-1.45
-0.632
0
0.015
0.011

4.155
117.961
4.151
0.681
1
88.1
0
1
0.5
0
0.417
1
1
42.357
1
148
5.05
2.604
8.483
1.162
0.116
0.489
0.547

Table 27

Descriptive data of family firms run by founding generation family members and family firms run by later
generation family members

Variable
1. Difference between ID and ED
2. Ratio of ID to ED
3. Industry Adjusted ID
4. Industry Adjusted ED
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO
9. Family Representation in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Representation on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Internationalization
21. Advertising
22. Investment
23. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry

Family Firms Run by Founding Generation
Family Members
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
0.113
0.658
-0.632
4.155
-4.886
44.078
-307.28 117.961
0.138
0.648
-0.066
4.151
0.026
0.077
-0.019
0.681
1
0
1
1
31.882
22.447
0
88.1
0
0
0
0
0.71
0.454
0
1
0.263
0.148
0
0.5
0.884
0.32
0
1
0.229
0.101
0
0.429
1
0
1
1
0.689
0.463
0
1
17.377
13.042
0
42.357
0.866
0.341
0
1
30.423
18.563
1
87
0.782
1.537
-2.865
4.394
0.276
0.545
0
2.604
0.41
1.717
-1.45
8.483
0.003
0.293
-0.632
1.162
0.017
0.034
0
0.153
0.119
0.094
0.013
0.489
0.209
0.141
0.01
0.547
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Family Firms Run by Later Generation
Family Members
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
0.02
0.424
-0.632
4.155
-0.633
32.483 -307.28 117.961
0.051
0.413
-0.066
4.151
0.031
0.084
-0.019
0.681
1
0
1
1
36.274
27.41
0
88.1
0
0
0
0
0.443
0.497
0
1
0.136
0.146
0
0.5
0.638
0.481
0
1
0.18
0.106
0
0.429
0
0
0
0
0.413
0.493
0
1
14.525
13.718
0
42.357
0.894
0.308
0
1
78.741
34.304
1
160
1.719
1.417
-2.865
5.05
0.324
0.461
0
2.604
0.119
1.278
-1.45
8.483
0.069
0.336
-0.632
1.162
0.024
0.044
0
0.153
0.092
0.065
0.013
0.489
0.194
0.154
0.02
0.547
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Figure 2

The main window of G*Power
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ESSAY 2: AN INVESTIGATION OF PRODUCT AND INTERNATIONAL
DIVERSIFICATION IN FAMILY FIRMS
Introduction
Product and international diversification are two means that firms can use to
expand the scope of their activities (Agarwal & Gort, 2002; Andrews, 1971; Ansoff,
1965; Cottrell & Nault, 2004; Kim & Kogut, 1996; Mackey, Barney, & Dotson, 2017;
Rawley & Simcoe, 2010; Tippmann, Scott, & Parker, 2017). In the family business
literature, family firms are found to be less likely to engage in product diversification
than nonfamily firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Kintana,
2010)26. In the meantime, research also shows that family firms have lower levels of
international diversification than their nonfamily counterparts (Fang, Kotlar, Memili,
Chrisman, & De Massis, 2018; Fernández & Nieto, 2005; Gallo, & Pont, 1996; GomezMejia et al., 2010; Pukall & Calabro, 2014). Although family firms are more reluctant in
investing in product and international diversification than nonfamily firms, studies
highlight that family firms do, indeed, engage in both product and international
diversification albeit at a potentially lesser scale.

Family firms are defined by a family’s involvement in a firm, which allows it to pursue family-centered
goals and utilize family-based resources in its strategic initiatives (Bennedsen, Pérez-González, &
Wolfenzon, 2010; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999).
26
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Several studies indicate that family firms represent over 33% of large publicly
listed US firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Villalonga, Amit,
Trujillo, & Guzmán, 2015) and represent 30% of the 20 largest publicly traded firms in
the 27 richest economies in the world (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999).
These studies suggest that like nonfamily firms, family firms choose to diversify to
expand the scope of their activities. However, a question remaining in the extant
literature is how family firms diversify once they decide to do so. Specifically, which
type of diversification (product versus international diversification) family firms prefer
relative to nonfamily firms remains a question to be answered. Moreover, firms are likely
to undertake both product and international diversification simultaneously (Mayer,
Stadler, & Hautz, 2014), but at the same time, firms often face the difficulty of managing
both types of diversification (Sambharya, 1995). This suggests product diversification
and international diversification may represent a trade-off relationship (Kumar, 2009) and
firms may prefer for one diversification strategy to the other. This naturally imposes a
question—which diversification strategy are firms likely to prefer?
Thus, the purpose of this essay is to investigate which primary dimension of
diversification family firms are likely to select once they decide to diversify in
comparison to nonfamily firms. Based on recent advancements in the field of family
firms that highlights the importance of the combination of goals, governance, and
resources in influencing a firm’s strategic behaviors and outcomes (Chrisman & Holt,
2016; Chrisman, Sharma, Steier, & Chua, 2013; Daspit, Chrisman, Sharma, Pearson, &
Mahto, 2018), I theorize that family firms exhibit differences from nonfamily firms in
their propensity towards product rather than international diversification. Research
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further suggests that family firms are largely a heterogeneous group (König,
Kammerlander, & Enders, 2013; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007),
and heterogeneity among family firms is even found to be greater than between family
and nonfamily firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012)27.
Causes of heterogeneity among family firms can be grouped according to
governance structures (Carney, 2005), goals (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012),
and resources (Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003). For example, different
governance structures represented by the family’s involvement in ownership,
management, and the board can lead to a variety of outcomes (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, &
Rau, 2012). The mix of economic and noneconomic goals and the relative importance of
these goals is another cause of heterogeneity among family firms (Chrisman, Chua, et al.,
2012). Differences in resources arising from the family’s involvement in governance and
management can also lead to different outcomes (Chua et al., 2012).
My study offers several important contributions to the family business and
diversification literature. First, while family firms are found to be less likely to engage in
product and international diversification (Anderson et al., 2003a; Fang et al., 2018;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), the question regarding how family firms diversify remains to
be answered. By investigating which primary dimension of diversification family firms
prefer, this study extends our knowledge of family firms’ diversification behavior.
Second, the existing studies on diversification and internationalization of family firms
have mostly compared their diversification or internationalization proclivity with those of

27

It is important to note that the focus of this essay is to look at the relative preference for these two types
of diversification (i.e., product diversification and international diversification) in family and nonfamily
firms, as well as among various types of family firms.
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nonfamily firms. Our knowledge of the variance among family firms regarding their
propensity towards types of diversification remains limited. By investigating
diversification preferences among various types of family firms, this study contributes to
our knowledge of heterogeneity across family firms.
Third, diversification represents one of the most studied topics in the strategic
management literature (Ahuja & Novelli, 2017; Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006).
Product and international diversification are considered two of the critical determinants
of the success of firms (Delios & Beamish, 1999). By investigating the relative
preference for these two types of diversification in family firms, this study contributes to
the diversification literature in general, and diversification types in particular. Fourth, I
find that family firms with a large representation of family executives in the TMT are
more likely to choose internal rather than external diversification, thus highlighting the
heterogeneity nature of family firms (Chrisman, Chua, et al., 2012).
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Product and international diversification are central to corporate strategy (Hitt,
Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). They represent two key dimensions
of a firm’s diversification strategy (Hutzschenreuter & Gröne, 2009; Kumar, 2009;
Mayer et al., 2014). Product diversification is a firm’s decision to expand the scope of its
business into new lines of activity (Ahuja et al., 2017; Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000),
whereas international diversification is “the expansion across the borders of global
regions and countries into different geographic locations or markets” (Hitt et al., 1997:
767). In other words, while product diversification is focused on adding new products,
potentially to serve new customer segments, international diversification involves entry
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into foreign markets usually with little change in product offerings (Wan, Hoskisson,
Short, & Yiu, 2011)28.
Various perspectives have been used to understand the antecedents of product and
international diversification, including the resource-based view of the firm (RBV)
(Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984), incentives and goals of
the firm (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990), ownership structure of the firm (Ramaswamy, Li, &
Veliyath, 2002), among others. Among the extant literature, there is a large body of
research using the RBV as the major perspective in understanding the antecedents of a
firm’s diversification into multiple products and geographic markets (Attig, Boubakri, El
Ghoul, & Guedhami, 2016; Døving & Gooderham, 2008; Fang, Wade, Delios, &
Beamish, 2007; Hitt et al., 1997; Sakhartov, 2017; Teece, Rumelt, Dosi, & Winter, 1994;
Tippmann et al., 2017). According to the RBV, to the extent a firm’s resources are
valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and nonsubstitutable, the firm can utilize its
resources to optimally diversify into new businesses or geographic markets (Hitt,
Tihanyi, et al., 2006; Wan et al., 2011). As such, the RBV underscores the importance of
resources and resource sharing in determining a firm’s diversification strategies.
Prior Literature on Product Diversification
From the resource perspective, prior research suggests that firms must have the
necessary resources in order to make diversification economically feasible (Beaumont,
Hebert, & Lyonnet, 2017; Døving et al., 2008; Hoskisson et al., 1990; Matusik & Fitza,
My theoretical discussion of product diversification focuses on diversification without regard to a firm’s
geographic market diversification. Likewise, my discussion of international diversification focuses on
geographic market diversification without regard to a firm’s product diversification. Therefore, crossborder acquisitions, a fairly recent phenomenon that combines both expansion strategies (Galavotti,
Depperu, & Cerrato, 2017), will be dealt with only indirectly.
28
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2012; Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt, 1984). Resources such as technological know-how,
managerial know-how, as well as various types of competencies and capabilities are
essential for a firm’s product diversification (Wan et al., 2011). Firms often diversify by
identifying new activities requiring resources and capabilities that are already possessed
but currently underleveraged by its workforce (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Neffke &
Henning, 2013). Thus, a firm’s resource base is a powerful predictor of a firm’s
diversification, especially which business a firm is likely to enter (Sakhartov, 2017).
Research suggests that firms are likely to diversify into industries that are similar to their
home industries with respect to firm expertise, product-market, or production knowledge
(Miller, 2006; Robins & Wiersema, 1995; Silverman, 1999). Further, diversification not
only may be a result of excess resources but can be viewed as a process of accessing new
resources across different industries or market segments (Mosakowski, 1997; Wan et al.,
2011).
The dynamic capabilities view (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, &
Shuen, 1997) is also used for understanding a firm’s diversification behavior. Dynamic
capabilities are “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and
external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 1997:
516). Research has suggested that the scope of diversification in a firm can be accounted
for by differences in their dynamic capabilities and highlighted that dynamic capabilities
would enable firms to expand their scope of services (Døving et al., 2008; Ng, 2007). By
reconfiguring and redeploying resources and capabilities between various businesses, a
firm can achieve economies of scope—the average total cost of a firm’s production
decreases as the number of diversified businesses increases (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004).
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A firm’s prior diversification experience is recognized as another determinant of a
firm’s subsequent decisions on entering new product markets (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002;
Mayer et al., 2014; Sapienza, Autio, George, & Zahra, 2006). Based on the literature that
prior experience is central to the development of organizational capabilities (Barney,
Ketchen, & Wright, 2011), previous studies suggest that experience with product
diversification will support the development of managerial capabilities to manage
multiunit organizations (Geringer, Tallman, & Olsen, 2000; Hitt et al., 1997). Greater
experience in product diversification can allow firms to overcome short-run constraints in
dealing with diversification and thus enable them to exploit their ability to enter new
markets and manage the complexity associated with a multiunit enterprise (Mayer et al.,
2014; Wu, 2013). For example, Wu (2013) shows that firms with a larger stock of
experience, specifically innovation experience, are more likely to diversify because preentry experience and capabilities will allow firms to establish competitive viability in the
new market.
Prior research has also highlighted the effects of top managers’ decision-making
and cognitive ability on the scope of a firm’s businesses (Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin,
1994; Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). For instance, Calori et
al. (1994) found that top managers of diversified firms have more complex cognitive
maps of the structure of their environment than top managers in other firms. Top
managers’ external ties and political connections are also seen as key antecedents of
corporate diversification (Farjoun, 1994; Kor & Leblebici, 2005; Li, He, Lan, & Yiu,
2012; Sun, Peng, & Tan, 2017). For example, Li and colleagues (2012) found that
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external ties and political connections associated with top managers drive companies to
diversify into different businesses.
Resources may not lead to diversification unless they are activated by incentives
or goals of the firm (Hoskisson et al., 1990). Goals provide reasons for a firm to engage
in diversification. Low performance (Iyer & Miller, 2008), overall risk reduction
(Hoskisson et al., 1990), and family-centered noneconomic goals related to family
governance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) can all influence whether a firm will undertake
diversification or not. For example, from a performance feedback perspective, research
shows that as a firm’s performance falls below its aspiration levels the probability of an
acquisition will increase (Iyer et al., 2008). This is because firms will engage in
problemistic search through acquisitions in order to overcome current performance
shortfalls (Cyert & March, 1963). Researchers have also long argued diversification,
especially unrelated diversification, can be influenced by managerial motives (Amihud &
Lev, 1981, 1999). Specifically, diversification can be driven by managers’ motivations
for increasing their compensation or gaining more power and prestige associated with
managing a larger firm (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, &
Dharwadkar, 2007).
Moreover, the governance structure of a firm, specifically, its ownership structure,
can affect a firm’s diversification (Goranova, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2010;
Ramaswamy et al., 2002). For example, different institutional ownership structures are
likely to inspire different motivations for diversification (Ramaswamy et al., 2002).
Specifically, pressure-sensitive owners such as banks and insurance companies are
argued to be positively disposed to unrelated diversification (Ramaswamy et al., 2002),
102

because they are susceptible to the influence exercised by the firm’s managers (Brickley,
Lease, & Smith, 1988) and likely to have a significant vested interest in supporting the
management in their corporate strategy initiatives. Moreover, pressure-resistant owners
such as mutual funds are expected to bring with them an aggressive monitoring approach
that limits managerial excesses and exploitation of self-interests to the detriment of
shareholders and is found to weaken the propensity of a firm’s managers to engage in
unrelated diversification attempts (Ramaswamy et al., 2002).
Moreover, there is a growing body of research focusing on the influence of family
ownership structure on a firm’s diversification (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003a; GomezMejia et al., 2010). This stream of research shows that due to their family-centered goals,
unique governance structures, and idiosyncratic resources, family firms are less likely to
engage in product diversification than nonfamily firms (Anderson et al., 2003a; Ducassy
& Prevot, 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Diversification requires funding and
managerial talent and expertise that may not be available within the family. A
diversifying family firm may have to seek external financing and recruit external
professionals, thus imposing threats on the family principal’s tendency to exercise
unconstrained authority and influence of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Moreover,
in the case of external diversification, it is a fundamental challenge to achieve the
necessary level of organizational integration after acquisitions (Zollo & Singh, 2004).
Such challenges may arise from the retention of employees in the acquired firm (Cannella
& Hambrick, 1993), knowledge transfer between the acquiring and acquired company
(Ranft, 1997), and the potential incompatibility of organizational routines between the
acquired and acquiring firms (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001). Due to the difficulty
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associated with integration and the possibility of reconfiguring organizational structures
after an acquisition (König et al., 2013), family firms often show more reluctance to
engage in acquisitions than nonfamily firms (Gomez-Mejia, Patel, & Zellweger, 2015;
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010).
In summary, the above literature has informed our understanding of how factors
including resources (e.g., Døving et al., 2008; Mayer et al., 2014; Wan et al., 2011),
goals/incentives (e.g., Iyer et al., 2008), and governance (e.g., Ramaswamy et al., 2002)
may influence a firm’s product diversification.
Prior Literature on International Diversification
Previous research has investigated various factors that may drive the degree or
scope of a firm’s international diversification (Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2002; Hitt, Tihanyi,
et al., 2006; Kumar, 2009). Resources as a basis for internationalization have gained
considerable research attention (Delgado-Gómez, Ramírez-Alesón, & Espitia-Escuer,
2004; Hitt, Tihanyi, et al., 2006). Based on the RBV, researchers suggest resources,
particularly intangible resources are the basis of a firm’s motivation to expand into new
geographic markets (Delgado-Gómez et al., 2004; Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, &
Shimizu, 2006; Sethi, Guisinger, Phelan, & Berg, 2003; Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, &
Hitt, 2003). The possession of intangible resources such as technological capabilities,
managerial or production skills, organizational and marketing systems, and experience
can have a positive effect on a firm’s international diversification. For example, a firm’s
possession of proprietary technological assets and marketing assets are found to be
positively related to the firm’s geographic scope (Delios et al., 1999).
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A firm’s international diversification is not only influenced by the firm’s internal
resources, but also by resources and relational network external to the firm (Araujo &
Rezende, 2003). For example, firms holding strong relational capital with foreign
governments and large corporate customers are found to have a higher probability of
expanding internationally (Hitt, Bierman, et al., 2006; Nachum & Zaheer, 2005). Strong
relational capital characterized by mutual trust and joint problem-solving ability (Uzzi,
1997) can result in shared meaning, commitment, norms of reciprocity, and deeper
understanding of each party (Granovetter, 2005; Zucker & Darby, 2005), thus facilitating
a firm’s expansion into international markets (Hitt, Bierman, et al., 2006).
Internationalization can also be motivated by firms’ seeking resources from the host
country, especially for firms in information-intensive industries (Hitt, Tihanyi, et al.,
2006; Nachum et al., 2005). For example, firms can often access diverse knowledge
bases not available in the domestic market and increase learning through exporting
activities (Salomon & Shaver, 2005).
The important role of top executives in the decision to diversify internationally
has also been emphasized in the prior literature (Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton,
2000; Wally & Becerra, 2001). For instance, prior findings demonstrate that greater
international experience of the top management team (TMT) is positively associated with
firm international diversification (Hitt, Bierman et al., 2006; Sun et al., 2017). These
researchers reason that international experience of top managers reduces the uncertainty
associated with international expansion and creates social capital that can facilitate a
firms’ plans to diversify internationally (Hitt, Bierman, et al., 2006). Further, a
heterogeneous TMT is likely to facilitate international diversification (Sambharya, 1996;
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Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). For instance, a diverse TMT in terms of educational
specialization and tenure may indicate individual members have different interpretations
and perspectives, which can enhance the information-processing capabilities of the group
by considering a broader range of solutions (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) to deal with the
complexity associated with internationalization.
Similar to firms that diversify their product portfolio, firms that diversify
internationally have diverse motives, including economies of scale associated with large
size, an extension of innovative capabilities, and location advantages, among others (Hitt,
Tihanyi et al., 2006; Siegel, Omer, Rigsby, & Theerathorn, 1995). For example, the
intention of gaining a larger market size and accessing abundant resources can drive a
firm to engage in international diversification (Hitt, Tihanyi, et al., 2006). Researchers
also argue that different ownership structures inspire different reasons for international
diversification (e.g., Tihanyi et al., 2003). For example, while both professional
investment funds and pension funds are argued to be positively related to a firm
international diversification, there are different reasons for their propensity for
internationalization (Tihanyi et al., 2003). Professional investment funds are likely to be
interested in international diversification because they may seek to take advantage of
international opportunities and the potential positive effect of international diversification
on shareholder wealth, whereas institutional ownership by pension funds leads to
investment in international diversification because of its long-term performance
orientation (Tihanyi et al., 2003).
International diversification is also found to be associated with the governance
structure of a family firm (Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012; De Massis, Frattini,
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Majocchi, & Piscitello, 2018; Fang et al., 2018; Gallo et al., 1996; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2010; Pukall et al., 2014). Research shows that family firms are generally less likely to
engage in international diversification than nonfamily firms (Arregle et al., 2012;
Banalieva & Eddleston, 2011; Fang et al., 2018; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). One of the
reasons for family firms’ reluctance to engage in internationalization is that international
diversification requires increased ties to foreign resources, stakeholders, and institutions
(Hitt et al., 1997), which makes the family more dependent on human and relational
capital outside the family circle, thus diluting family control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia,
Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011).
As reviewed above, antecedent factors leading to a firm’s international
diversification can be understood by considering its resources (Hitt, Bierman, et al., 2006;
Wally et al., 2001), goals (Hitt, Tihanyi, et al., 2006), and governance (Tihanyi et al.,
2003). These studies have informed our understanding of how resources, goals, and
governance may influence a firm’s international diversification.
A Comparison between Product and International Diversification
While there is a large body of research devoted to investigating factors that
influence a firm’s scope expansion along these two dimensions—product and
international diversification, the majority of prior research has investigated their
antecedents separately, despite the fact that firms generally use both dimensions of
diversification simultaneously (Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Denis et al., 2002; Hitt et al.,
1997). However, extant research has gradually shifted the focus on their interrelationship
to examine how the growth in one dimension of diversification is associated with the
other. Regarding the relationship between product and international diversification, prior
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research has generated mixed findings (Denis et al., 2002; Kumar, 2009; Mayer et al.,
2014; Wiersema & Bowen, 2008).
Some researchers argue that these two dimensions represent a complementary
relationship (Denis et al., 2002). This view is supported by the argument that both
international and product diversification require fungible and intangible resources such as
technical and production know-how that can be transferred from one dimension to the
other (Hitt et al., 1997; Kumar, 2009; Teece, 1982). However, other researchers suggest
that product diversification and international diversification represent a trade-off
relationship and argue that growth along one dimension is likely to be negatively related
to the growth along the other dimension (Kumar, 2009; Wiersema et al., 2008). The main
argument in support of this trade-off relationship is that firms are subject to various shortterm constraints (e.g., ‘sticky’ intangible resources) (Szulanski, 1996), which may
increase the difficulty of replicating and transferring of knowledge, tacit knowledge in
particular, from one opportunity to another and thus limit the chance a firm can
simultaneously utilize the resources along these two dimensions of diversification
(Kumar, 2009).
While there is a growing number of studies investigating the relationship between
these two types of diversification, the question regarding which type of diversification
firms are more likely to prefer has not been answered. Given that firms often engage in
both product and international diversification simultaneously but have difficulty
managing both types, it is important to investigate a firm’s relative emphasis on these two
types of diversification. In order to understand a firm’s relative propensity to invest in
product versus international diversification, I shall discuss advantages and disadvantages
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associated with each diversification type. The similarities and differences between these
two diversification strategies can be understood in terms of resource and capability
requirements, as well as risks of diversification.
First, as alluded to previously, resources are the basis for product and
international diversification (Hitt et al., 1997; Kumar, 2009; Wan et al., 2011). Firms
need tangible resources such as structural mechanisms represented by a multidivisional
structure that can facilitate learning and coordination across multiple units or geographic
markets. Intangible resources related to marketing, technology, production know-how,
and dynamic capabilities in terms of the ability to manage diverse subunits and markets
are also required for both types of diversification. Further, diversifying into a new
product or a new geographic market requires firms to develop organizational process,
routines, and practices in response to the greater organizational complexity associated
with the management of a multiunit, multimarket enterprise (Galan & Sanchez-Bueno,
2009; Kumar, 2009; Mayer et al., 2014), as well as the ability to reconfigure linkage
among various components of the firm and manage diverse subunits.
Moreover, product diversification requires distinctive and core competencies
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), as well as top managers’ cognitive capabilities (Calori et al.,
1994; Wiersema et al., 1992), to manage a diversified product portfolio. Product
diversification also imposes great requirements on a firm’s ability to reconcile
subsystems and share resources across diverse subunits (Wan et al., 2011), especially
when diversification is conducted via external acquisition, which is generally considered
a complicated process of integrating culture and strategy between the acquiring and
acquired firms (Lakshman, 2011). Diversification, especially unrelated diversification,
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also requires a firm’s ability to engage in a major restructuring of the firm (Barkema &
Schijven, 2008). Similar to firms diversifying their product portfolio, firms expanding
internationally also need resources and competencies to manage a geographically
diversified market (Hitt, Tihanyi, et al., 2006). These firms need managerial
competencies to reconcile system and subsystem priorities and ability to develop and
coordinate across the global web of subsidiaries (Kim & Mauborgne, 1991; Sanders et
al., 1998).
While both types of corporate scope expansion require necessary resources and
managerial competencies to manage and coordinate subunits and markets of complex
diversified firms, a firm might prefer product or international diversification depending
on the nature of the resources the firm possesses. For example, prior research suggests
that high levels of transferability of a firm’s resources can facilitate a firm’s propensity
towards product diversification (Speckbacher, Neumann, & Hoffmann, 2015). High
transferability of existing resources can provide the firm with immediate opportunities to
build up and accumulate the required target segment resources via internal diversification
and thus reduce the costs, time, and risks of diversification (Qian, Agarwal, & Hoetker,
2012). However, transferring existing resources, especially ‘sticky’ tacit resources, is
significantly more difficult across a geographically diversified market (Roth &
O’Donnell, 1996; Sanders et al., 1998). This is because the transferring of resources often
necessitates close contact between transferors and potential recipients (Kogut & Zander,
1993; Szulanski, 1996).
Furthermore, product diversification, especially internal diversification is likely to
be more compatible with the firm in terms of culture, systems, and procedures (Sharma,
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1998). Managers engaging in product diversification in a domestic setting are likely to
have connections through work and social networks with their counterparts in other
operating divisions of the firm and therefore be more comfortable and effective in
drawing upon relevant resources (Sharma, 1998). This is in contrast to the difficulty
associated with international diversification. A firm diversifying to another country may
face complexity and difficulty associated with communication and coordination across
countries (Kogut & Singh, 1988), which may become even harder when there is a greater
cultural distance represented by the differences in managerial values, mindsets, and
norms (Hofstede, 1980). Moreover, as firms expand beyond their domestic markets, they
are likely to face increasingly diverse and inconsistent laws, governmental regulations,
and ethical policies (Attig et al., 2016; Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; Gomez-Mejia &
Palich, 1997; Sanders et al., 1998; Zahra & Garvis, 2000). Such diversity is often in
conflict with the domestic managerial mindset of the top management team and puts
pressure on the team’s ability to divide its attention geographically (Kim et al., 1991;
Sanders et al., 1998).
The complexity associated with internationally coordinating and reconciling
systems across a global network also increases the volume, variety, and disunity of the
information that firms and their top management teams must process (Sanders et al.,
1998). Indeed, “information-processing demands are more complex and greater when
firms move into new international markets than when they move into different product
markets within the same domestic setting” (Hitt et al., 1997: 773). For example, firms
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engaging in exporting activities29 need to be familiar with the environment and
regulations in the target market and develop information-processing mechanisms capable
of dealing with complexity that allows it to efficiently collect and process relevant
information. Other foreign market entry modes such as foreign direct investment (FDI)
engages deep and direct involvement with stakeholders and imposes even greater
requirements on a firm’s ability to process information related to the host country (Zahra,
Ireland, & Hitt, 2000). Often times, firms need to invest heavily in understanding these
local conditions and learning to deal with new bureaucratic procedures in the foreign
country (Vlasic, 1998). Sometimes firms even face a hostile international environment
due to local governments’ policies and actions in protecting their national markets (Hitt et
al., 1997; Zahra et al., 2000). For example, it is reported that U.S. firms venturing into
Asian countries such as Singapore, Korea, or Taiwan often have to face the situation that
governments in these countries have used various ways to protect and support their own
country’s firms (Zahra et al., 2000).
Second, both product and international diversification are considered “expressions
of explorative behavior” (Galavotti, Depperu, & Cerrato, 2017:893). As such, they both
are risky strategies (Galavotti et al., 2017; Sambharya, 1995). Product diversification
involves great risks and uncertainty associated with entrepreneurial activities related to
the development of new products, technologies, and capabilities (Burgelman, 1983;
Kelley, Peters, & O’Connor, 2009; Sharma & Chrisman, 1999; Verbeke, Chrisman, &

29

Exporting is the most prevalent form of international expansion (Salomon & Shaver, 2005; Shaver,
2011). For example, statistics show that US firms exported $1.07 trillion of goods and services in 2000
with most of the firms from the manufacturing industry (US BEA, 2001). Thus, in consideration of other
foreign market entry modes, I focus on exporting activity in my analysis.
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Yuan, 2007; Zahra, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2009). For example, internal diversification
often has long payoff horizon and thus entails substantial risk (Chrisman & Patel, 2012;
Lee & O'Neill, 2003). In addition, when firms engage in external acquisitions, they have
to face the risk of purchasing a firm with serious but previously unknown problems
(Akerlof, 1970).
International diversification may differ from product diversification in the risk
profiles (Alessandri et al., 2014; Gande, Schenzler, & Senbet, 2009). Firms expanding
internationally often face great social, political, and legal risks, as well as volatile
exchange-rate (Alessandri et al., 2014; Ellstrand, Tihanyi, & Johnson, 2002; Moser,
Nestmann, & Wedow, 2008; Tihanyi et al., 2003). Such risks often constitute important
frictions to international diversification. For example, Moser et al. (2008) found political
risk has a detrimental effect on exporting activities of German firms. Moreover, exporters
often need to face the advance payment issue by importers who are often not obligated to
pay until 90 days after the goods arrive (Amiti & Weinstein, 2011).
In addition, international diversification is likely to incur risk arising from the
“liability of foreignness” (Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). There are four
sources of the liability of foreignness: risk deriving from the lack of familiarity with the
environment in the host country; risk generated by the host country environment in terms
of lack of legitimacy of foreign firms; risk associated with spatial distance (e.g.,
transportation, travel); and risk deriving from the home country environment (e.g.,
restrictions on sales to some specific countries) (Zaheer, 1995). For example, exporters
face significant uncertainty as they develop marketing channels and gain information
related to consumers from different countries (Greenaway, Guariglia, & Kneller, 2007).
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Since consumers from different nations do not share identical tastes, the end products
desired by consumers in the destination country may vary from those offered in the home
country. In this case, exporters need to rely on export intermediaries or other agents in the
foreign environment to learn about customer preferences and provide feedback regarding
demands on their products and then adapt products and packaging to foreign tastes.
International diversification may also face the risk of technological and marketing knowhow being expropriated by their foreign partners (Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990). For
example, in the case of licensing, a firm grants a license to a foreign enterprise to use
firm-specific know-how to manufacture or market a product and thus runs a significant
risk of the licensee disseminating that know-how, or using it for a purpose other than
those originally intended (Hill et al., 1990).
In sum, product diversification and international diversification are likely to differ
from one another in the aspects of resources and risks. The characteristics of product
diversification and international diversification are captured and shown in Table 28.
In consideration of the three main categories of antecedent factors that I reviewed
for product and international diversification, in the following section I discuss the goals,
governance, and resources and their influence on a firm’s behaviors and strategies,
specifically in the context of family firms, which are argued to have unique goals,
idiosyncratic governance structures, and distinctive resource stocks (Chrisman, Chua, Le
Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier, 2018; Chrisman et al., 2013; Chua et al., 2012).
The Goals, Governance, and Resources Framework
Although the influence of goals, governance, and resources has long been
recognized by strategy scholars to exist for all firms (Hofer & Schendel, 1978), family
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business researchers have recognized that the nature of the goals followed (Chrisman,
Chua, et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes,
2007), the governance systems enacted (Carney, 2005), and the resources available
through family involvement (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Habbershon & Williams,
1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) appear to lead to differences in behaviors and outcomes
between family and nonfamily firms, as well as among various types of family firms
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chrisman et al., 2013). In the following section, I will discuss
these three elements individually30.
Goals
The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert et al., 1963) has long recognized that
firms have a diverse set of goals including economic and non-economic goals. Family
business researchers have proposed that a greater emphasis on non-economic goals may
be what differentiates family from nonfamily firms (Chrisman et al., 2012; Chrisman,
Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2013; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Westhead &
Howorth, 2007; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). The non-economic
goals reflect the unique interests and preferences of the controlling family (Chrisman,
Chua, et al., 2012; Zellweger & Nason, 2008). These noneconomic goals may include
maintaining family control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), perpetuating the
family’s identity (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012), maintaining a strong sense of
community (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), and preserving the family business across

30

Some researchers consider governance as another resource owing to the potential for concentrated
control to allow for rapid, timely decision-making (Sirmon et al., 2003). This suggests that governance and
resources are likely to overlap. Consistent with prior literature (Chrisman et al., 2013), in this regard I
would note that goals, governance, and resources are interdependent.
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generations (Chrisman, Chua, et al., 2012; Zellweger et al., 2012). For example, research
shows that family firms have a higher level of strategic persistence due to their tendency
to sustain family tradition and heritage (Fang, 2016). Family firms are also found to be
willing to risk financial losses and bear a greater probability of failure in order to
maintain family control of the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).
While there may be a number of goals that can be related to a family firm’s
relative propensity towards one diversification strategy over the other, several goals are
especially important, including goals related to exercising family control of the firm and
maintaining a positive reputation for the family firm. Due to the intimate connection
between family and business entities, the desire to maintain family control is an important
goal in family firms’ strategic decision-making (Chrisman, Chua et al., 2012; GomezMejia et al., 2007). Moreover, family members typically have a strong emotional
attachment to the firm (Berrone et al., 2012; Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, &
Kellermanns, 2012). Such emotions permeate the organization and influence the family
business’s decision-making process (Baron, 2008; Berrone et al., 2012). Because the
identity of the family owner is so closely tied to the organization, external stakeholders
often perceive the firm as an extension of the family itself. Family members are usually
sensitive to the image they project to external stakeholders (Craig & Dibrell, 2006; Cruz,
Larraza-Kintana, Garcés-Galdeano, Berrone, 2014). Perpetuating a positive family and
business identity and reputation is another major goal that drives family firms’ strategic
decision-making (Zellweger et al., 2008; Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2013).
Further, different types of family firms are likely to pursue different goals and
attach different levels of importance to the pursuit of such goals (Chrisman, Chua, et al.,
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2012; Holt, Pearson, Carr, & Barnett, 2017). For instance, the greater the extent of family
involvement and influence in the firm, the greater attachment family firms should have
towards the pursuit of their unique goals and the more these goals should reflect the
underlying vision and intentions of the controlling family (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008;
Chrisman, Chua, et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008).
Moreover, founding generation family owners tend to share the goals of the dominant
family, however, the importance of pursuing such goals tends to diminish as the firm
transitions to later generations (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2018). These
differences can help us understand why product diversification and internationalization
may vary among family firms led by the founding generation versus later generation
family owners (Fang et al., 2018).
Governance
While goals of a family firm give the dominant family “willingness” to exert
influence on the firm’s strategies and outcomes, the firm’s “ability” will be reflected in
the governance structure (Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, Frattini, & Wright, 2015).
Systems of corporate governance embody authority patterns, incentives, and norms of
legitimation that generate particular organizational propensities to create competitive
advantages and disadvantages for the firm (Carney, 2005). For example, family
governance in terms of having a majority or controlling ownership and holding prominent
positions in the TMT and/or on the board of directors gives the dominant family coalition
virtually unfettered ability to behave idiosyncratically (Carney, 2005). Carney (2005)
argues that the impact of a family’s control rights over a firm’s assets generates three
dominant propensities labeled as parsimony, personalism, and particularism.
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First, family business scholars argue that family firms have the propensity for
parsimony because family firms make strategic decisions with the family’s personal
wealth (Carney, 2005). The unification of ownership and control can promote interest
alignment between owners and managers, and thus reduce agency costs and the tendency
toward opportunistic behaviors (Carney, 2005). The alignment of interests can also
promote the dominant family’s tendency to be parsimonious and careful in conserving
and allocating resources (Carney, 2005). Second, in family governance, the ultimate
authority is incorporated in the person of an owner-manager who is less subject to
external constraints associated with disclosure, accountability, and transparency (Carney,
2005; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). Due to personalization of authority, the
dominant family is able to project its own vision onto the business (Chua, Chrisman, &
Sharma, 1999). Lastly, particularism is the family firm’s tendency to use idiosyncratic
and particularistic criteria in decision-making (Chrisman, Steier, & Chua, 2006) and it
stems from the tendency of the owner-manager to view the firm as “our business”
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). For example, family firms may use family control as an
important particularistic criterion in making strategic decisions such as diversification
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).
Based on the governance systems enacted, the controlling family is likely to have
different levels of ability and discretion to make idiosyncratic decisions. For example, the
controlling family may have limited discretion to make decisions in a family-influenced
firm in which there is considerable non-family ownership, whereas the controlling family
is likely to have unconstrained discretion in a family-controlled firm (Arregle et al.,
2012). The more of the business the family owns, the greater power and discretion that
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the family has to act in ways that attend to the needs of the controlling family (Zellweger
et al., 2012).
In family firms where the family dominance in governance and top management
is less pronounced, family attributes will drive strategic choices to a lesser extent as there
are “other voices at the table” (Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008: 980). Non-family
owners can also provide financial, human, and technological resources essential for
engaging in strategic activities such as entering foreign markets (Arregle et al., 2012;
Sciascia, Mazzola, Astrachan, & Pieper, 2012). On the other hand, a concentrated family
ownership structure gives rise to resource deployment and capability development that, in
turn, has implications for a family firm’s strategies (Hoopes & Miller, 2006).
Family firms may differ from one another in their governance structures, which
may be reflected in the extent of family ownership, the level of family representation in
the TMT and/or on the board of directors, the generation of family members owning and
controlling the family firm (Chua et al., 2012; Daspit et al., 2018; Nordqvist, Sharma, &
Chirico, 2014). The ownership of family firms may vary along the proportion of family
ownership in terms of full, majority, or controlling ownership (Chrisman et al., 2018;
Daspit et al., 2018). The dimensions of the variance in family involvement in
management and boards are similar to those associated with ownership. For example, the
management of family firms can consist of a small versus a large number of family
members, or family members from the founding generation versus later generations.
Heterogeneity in governance is likely to be associated with differences in goals
and resource configurations (Carney, 2005; Chua et al., 2012; Le Breton-Miller & Miller,
2006; Pittino, Matinez, Chirico, & Galvan, 2018). Differences in governance, goals, and
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resources can lead to a wide variety of outcomes, such as initial international entry
(Evert, Sears, Martin, & Payne, 2018), entrepreneurial orientation (Pittino et al., 2018),
and international entrepreneurship (Sciascia et al., 2012). For example, in a survival
analysis of 190 U.S.-based and listed family firms, Evert and colleagues (2018) find that
family ownership and management control decrease the likelihood of family firms’ first
expansion into a foreign market. As another example, Pittino et al. (2018) investigate the
moderating effect of heterogeneous governance conditions, specifically, the number of
generations involved in the TMT, on the relationship between family members’
psychological ownership and knowledge sharing. Specifically, they found that the
relationship between psychological ownership and knowledge sharing is positively
moderated when there is a large representation of family members involved in the TMT
(Pittino et al., 2018). Moreover, the presence of a family CEO is also likely to enable the
controlling family to make idiosyncratic decisions that benefit the dominant family
(Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001). A firm’s strategy, specifically,
diversification, is also found to be related to the representation of family members on the
board of directors (Arregle et al., 2012).
In all, these findings highlight how heterogeneous governance structures in terms
of ownership, management, and board of directors may affect a family firm’s strategic
behaviors and underscore the importance of considering different dimensions of the
family governance in the study of family firms’ strategies.
Resources
Goals and governance also require resources if strategic intentions are to be
successfully realized through the firm’s actions (Hofer et al., 1978). The unique
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governance characteristics of family firms allow their management considerable latitude
in the development of certain resources such as social capital (Gedajlovic & Carney,
2010; Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). Family firms are argued to have unique familyendowed resources (i.e., familiness) that are embedded in the family’s involvement in the
firm due to the systems interaction between the family, its individual members, and the
business (Chrisman et al., 2003; Habbershon et al., 1999; Sirmon et al., 2003). Familiness
often reflects the intention and vision constituting the essence of a family business
(Chrisman et al., 2013; Chua et al., 1999). Such familiness can affect family firms’
behaviors (Carnes & Ireland, 2013; Duran, Kammerlander, Van Essen, & Zellweger,
2016). For example, research suggests that familiness will reduce the production of major
innovations of a firm (Carnes et al., 2013; Chrisman et al., 2013). Family firms are also
argued to have advantages in utilizing and orchestrating their unique resources (Duran et
al., 2016).
Further, the stock of resources and familiness may vary among different types of
family firms. For example, family CEOs are argued to be efficient in orchestrating and
transferring resources due to their firm-specific tacit knowledge and idiosyncratic
managerial capabilities (Duran et al., 2016; Li, 2017). However, at the same time, family
CEOs are likely to have limited exposure to external environments (Zona, 2016), which
might act as a constraint on a firm’s internationalization. An increased participation from
nonfamily TMT members can provide access to a diverse information pool which can be
used to facilitate collective decision-making and increase decision comprehensiveness
(Patel & Cooper, 2014; Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999). Moreover, the presence of
external owners in a family firm can be useful resource providers for resource121

constrained family firms, and thus motivate internationalization in family-controlled
firms (Arregle et al., 2012).
In summary, the governance structure of family firms gives the dominant family
ability and power to pursue its economic and noneconomic goals and develop and utilize
unique resources. This suggests that family firms act idiosyncratically because the family
is able to use its ability granted through family governance to pursue a broad range of
economic and noneconomic goals and/or exploit the resources that come from its
involvement in the firm. However, consideration of each of these three concepts is
necessary but individually insufficient to understand strategic behaviors of family firms,
instead, goals, governance, and resources are collectively important for gaining an
integrated understanding of family firm outcomes and behaviors.
The Relative Emphasis on Product versus International Diversification in Family
and Nonfamily Firms
Family involvement in governance and management of a firm shapes the firm’s
governance structure by increasing the family members’ power, latitude, and legitimacy
to make idiosyncratic decisions that maximize the achievement of family-centered noneconomic goals and utilize “familiness” resources of the firm. I expect that family and
nonfamily firms are likely to exhibit differences in their relative emphasis on these two
types of diversification, i.e., product diversification and international diversification.
Specifically, I argue that family firms are likely to show a stronger tendency towards
product diversification than international diversification compared to nonfamily firms.
Several reasons can support this line of argument.
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Retaining Decision-Making Control
First, maintaining family control and influence are an integral part of family firm
goals and highly desired by family members (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman, Chua et al.,
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Zellweger et al., 2012). Family control of the firm
allows the family to pursue its interests through the firm. Family owners are argued to be
reluctant to share their decision-making control and authority with other parties and likely
to perpetuate their direct or indirect control and influence over the firm’s strategic
decision-making (Carney, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2015; Chua et al., 1999; Schulze,
Lubatkin, Dino, 2003). I expect that due to their desire to maintain family control over
the firm, family firms are likely to prefer product diversification to international
diversification to a larger extent than nonfamily firms.
On the one hand, product diversification, specifically, external acquisitions, may
involve stock swaps (Nail, Megginson, & Maquieira, 1998), and thus dilute family
ownership control of the firm. However, acquisitions generally give the firm control over
their decision-making in terms of whether to engage in acquisitions, when to engage in
such acquisitions and with whom such acquisitions will take place. Moreover, internal
diversification in terms of internal R&D investment is likely to provide a family firm
with total management control, especially over the strategic decision-making of the firm,
including resource allocation and the development of a timeline for the project, etc.
(Teng, 2007). The family is likely to maintain managerial control in their new product
development (NPD) (De Massis, Kotlar, Frattini, Chrisman, & Nordqvist, 2016). Product
diversification regardless of external or internal diversification require outside nonfamily
managers (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), and thus lead to the loss of family control over the
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firm’s strategic decision-making. However, the risk of diluting decision-making control
to external partners in an exporting relationship will be substantially less compatible with
family firms than the risk of diluting decision-making control to nonfamily managers
employed in the firm in the case of product diversification. In other words, product
diversification is likely to give family firms direct control over the firm’s strategic
decisions.
International diversification, on the other hand, is likely to dilute the family’s
ability to exercise decision-making control of the firm. For example, in the case of FDI,
firms need to delegate their day-to-day operations and certain strategic decisions to the
foreign subsidiary, although the ultimate control typically resides at the firm’s corporate
office (Hill et al., 1990). In the event of low-control foreign entry modes such as joint
ventures or licensing or direct exporting, the chance to dilute control over a firm’s
strategic decision-making is even greater. In a joint venture arrangement, a firm must
share its decision-making control with venture partners. Firms even have less control
over their decisions when they are the minority partner in the arrangement (Westman &
Thorgren, 2016). Moreover, the exporting mode generally lacks in providing marketing
control for the firm while it often offers the firm with operational control (Agarwal &
Ramaswami, 1992). A host government may have bargaining power against foreign
companies and thus control market access of these foreign firms. This power becomes
even more apparent in emerging economies due to government ownership of many local
enterprises (Luo, Shenkar, & Nyaw, 2001).
The exporter, especially through the distributor, sometimes only has indirect
control with export operations locally in the export market (Solberg & Nes, 2002).
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Exporters supervise only the result of the activities of the local representative ex-post
such as sales volume, market share, profit, leaving the development of the marketing
activities largely to the discretion of the local representative (Solberg et al., 2002). When
firms export to multiple countries, the loss of marketing control can become even greater
because firms are likely to lose control of the market once they move from one market to
another.
This suggests product diversification, especially internal diversification, is more
likely to provide a family firm with strategic decision control over the firm (Chrisman &
Patel, 2012; Kotlar, Fang, De Massis, & Frattini, 2014), although sometimes the
employment of nonfamily managers can dilute family control over the firm. However,
compared to the type of control loss associated with international diversification, the loss
of strategic control due to the employment of nonfamily managers within the family firm
may be perceived as less serious by family firms. Since family firms are more likely to
perpetuate owners’ direct control over the firm’s strategic decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2007), I expect in comparison to nonfamily firms, family firms are likely to be more
sensitive to the loss of direct decision-making control associated with international
diversification than the loss of decision-making control associated with product
diversification.
Utilizing Firm-Specific Resources
Second, from a resource perspective, while all firms are concerned about building
their resource stocks, family involvement may produce differences between family and
nonfamily firms in terms of the level and nature of resources as well as the way resources
will be deployed and exploited (Chrisman, Chua, et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2005; Sirmon
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et al., 2003). Family firms are argued to be uniquely suited to develop and transfer classes
of assets such as tacit knowledge and social capital which are largely embedded in the
family’s control and human capital investment in the firm (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010;
Memili, Chrisman, & Chua, 2011). The frequent interactions among family members can
produce deep levels of firm-specific tacit knowledge (Carnes et al., 2013; Chrisman et al.,
2016; Sirmon et al., 2003). The long-term orientation and patient capital of family firms
also allow them to devote the proper time to cultivating the necessary relationships that
will facilitate rich knowledge transfer (Miller et al., 2005; Sirmon et al., 2003).
While one of the key challenges in product diversification is how to control
coordination costs (Cardinal, Miller, & Palich, 2011), social capital and tacit knowledge
of family managers is argued to be particularly effective in limiting these costs (Stadler,
Mayer, Hautz, & Matzler, 2018). In addition, the internal social capital of family
members can address some of the key challenges associated with the management of a
diversified firm and thus facilitate the management process of the diversification (Stadler
et al., 2018). However, such locally rooted and grounded human and social capital of
family managers represented by relatively tight sets of local relationships and
communities (König et al., 2013; Stadler et al., 2018) may be less useful and less likely to
be leveraged in international diversification. Geographical and cultural distances
associated with international diversification will make communication across national
borders more difficult and increase the challenges of maintaining a close and long-term
buyer-seller relationship which is essential in an exporting setting (Alteren & Tudoran,
2016; Leonidas, Katsikeas, & Hadjimarcou, 2002).
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Further, product diversification, especially internal diversification, is usually a
great deal more compatible with a family firm’s structures and procedures (Sharma,
1998) as it allows for the transfer of ‘sticky’ tacit resources such as ideas and resources
across departments and business units, and thereby supports more efficient resource
orchestration within the family firm (Bammens, Notelaers, & Van Gils, 2015; Duran et
al., 2016; Sirmon et al., 2003). The rich social relationships and social capital of family
firms (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2005; Miller et al., 2005) often requires
frequent interactions among family business networks which allow better estimates of
trust and understanding (Lester & Cannella, 2006) and thus facilitate knowledge
exchange and cooperation (Stadler et al., 2018). Conversely, internationalization often
requires foreign assignments of family or nonfamily managers, and the increase of
physical and cultural distance can reduce interactions among family members, thus
increasing the difficulty of sustaining the interaction and interdependence required to
maintain the advantages of family-based social capital (Arregle, Duran, Hitt, & van
Essen, 2017; Pearson et al., 2008; Stadler et al., 2018). This suggests that compared to
nonfamily firms, family firms are likely to perceive the benefits of product diversification
to be greater because it allows them to leverage the advantages of the unique family firmspecific knowledge and facilitate the transferring of such knowledge, and thus are likely
to have a greater preference for product diversification to international diversification.
Facing the Risk of Knowledge Being Expropriated
Third, another characteristic that distinguishes family from nonfamily firms is that
family owners often have strong emotional attachment to their resources and assets
(Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman, Chua, & Kellermanns, 2009; Chrisman, Fang, Kotlar, &
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De Massis, 2015; König et al., 2013). The existing assets and architectures of a family
firm often represent the fruits of the decisions of family owners and managers (Chrisman
et al., 2015). The linkage between the family and the business also tends to intensify
attachment and commitment to the existing resources and procedures of the firm among
family members (Craig, Dibrell, & Davis, 2008; Memili et al., 2011; Sharma & Irving,
2005).
I argue that the strong emotional ties to existing resources will serve as extra
incentives for family firms to choose product diversification rather than international
diversification compared to nonfamily firms. International diversification is more likely
to create the risk of appropriation associated with disseminating firm-specific know-how
such as technological and marketing know-how to external parties (Hill et al., 1990).
While exporters generally need to acquire and assimilate new knowledge related to
foreign markets where they have little or no previous experience (Khalid & Bhatti, 2015),
they often face the risk of reverse engineering by foreign partners. Local partners may
deconstruct the imported goods to extract knowledge and thus place the exporting firms
at great risk of their knowledge being expropriated. Conversely, product diversification,
internal development, in particular, can provide safeguards to protect the value of the
existing resources and knowledge of the firm and thus help keep control of the firm’s
resources (Gulati & Singh, 1998). For example, Pisano (1990) found that fear of
capability leakage motivates firms to greater use of internal development (Pisano, 1990).
Internal developing allows a firm to coordinate activities needed to build on its existing
capability stock and provide a more stable platform for future development of new
capabilities because of their greater integration into the firm’s context and knowledge
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base (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Kogut & Zander, 1996). Since family firms have financial
as well as emotional attachment to their existing resources and assets, I expect that in
comparison to nonfamily firms family firms are likely to perceive the risk of knowledge
expropriation resulting from international diversification to be greater.
Facing the Risk of Family Image and Reputation Being Threatened
Fourth, while all firms are concerned with building a positive reputation, family
firms are particularly sensitive to protect and enhance their image and reputation
(Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman et al., 2018; Cruz et al., 2014). This is because family
firms often perceive a strong link between the fate of the business and their own wellbeing (Berrone et al., 2010). Family firms often go to great lengths to perpetuate a
positive family image and reputation in their local communities and strive to create a
business with an enduring reputation (Berrone et al., 2012; Dyer & Whetten, 2006;
Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). I argue that this particular sensitivity towards building a
positive reputation will serve as an extra incentive for family firms as compared to
nonfamily firms to prefer product diversification to international diversification.
Product diversification typically takes place in an environment which is close and
familiar to the focal firm. Product diversification, especially related diversification, is
likely to allow family firms to benefit from long-established relationships with vendors
and suppliers in the local community who are often viewed as part of the family. Product
diversification also allows the exploitation of an established family “name” and the
acceptance in the regional market (Banalieva et al., 2011; Stadler et al., 2018). In
addition, product diversification, especially diversification through investment in
exploitative R&D, can enhance a family firm’s historical linkages with their business
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activities and thus augment the reputation of the firm (Patel & Chrisman, 2014). While
failed R&D attempts or acquisitions might also damage a firm’s reputation (Chrisman &
Patel, 2012; Dyer et al., 2006), I expect that product diversification in a local setting
usually makes it easier to create and maintain a positive reputation and translate
reputation across local regions (Banalieva et al., 2011).
As firms expand globally, firms need to face increased risks associated with a less
familiar environment and new cultural and institutional requirements, as well as unknown
“rules of engagement” in a foreign country (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Firms may also
face the escalated difficulty of balancing the numerous demands of different cultural and
national differences imposed by geographically dispersed subsidiaries (Kostova & Roth,
2003; Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006), and such difficulty will be enhanced when there is a
great cultural distance between the origin and host countries (Hofstede, 1980). This will
motivate family firms to diversify into countries that are culturally close to their home
country rather than culturally distant countries (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). While
exporting may generate high growth, and this could also have a positive effect on the
family firm’s reputation, exporting may put the family firm’s reputation at risk. Exporting
often requires finding a local partner in each market and exporters must learn the
reliability of their partners through experience (Aeberhardt, Buono, & Fadinger, 2014).
An untrustworthy partner in an exporting relationship can prevent a firm from meeting its
customers’ demands and orders and thus threaten the family firm’s reputational capital
(Paul, Parthasarathy, & Gupta, 2017). Difficulties in monitoring their partners’ behavior
in a foreign country might also negatively affect product or service quality and as a result,
put the family firm’s reputation in danger.
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In addition, international diversification requires a firm’s norms to be adapted to
foreign cultures and thus leads to the destabilization of social relations within the family
(Stadler et al., 2018), which may dilute the image of the family firm and the family
owners (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013). I argue that compared to nonfamily firms,
family firms are likely to perceive the risk to the family’s image and reputation as a result
of international diversification to be greater because international diversification might
put the reputation of the firm, the family, as well as family members at risk. Thus, I
hypothesize31:
Hypothesis 8: Family firms will rely more on product diversification than
international diversification in comparison to nonfamily firms.
Heterogeneity within Family Firms
In Hypothesis 8, based on the insights drawn from the goals, governance, and
resources framework, I propose that relative to nonfamily firms family firms have a
stronger tendency to diversify into a new product line in a domestic market rather than a
new geographic market in a foreign country. Since family firms are a largely
heterogeneous group, I expect that the stronger tendency for product diversification rather
than international diversification is likely to vary among different types of family firms.
Heterogeneity in family firms can be manifested in the level of family ownership of the
firm (Chrisman, Chua et al., 2012), the identity of the CEO and the board chair (Berrone
et al., 2012; Duran et al., 2016), the representation of family executives and directors
(Liang, Wang, & Cui, 2014; Minichilli, Nordqvist, Corbetta, & Amore, 2014), as well as

31

These four lines of arguments used to support Hypothesis 8 are summarized and shown in Table 29.
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the generation of family members controlling the family firm (Fang et al., 2018).
Differences in these governance structures have important implications for our
understanding of differences in goals and resources of family firms. For example, family
firms where the controlling family owns a large percentage of shares are likely to have
more power and legitimacy to pursue goals that will attend to the needs of the controlling
family (Chrisman et al., 2012). As another example, in comparison to nonfamily CEOs,
family CEOs are more likely to have their goals aligned with those of the controlling
family and thus attend to the preferences of the dominant family (Berrone, Cruz, GomezMejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010). Further, “familiness” in terms of resource stocks and
the transferring of resources is likely to differ in family firms where there is a large
representation of family members in the TMT. As the representation of family members
in the TMT increases, the TMT might have a deeper level of tacit knowledge about the
family firm (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006).
The Effect of the Percentage of Family Ownership
Family ownership is an important dimension of family governance in our
understanding of family firm heterogeneity (Chrisman et al., 2012; Dou, Zhang, & Su,
2014; Sciascia et al., 2012). I argue that the percentage of family ownership of the firm is
likely to be positively associated with the level of emphasis on product diversification
rather than international diversification. The dominant family’s ability and discretion to
make idiosyncratic decisions is associated with the level of family ownership control of
the firm (Zellweger et al., 2012). Where family members are large shareholders, they will
have the power to shape the firm’s choice of diversification strategy according to their
preferences. By contrast, where families hold a small percentage of share, they will not
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be able to have much of an impact on diversification strategy. This suggests that a larger
percentage of ownership of the firm is likely to give the controlling family more power to
pursue goals related to remaining decision-making control of the firm and maintaining a
positive reputation for the family and business, and thus have a stronger tendency toward
product diversification rather than international diversification.
Specifically, family ownership is an important dimension for the family to retain
control of the firm and its ability to influence firm decisions and achieve family-centered
goals (Chrisman et al., 2015; De Massis, Kotlar, Chua, & Chrisman, 2014). Where family
members are large shareholders, they are likely to have more incentive to pursue these
goals, because the more shares a family owns the business, the more there is at stake for
them (Miller et al., 2010). As control of the firm through ownership increases, the
association of the family’s name with the firm also increases (Dyer et al., 2006). Indeed,
empirical studies have shown that the extent of family ownership of the firm is positively
associated with the firm’s pursuit of a favorable reputation for the family and business
(Deephouse et al., 2013). In addition, family influence is associated with higher levels of
emotional ties to the existing assets (König et al., 2013). This suggests that as the family
ownership increases, the family has a stronger attachment to the existing resources and
assets of the firm, and are thus more likely to avoid international diversification due to
the concern associated with the expropriation of the firm’s resources and knowledge. In
summary, the extent of the family’s ownership control should positively affect the pursuit
of family-centered goals. As expressed below, this suggests that as family ownership
increases, family owners will have a stronger preference for product rather than
international diversification.
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Hypothesis 9: The percentage of shares held by the family is positively related to
the extent of using product diversification rather than international diversification.
The Effect of a Family CEO
The importance of CEOs on strategy behavior and initiatives of a firm has long
been recognized in the upper echelons literature (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Michel
& Hambrick, 1992; Quigley & Hambrick, 2015; Souder, Simsek, & Johnson, 2012).
There is a growing number of studies in family business suggesting that family influence
on a firm’s strategies and behaviors is also through the presence of a family CEO in the
firm (Duran et al., 2016; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013; Miller, Le BretonMiller, Minichilli, Corbetta, & Pittino, 2014). Prior research has shown that having a
family CEO can affect a firm’s strategic behaviors in areas such as corporate divestitures
(Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2016), environmental practices (Berrone et al., 2010),
innovation inputs and outputs (Duran et al., 2016), as well as strategic conformity of the
firm (Miller et al., 2013). For example, family firms with a family CEO have lower
innovation inputs than those without a family CEO, because the interests of the family
CEO mirror the family firm owners’ investment preferences in terms of maintaining
control of the firm and thus invest less in innovation (Duran et al., 2016). As such, I
expect family CEO is another variable relevant to our understanding of a family firm’s
relative emphasis on product over international diversification. Specifically, I propose
that family firms with a family CEO will be more likely to choose product rather than
international diversification than those without a family CEO.
First, a family CEO enables the dominant family to exercise influence on a firm’s
decisions more effectively than a nonfamily CEO does and gives them more power and
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discretion to pursue family-centered goals in terms of maintaining family control of the
firm and perpetuating a positive reputation for the family firm (Berrone et al., 2010). As
argued earlier, family firm owners are reluctant to choose international diversification
because they are unwilling to cede decision-making control over their firm, and ceding
control is harder to avoid in international diversification than product diversification. I
argue that a family CEO is also less likely to be willing to cede control, which will limit
the latitude of the CEO’s managerial actions and decisions as a manager and restrict his
or her shareholder voting power as an owner (Duran et al., 2016). As such, I expect that
firms with a family CEOs will be less likely to choose international diversification
compared to those without a family CEO. In addition, a family CEO shall have strong
incentive to maintain a good reputation for the family firm since the family’s past,
present, and future are tied to the reputation of their firm (Miller & Le Breton-Miller,
2006). Relative to diversifying into international markets, diversification in local markets
potentially targeting different segments of customers also allows a family CEO to create
a positive image of the family in the local region (Banalieva et al., 2011).
In contrast, a nonfamily CEO is likely to be less emotionally attached to the
family firm (Miller et al., 2013; Minichilli et al., 2014). There may be an incongruity
between the goals of the nonfamily CEO and the dominant family (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2001). This implies a nonfamily CEO may be less likely to frame strategic decisions with
reference to pursuing family-centered goals. Moreover, due to the information asymmetry
problem, a nonfamily CEO may not be able to fully understand the importance of the
pursuit of family-centered goals for the family coalition and thus be less likely to pursue
family-centered goals (Chrisman, Memili, & Misra, 2014). This suggests that family
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firms with a nonfamily CEO will be less concerned about the pursuit of family-centered
goals in terms of retaining family decision-making control of the firm and perpetuating a
positive reputation for the family business and less likely to prefer product diversification
to international diversification than firms with a family CEO.
Second, from a resource perspective, a major role of CEOs is to integrate different
views of the top management team. They are often considered ‘cognizers’ of the firm and
required to have high cognitive ability (Calori et al., 1994). Product diversification, and
internal product diversification, in particular, will provide family CEOs with an
opportunity to transfer their tacit knowledge across departments of the firm. Due to their
tacit knowledge and idiosyncratic managerial capabilities, family CEOs are argued to be
efficient in orchestrating and transferring resources via internal development (Li, 2017).
Prior research has shown that family CEOs are likely to utilize their knowledge to
facilitate the innovation process of the family firm (Duran et al., 2015). However, such
advantage of utilizing firm-specific knowledge is less likely to be leveraged via
international diversification. Moreover, family CEOs are likely to have limited exposure
to external environments (Zona, 2016), which will also make international diversification
less likely. Based on these arguments, I propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 10: Family firms with a family CEO will rely more on product
diversification than international diversification in comparison to those without a
family CEO.
The Effect of Family Representation in the TMT
Top managers play an important role in our understanding of a firm’s
diversification (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Sun et al., 2017; Tihanyi et al., 2000). As
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such, I expect that the representation of family members in the TMT is likely to affect a
family firm’s preference for these two types of diversification, i.e., product and
international diversification. Consistent with my previous arguments regarding the
relationship between family firms’ goals, governance, and resources and diversification
preference, I expect that the representation of family executives is likely to be positively
associated with a family firm’s propensity towards product diversification rather than
international diversification. First, a large representation of family members in the TMT
will provide the controlling family with high power and discretion to pursue familycentered goals, including maintaining family decision-making control of the firm and
perpetuating a positive reputation for the family firm, and thus show a stronger
preference for product to international diversification.
Second, from a resource perspective, I also expect that family firms with a large
representation of family executives are more likely to choose product rather than
international diversification. A firm’s decision on scope change is often formulated and
implemented by top managers and the cognitive ability of top managers to process
information is an important factor in affecting a firm’s expansion (Calori et al., 1994;
Hutzschenreuter & Horstkotte, 2013; Wiersema et al., 1992). Family managers who are
intimately familiar with the firm and its informal culture, customs, and unwritten rules
(Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013) often gain early and deep exposure to the family
firm and develop a significant stock of knowledge and skills (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006;
Miller et al., 2005; Stadler et al., 2018). Such deep levels of firm-specific expertise and
tacit knowledge by family managers can facilitate the transfer of ideas and resources
across departments internally (Sirmon et al., 2003) and the expansion of new product
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segments in a local region rather than exploring opportunities in new geographic markets
(Liang et al., 2014). Conversely, the advantage associated with the utilization of such
tacit knowledge is less likely to be leveraged via international diversification. Thus, I
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 11: The percentage of family members in the top management team of
a family firm is positively related to the extent of using product diversification
rather than international diversification.
The Effect of a Family Board Chair
Decisions related to diversification are often influenced by the chair of the board
(Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). This is especially true in family firms where
a family can exert influence on a firm’s strategic decision-making by assuming the board
chair position of the firm (Berrone et al., 2012). Consistent with my previous arguments
regarding the relationship between family firms’ goals and diversification preference, I
expect that family firms with a family board chair are likely to have a stronger tendency
to engage in product diversification than international diversification than those without a
family board chair. The presence of a family board chair is likely to grant the dominant
family power and discretion to make decisions that favor the pursuit of family-centered
noneconomic goals including retaining family control of the firm and perpetuating a
positive reputation for the firm and family. By having a family member serving as the
chairperson of the board, the dominant family can exercise their influence over the firm’s
strategic decision-making (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) and thus will
prefer product diversification more. In addition, a family chairperson is likely to possess
a deep level of tacit knowledge of the family and the firm, which can be used to facilitate
138

product diversification, specifically internal diversification (Minichilli et al., 2014). Thus,
I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 12: Family firms with a family board chair will rely more on product
diversification than international diversification in comparison to those without a
family board chair.
The Effect of Family Representation on the Board
Family influence on a firm’s behavior also comes through the representation of
family members on the board of directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Berrone et al., 2010;
Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Jones, Makri, & Gomez-Mejia, 2008). I expect that a family
firm’s relative emphasis on product diversification over international diversification is
associated with the representation of family directors on the board. On one hand, family
members acting as directors can increase disproportionally the attention to family needs
(Miller et al., 2013; Minichilli et al., 2014) and thus enhance the family impact on the
business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Family firms with a large representation of family
directors are likely to have more power and discretion to pursue family-centered goals
such as retaining family control over the firm and thus have a stronger preference for
product diversification than other family firms.
Moreover, family directors are likely to have strong locally rooted and grounded
human and social capital and deep levels of firm-specific tacit knowledge can be used to
facilitate product diversification. Consistent with my previous argument regarding the
relationship between family firms’ tendency to utilize their local firm-specific resources
and their diversification preference, I expect that a larger representation of family
directors is associated with a stronger preference for product diversification rather than
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international diversification because this group of family firms is more likely to perceive
the benefits associated with product diversification that allows them to utilize their strong
local resources. Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 13: The percentage of family members on the board of a family firm
is positively related to the extent of using product diversification rather than
international diversification.
The Effect of Founding Generation Family Owners
The family business literature has emphasized there is a distinction between firms
run by founding and later generation family owners (Morck & Yeung, 2003; PérezGonzález, 2006). The interests of succeeding family generations may be different from
those of the founding generation (Fang et al., 2018; Miller et al., 2006). The generation of
family members owning and controlling the family firm shall have important implication
for our understanding of a family firm’s relative emphasis on product versus international
diversification.
From a goals perspective, the founding generation family owners tend to perceive
the business as an extension of the family (Berrone et al., 2012) and are likely to have a
high level of attachment to the firm (Chua et al., 1999; Fang et al., 2018; Gomez-Mejia et
al., 2007; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009). However, as family branches in later
generations emerge, family influence becomes more dispersed (Gersick, Davis, Hampton,
& Lansberg, 1997; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2013). Specifically,
as the firm transitions into subsequent generations, later generation family owners
become less attached to the family firm and less concerned about the pursuit of
noneconomic goals for the family (Chua et al., 1999; Fang et al., 2018; Gomez-Mejia et
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al., 2007; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2013). As such, later generations of family owners will
be less concerned about retaining family control for the firm, and they will be more
interested in “cashing out” and using the family assets for their own personal purposes
(Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Kammerlander & Ganter, 2014; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013). Indeed,
Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2007), in their study of family-owned olive oil mills from
Spain, have shown that the willingness to give up family control is lowest at the founding
generation and such willingness increases as firms move from the founding generation to
later generations. As such, independent of financial considerations, losses in family
control should weigh less heavily as family firms move from the founding generation to
later generations. Consistent with my previous arguments regarding the relationship
between family firms’ goals and diversification preference, I expect that family firms run
by founding generation family members will rely more on product diversification than
international diversification in comparison to family firms run by later generation family
members.
From a resource perspective, I argue that founding generation family owners have
typically been involved in the business since its inception and thus they are likely to have
implicit and tacit knowledge of the firm (Duran et al., 2016). Such knowledge can
facilitate entrepreneurial activity and innovation associated with product diversification,
especially internal mode of diversification (Burgelman, 1983; Srivastava, & Lee, 2005).
As the second and subsequent generations seek to enter the business, new generations
may have acquired abilities and knowledge that the founder generation may not have and
they may be impatient to demonstrate their capabilities by looking for strategic
opportunities and fostering the business through international expansion and as such
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create “space” for themselves (Fernández et al., 2005; Okoroafo & Perryy, 2010). This
suggests later generation family owners are likely to be more receptive to export
involvement (Okoroafo et al., 2010). Anecdotal evidence can provide some support to
this line of argument. For example, the Rothschild family adopted a geographic
diversification strategy and had each of their five sons set up banking business in one of
the era’s five principal European financial capitals including Frankfurt, Vienna, Paris,
Naples, and Paris (Hughes, 2004). In this case, international diversification allowed the
second generation Rothschild family members to use their talents and explore various
international markets (Hughes, 2004). Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 14: Family firms run by founding generation family members will
rely more on product diversification than international diversification in
comparison to other family firms.
In sum, these relationships are depicted in the theoretical model in Figure 3.
Methodology
Sample and Data Collection
To test these hypotheses, I drew my sample from several sources including
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Compustat, the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP), Mergent Online, company proxy statements (DEF 14A), company annual
reports (10-K), and company Web sites. Product and international diversification data
was drawn from Compustat database and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
Data on firm characteristics including ownership structure of the firm, family
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management, and governance was manually collected from firms’ proxy statements filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)32.
Specifically, my sample consists of 573 manufacturing firms drawn from S&P
1500 for the fiscal years 1998 to 2017. I used the sample for the fiscal years 1998 to 2017
due to the differences in reporting information about operating segments of a firm preand post-1998 (Jiraporn, Kim, & Davidson, 2008; Kumar, 2009). In order to keep the
industry background consistent, I focused my analysis on manufacturing firms with 4digit SIC codes ranging from 2000 to 3999. Utility and service firms are subject to
specific government regulations compared to other firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Patel
& Chrisman, 2014), and they are also less likely to engage in international actions (Fang
et al., 2018). As such, these firms were not included in my analysis. To ensure the
direction of causality, one-year lags between the dependent and other variables are used.
The dependent variable is measured from 1999 to 2017, whereas the independent and
control variables are measured from 1998 to 2016. Due to the longitudinal nature of data,
I used fixed-effect longitudinal regression models to test all hypotheses33.
In total, initial data collection generated 578 firms representing 11,560 firm-year
observations from 1998 to 2017 for further cleaning and analysis. Within this sample, I
carried out an initial data cleaning. I replace missing values associated with sales
generated from noncore businesses with zero. Likewise, I replace missing values
associated with sales from foreign markets with zero34. The final sample yielded an

32

SEC is accessed via https://www.sec.gov/. This data collection process involved several hundred hours of
work over a period of six months.
33
Hausman test also confirmed the superiority of fixed effects model over random effects (p<0.001).
34
There are 1,841 observations that foreign sales value equals to zero and 628 observations that noncore
business sales equal to zero.
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unbalanced panel dataset consisting of 573 firms representing 9,508 firm-year
observations used to analyze the difference between family and nonfamily firms (H8),
and 136 family firms representing 1,816 firm-year observations to analyze the
heterogeneity hypotheses (H9 – H14).
Measures
Dependent Variable
The relative emphasis on product over international diversification. In this study,
I am interested in examining the relative emphasis on these two types of diversification
(i.e., product diversification and international diversification) in family and nonfamily
firms, as well as in various types of family firms. Based on prior literature (Kumar,
2009), I used the following approach to measure product diversification. I first identified
the core business segment of each firm as the segment with the largest sales. I then
aggregated sales of the remaining segments to arrive at noncore business sales (Kumar,
2009). It is important to note that this measure captures entry into new markets as well as
increasing presence in existing noncore businesses. Ideally, I would have liked to
construct measures that captured only the number of new markets entered by the firm as
well as the size of entry in each of these markets, but such detailed data were not
available. From a theoretical standpoint, the fact that the measures may be capturing
increasing presence in existing markets is consistent with my arguments. Even after a
firm initially enters a particular product market, it is likely to face constraints in terms of
replicating competences and learning, which may lead to support for the use of this
measure (Kumar, 2009). Moreover, I measure product diversification using the ratio of a
firm’s sales generated from noncore businesses to sales in year t adjusted by subtracting
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median industry-level noncore business sales to sales in the same year. I adopted the most
commonly used measure of international diversification in the literature―the foreign
sales ratio―defined as a firm’s foreign sales divided by the total sales of the firm (Kang,
2013; Pukall et al., 2014; Tallman & Li, 1996). I then industry-adjusted this value by
subtracting median foreign sales to sales in the same year. Thus, the relative emphasis on
product over international diversification is calculated by taking the difference between
these two ratios35, specifically,
Difference between product and international diversification=
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 (
) − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 (
)
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠

Independent Variables
Family firms. Consistent with prior literature (Anderson et al., 2003b; Chrisman
& Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Villalonga et al., 2006), I use a binary measure
of family firms. The binary family firm measure distinguishes family firms (=1) from
nonfamily firms (=0) on the basis of ownership and family involvement in management
and board of directors. I classify firms as family firms when the following two conditions
are met: 1) at least 5% of shares held by the controlling family; 2) at least two family
members who are or have been employed as significant owners, top managers, or
directors in the firm’s history36. The advantage of this operationalization of the definition
of a family firm is that it signals intra-family succession intention (Chrisman et al., 2012),

35

As a robustness check, I also took the ratio of these two industry-adjusted values as an alternative
measure for the relative emphasis on product over international diversification.
36
Family member is a person who is related by blood or by marriage to the owning family. To further test
if my results hold at various ownership threshold levels, I also used a more conservative definition of
family control by using a measure of ownership where the family owns at least 10% or 20% of the equity
and at least two family members who are or have been involved in the top management team or the board
or as significant owners.
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which is considered the essence in the definition of a family firm (Chua et al., 1999). This
operationalization also allows me to separate “real” family firms from lone founder firms
in which no relatives of the founder is involved in the firm. This distinction is important
because these two groups of firms might display differences in their strategies and
outcomes (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011; Miller et al., 2007).
Family ownership. Although family ownership has been used to classify family
and nonfamily firms, it still significantly varies among family firms. Some family firms
may have larger family ownership compared to others. Family ownership is measured as
a continuous variable based on the overall percentage of shares owned by the controlling
family (Anderson et al., 2003a; Fang, 2016). Since I am interested in the variation of
family ownership in the family business population only, any firm with less than 5% of
family ownership is not included in the analysis of the heterogeneity hypotheses.
Family CEO. I define family CEO as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1
when the CEO of the family firm is a family member and 0 otherwise37.
Family board chair. I define family board chair as a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 when the chair of the board is a family member and 0 otherwise38.
Representation of family members in the TMT. This variable is measured using
the number of family executives divided by the total number of executives in the TMT39.

37

As a robustness check, I have also used the number of years that the CEO has worked in the firm as an
alternative measure to capture the presence of a family CEO in the firm.
38
As a robustness check, I have also used the number of years that the chair has worked in the firm as an
alternative measure to capture the presence of a family board chair in the firm.
39
As a robustness check, I have also used count variable to measure the representation of family members
in the TMT.

146

Representation of family members on the board. This variable is measured based
on the number of family directors divided by the total number of directors on the board40.
Family firms run by founding generation family members. This variable is defined as a
dummy variable and takes a value of 1 when there is a founding generation family
member in the TMT and/or the board and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
I include a number of control variables in my analysis to account for alternative
explanations of the relationship between family firms and the strength of the preference
for product to international diversification. Consistent with prior literature (Xie &
O’Neill, 2014), I control for influence of firm age and firm size. A firm’s age can
influence a firm’s diversification (Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000). New firms will
have fewer resources and lower level of structural complexity for diversification than
established firms (Haveman, 1993). Firm age is calculated using the number of years
since the firm was founded. Firm size is also argued to be positively associated with a
firm’s diversification (Fiegenbaum, Shaver, & Yeung, 1997). Firm size is measured as
the natural logarithm of the total number of employees of the firm. In addition, I control
for advertising intensity of a firm, which can also affect a firm’ geographic and market
expansion (Delios et al., 1999). Advertising intensity is calculated using advertising
expense divided by total sales of the firm. I also controlled for a firm’s investment

40

As a robustness check, I have also used count variable to measure the representation of family members
on the board.
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intensity, which is calculated as capital expenditures divided by plant property and
equipment investment.
I control for debt ratio using debt-to-asset ratio in year t-1 because debt ratio can
affect a firm’s strategies (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). I also included past financial
performance in my regression models as a control variable as performance may affect
strategic decisions in a firm (McNamara, Vaaler, & Devers, 2003; Su & Tsang, 2015).
The performance of a firm in the past year is measured using industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q
in year t-1 and ROA was used as a robustness check. I also control for a firm’s prior
diversification experience. Diversification is a phenomenon generally considered to be
path-dependent (Teece et al., 1997). A firm’s prior experience can affect a firm’s
subsequent diversification behavior (Jung, Beamish, & Goerzen, 2010; Mayer et al.,
2014). A firm’s prior diversification experience is measured using the difference between
product and international diversification in year t-141. Industry dummies measured at the
two-digit SIC level and year dummies were also used to control for differences in
diversification behavior across industries and years, respectively.
I have argued there will be differences in the strength of the preference for
product to international diversification between family and nonfamily firms as well as
among various types of family firms. It was important to make sure that my findings are
not caused by other types of concentrated ownership. Thus, I also include the ownership
structure of the firm (Tihanyi et al., 2003), specifically, nonfamily blockholder ownership
as a control variable. Nonfamily blockholder ownership is measured based on the overall

41

The ratio of product to international diversification in year t-1 is used as an alternative measure. I have
also used industry-adjusted PD and industry-adjusted ID as two separate controls. Similar results were
obtained.
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percentage of blockholder ownership in year t-1. Moreover, prior research also shows
that a firm’s diversification is related to the CEO duality (Sanders et al., 1998). CEOs
holding dual positions might be particularly able to pursue strategies that attend to the
needs of the controlling family (Duran et al., 2016; Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014).
Thus, I also control for family CEO duality (when both the CEO and the board chair
positions are assumed by a family member). Lastly, the inverse Mills ratio calculated to
control for endogeneity is added as an additional control in all models.
Controlling for Endogeneity
I used several approaches to mitigate endogeneity concerns, which may be caused
by alternative explanations or the problem associated with reverse causality between the
independent and dependent variables. First, as mentioned earlier, I manipulated one-year
lags between the dependent variable and other variables to infer the direction of causality.
Moreover, I included a firm’s diversification experience in year t-1 to control for reverse
causality. Second, On the basis of Lee, Maddala, & Trost (1980), I adopt Heckman’s
(1979) two-stage technique. I used two instrumental variables that are highly related to
the independent variables but are not related to the dependent variable to control for
alternative explanations. I include family firms’ fraction of sales by industry as an
instrumental variable (Amit, Ding, Villalonga, & Zhang, 2015; Fang, 2016)42. This
variable is naturally correlated with the probability that a firm in the industry is a family
firm, however, they should not be correlated with the second-stage dependent variable

Initially, I included family firms’ fraction of capital expenditure by industry and family firms’ fraction of
advertisement expenditure by industry as other instrumental variables. After running analyses, these
variables were found not to significantly predict family firms, and thus were not included in my subsequent
analyses.
42
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(i.e., the relative emphasis on product over international diversification). Family firms’
fraction of sales by industry is measured using the amount of sales by family firms in an
industry divided by the total amount of sales in the same industry.
I also included family trust holdings affiliated with the largest owners of the firm
in a given year as another instrumental variable (Fang, 2016). Family trust or foundations
are often used by family firms as means to take care of the needs of their family
members. Thus, family trust holdings are likely to be highly related to family business
variables but should not be related to the dependent variable (i.e., the relative emphasis
on product diversification over international diversification). Family trust holdings are
measured as a binary variable in which 1 denotes the situation where the owner holds
either trusts or foundations associated with family members and 0 otherwise. Data related
to family trust holdings was manually collected from firms’ proxy statement reports.
STATA package (version 13.0) was used for data analysis. Using Heckman’s
two-stage procedure, I first estimated a probit model in which family firms (=1) versus
nonfamily firms (=0) was regressed against the two instrumental variables and other
controls mentioned above. These predictors include nonfamily block holder ownership,
firm age, firm size, debt to equity ratio, firm performance, advertising to sales ratio, new
investment in plant and equipment, family trust holdings, family firms’ fraction of sales
by industry, and firm prior diversification experience (Anderson et al., 2003b). Based on
the first-stage regression, I calculated the inverse Mills ratio and included it in my
second-stage models, which are used to test my hypotheses.
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Analyses
I took a number of steps to address important methodological issues that are
common in panel data analysis. First, I employed a firm fixed effects model to attend to
the potential issue of unobserved heterogeneity that might arise out of multiple
observations per firm (Certo & Semadeni, 2006; Hsiao, 1985). The fixed effects model
focuses on within-firm variation over time, so the coefficients are not biased by timeinvariant firm heterogeneity (Greene, 2003). I conducted Hausman tests and the results
confirmed the superiority of fixed effects model over random effects (p<0.001)
(Hausman & Taylor, 1981). Accordingly, all analyses were estimated using the xtreg
STATA command with fixed-effects option (fe). Second, a Woolridge test (Woolridge,
2002) and a Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979) provided evidence of serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity in my panel dataset. To control for these problems, I
estimated robust standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimator clustered at
the firm level (White, 1980). Specifically, I used the vce(robust) STATA command to
obtain robust standard errors. Third, I also controlled for multicollinearity by examining
correlation matrix of coefficient of xtreg model using the estat vce, corr STATA
command43. I followed the threshold of 0.6 correlation recommended by Allison (1999).
According to Allison (1999), correlation above 0.6 will be a major concern. The results
obtained were well below 0.6, indicating multicollinearity is not a major concern. Finally,
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Variance inflation factor (VIF) is designed to check for multicollinearity for pooled OLS regression.
Since I used fixed effects models, I checked multicollinearity by examining correlation matrix of
coefficient (Allison, 1999).
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all variables were winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile in response to extreme outliers
in the data set44.
Empirical Results
Variables included in my analysis are listed and defined in Table 30, along with
their sources. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the variables are presented
in Table 3145. In general, family firms represent 19.3% of my sample, while lone-founder
firms represent 7.9%. These numbers are comparable to other studies exploring
publically traded family firms and lone-founder firms (Anderson et al., Chrisman &
Patel, 2012; Fang, 2016; Miller et al., 2007). Consistent with prior literature, family firms
are shown to have lower levels of product diversification (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) and
international diversification (Arregle et al., 2012) than nonfamily firms.
As mentioned earlier, this study used Heckman’s two-stage technique to partially
control for endogeneity. Model 1 in Table 32 was the first-stage probit treatment model
in which family firm as a binary variable was regressed against control and instrumental
variables. I did not include lone founder firms, because lone founder firms are mutually
exclusive from family firms. Family trust holdings (B=3.128, p<0.001) and family firms’
fraction of sales by industry (B=0.675, p<0.001) are found to be significantly and
positively related to the family business variable, suggesting that the selection of
instrumental variables is appropriate. Model 2 of Table 32 tested Hypothesis 8, which
predicts that family firms will rely more on product than international diversification in
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I have also run all of the analyses with the full sample. Similar results were obtained.
Comparison of the means, standard deviations, and ranges of all variables for family and nonfamily
firms, as well as among various types of family firms are also provided and shown in Table 45, 46, 47, and
48.
45
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comparison to nonfamily firms. The result shows that family firms do not have a
significant influence on a firm’s relative emphasis on product over international
diversification (B=0.009, p>0.1). In other words, there is no significant difference
between family and nonfamily firms in their tendency to engage in product rather than
international diversification. Therefore, H8 was not supported.
Models 3-9 (Table 33, 34, and 35) test heterogeneity hypotheses (H9 – H14)
concerning the effects of family ownership, family CEO, family representation in the
TMT, family board chair, family representation on the board, and founding generation
family members on a family firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than
international diversification. Model 3 (Table 33) tests the effect of family ownership on a
firm’s stronger tendency to engage in product rather than international diversification.
The result shows that family ownership is positively related to a firm’s tendency to
engage in product rather than international diversification, however, this relationship is
not significant (B=0.0002, p>0.1). Hence, H9 was not supported. Model 4 (Table 33)
tests the effect of a family CEO on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than
international diversification. Consistent with my prediction, family CEO is found to have
a significantly positive effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than
international diversification (B=0.051, p<0.1)46. This finding suggests that family firms
with a family CEO present in the firm are likely to have a stronger tendency to engage in
product rather than international diversification. Model 5 (Table 33) tests the effect of
family representation in the TMT on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than
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I have also tested this hypothesis using the number of years the CEO has worked in the firm as an
alternative measure for family CEO. The result shows a non-significant positive effect of family CEO on a
firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than international diversification (B=0.001, p>0.1).
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international diversification. The result shows that the representation of family executives
in the TMT has a significantly positive effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in product
rather than international diversification (B=0.212, p<0.05), suggesting that a larger
representation of family executives will increase the possibility of engaging in product
rather than international diversification and thus provides empirical support for H11.
Model 6 (Table 34) tests the effect of family board chair on a firm’s tendency to
engage in product rather than international diversification. The result shows that the
effect of family chair is positive, but not significant (B=0.066, p>0.1)47. Therefore, H12
was not supported. Moreover, Model 7 (Table 34) tests the effect of family representation
on the board on a family firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than international
diversification. The result shows that family directors have a positive effect on this
tendency, however, this effect is not significant (B=0.101, p>0.1). Therefore, H13 was
not supported. Lastly, Model 8 (Table 34) tests the effect of family founding generation
on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than international diversification. The
result shows that founding generation family has a non-significant negative effect
(B=−0.016, p>0.1). Therefore, H14 was not supported. Lastly, Model 9 in Table 35 has
all the heterogeneity variables included and shows that family CEO (B=0.054, p<0.1) and
family representation in the TMT (B=0.215, p<0.05) both have a significantly positive
effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than international diversification.
These results are consistent with those obtained when they were analyzed separately.

47

Similar result was drawn when family chair is measured using the number of years the chair has worked
in the firm (B=0.001, p>0.1).
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Robustness and Post-hoc Tests
A number of measures were employed to establish the robustness of my results.
First, in my analyses above, I have used the difference between product and international
diversification to measure the dependent variable. As a robustness check, I have also used
the ratio of product to international diversification to measure the emphasis on product
over international diversification. These results are shown in Model 10-18 (Table 36-39).
Family representation in the TMT is again found to have a significantly positive effect on
a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than international diversification when the
ratio measure is used (B=5.631, p<0.05) (Model 14 of Table 37). However, the
significantly positive effects of family CEO shown using the difference measure is not
found when the ratio approach is employed (B=0.638, p>0.1) (Model 13 of Table 37).
Other results, all not significant, are consistent with those obtained when the difference
measure is used.
Second, in my analyses above, I have used the threshold of 5% family ownership
to define family firms. As a post-hoc test, I have also used the threshold of 10% family
ownership to define family firms. Similar results were obtained48. Consistent with my
prediction, family representation in the TMT is again shown to have a significantly
positive effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than international
diversification (B=0.238, p<0.05)49 (Model 20 of Table 40), suggesting the representation
of family members in the TMT will increase the likelihood of using product rather than

48

The results reported herein are for H11 (family representation in the TMT) only. Other results are
available upon request.
49
I again tested the hypothesis using the ratio approach to measure the DV. However, the result shows a
non-significant positive effect (B=2.985, p>0.1).
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international diversification in family firms. As a further robustness check, I have used
the threshold of 20% family ownership to define family firms. Results obtained are
similar to those obtained when a 5% or 10% family ownership threshold is used. Family
representation in the TMT is found to have a significantly positive effect on a firm’s
tendency to engage in product rather than international diversification (B=0.339,
p<0.05)50. These results are reported in Table 40 (Model 19-20) and Table 41 (Model 2122), respectively.
Third, in my data cleaning process above, I have replaced missing values
associated with sales generated from foreign markets (i.e., international diversification)
and sales from noncore businesses (i.e., product diversification) with zero. As a further
check on the robustness of my results, I have dropped observations with missing values
related to foreign sales and noncore business sales. This process leads to a sample of
5,564 firm-year observations and 435 firms for testing H8 and 853 firm-year observations
and 91 family firms for testing heterogeneity hypotheses when family firms are defined
using 5% threshold. The results are largely consistent with those obtained when the larger
sample was used51. When 5% family ownership is used to define family firms, family
representation in the TMT is shown to have significant positive effect on a firm’s
tendency to engage in product rather than international diversification (B=0.351, p<0.01).
When 10% family ownership is used to define family firms, family representation in the
TMT is again shown to have a significantly positive effect on a firm’s tendency to engage
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I again tested the hypothesis using the ratio approach to measure the DV. However, the result shows a
non-significant positive effect (B=3.774, p>0.1).
51
The results reported herein are for H11 (family representation in the TMT) only. Results for other
hypotheses testing are available upon request.
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in product rather than international diversification (B=0.429, p<0.01). Further, when 20%
family ownership is used to define family firms, the effect of family representation in the
TMT is significantly positive (B=0.624, p<0.001). These results are reported in Models
23 and 24 (Table 42), Models 25 and 26 (Table 43), and Models 27 and 28 (Table 44),
respectively.
Further, in my analyses above, I have used the number of family executives in the
TMT as a percentage of total number of executive members to measure family
representation in the TMT. As a further robustness check, I have used the count variable
as an alternative measure for family representation in the TMT. Results drawn are largely
consistent with those obtained when a percentage measure was used. Specifically, based
on a sample with observations that noncore sales and foreign sales values are missing and
deleted, and the DV measured using the difference approach, and family firms defined
using 5% family ownership, family representation in the TMT has a significantly positive
effect (B=0.05, p<0.05). Using a sample with observations that noncore sales and foreign
sales are missing and deleted, and family firms defined using 10% family ownership,
family representation on the TMT has a significantly positive effect (B=0.056, p<0.05).
Based on a sample with observations that noncore and foreign sales are missing and
deleted, and family firms defined using 20% family ownership, family representation in
TMT has a significantly positive effect (B=0.087, p<0.01). Finally, when the full sample
was used and the DV is measured using the difference approach, the effects of family
representation in the TMT are shown as follows for 5%, 10%, and 20% family
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ownership, respectively: (B=0.037, p<0.05), (B=0.038, p<0.05), and (B=0.056,
p<0.01)52.
Lastly, given that few significant results were observed in my study, it is
important to calculate the power of my statistical tests to make sure I did not fail to detect
any significant relationship. Statistical power, or 1−β, is a function of significance level
α, sample size, and population effect size (Cohen, 1988). I use G*Power program to
calculate the power of my statistical tests. G*Power is a power analysis program
commonly used in the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences (Faul Erdfelder,
Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007; Wilden, Gudergan,
Nielsen, & Lings, 2013). Based on inputs related to effect size, α error probability, total
sample size, and number of predictors, a post hoc power is computed. An illustration of
the power calculation using G*Power is reported in Figure 2. The post-hoc power test
revealed that statistical power of each regression model was well above the commonly
accepted threshold of 0.8 (Cohen, 1992). Specifically, the statistical power of the
regression model had high post-hoc power ranging from 0.99 and 1. The powers of these
models are presented with the regression results in the attached tables. These results
further strengthen confidence in my results.
Discussion and Conclusions
Firms seeking to expand the scope of their activities can do so by engaging in
product or international diversification or both (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2009; Kumar,
2009; Mayer et al., 2014). Family firms are found to have lower levels of diversification

52

Detailed results to these tests are available upon request.
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in both product (Anderson et al., 2003a; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010) and international
dimensions (Fang et al., 2018; Pukall et al., 2014). At the same time, research shows the
prevalence of large-scale family firms (e.g., Villalonga et al., 2006). This suggests while
family firms are more reluctant to make such investments, family firms do invest in
diversification. This naturally raises a question of which type of diversification family
firms are more likely to choose once they decide to diversify. Thus, this essay sets out to
answer the following research question—when family firms decide to diversify, which
type of diversification (product versus international diversification) are they more likely
to choose relative to nonfamily firms?
There is a growing recognition that the essence of family influence on a firm’s
behaviors and strategies can be understood based on three pillars—goals, governance,
and resources (Chrisman et al., 2013; Chua et al., 2012; Daspit, Chrisman, Sharma,
Pearson, & Long, 2017). Family firms are argued to have unique family governance,
pursue family-centered goals, and possess idiosyncratic resources (Chrisman et al., 2013;
Daspit et al., 2018). Based on insights drawn from the goals, governance, and resources
framework, I theorize and test that family firms will be more likely to rely on product
rather than international diversification in comparison to nonfamily firms (H1). Given
that family firms are a largely heterogeneous group (Chua et al., 2012; Melin &
Nordqvist, 2007), I further propose and test that different types of family firms are likely
to exhibit different levels of preference for product diversification and international
diversification. Specifically, family firms with larger percentages of family ownership
(H9), the presence of a family CEO (H10), larger representations of family executives
(H11), the presence of a family board chair (H12), larger representations of family
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directors (H13), and the presence of founding generation family owners (H14) are likely
to exhibit stronger preferences for product to international diversification.
Based on a sample of publicly held manufacturing firms drawn from the S&P
1500 index, I found that family representation in the TMT has a significantly positive
effect on a firm’s propensity towards product rather than international diversification.
This finding is consistent with my prediction. This finding is robust when the dependent
variable is measured using either the difference or the ratio approach. Likewise, this
finding is robust when different family ownership threshold is used to define family
firms. Lastly, this finding is robust when family representation in the TMT is measured
using either the percentage of family executives divided by the total number of
executives or the count measure based on the number of family executives.
The top management team are senior office executives in a firm, such as the CEO,
vice chairman, or executive vice president. The interaction and demography of the TMT
play an important role in strategy formation of an organization. The importance of the
background, experiences, and values of top managers in influencing the choices they
make has long been emphasized in the upper echelon literature (e.g., Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The upper echelon theory purports that firm
behavior is a “reflection” of the characteristics and actions of the top management team
(Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Hambrick, 2007). Family firm, like other organizations,
is often managed by a team or group of individuals whose collective dynamics has a
direct impact on the firm’s decisions (Ensley & Pearson, 2005).
In recent years, there is a growing number of studies investigating the
involvement of family members in leadership positions and its implications on a family
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firm’s behaviors (e.g., Patel et al., 2014; Stadler et al., 2018). From a resource
perspective, the endowment of social and human capital of top managers is central to the
firm’s strategic decisions. On one hand, family managers’ early and close involvement in
the firm helps them develop valuable human and social capital that can be used for
product diversification. The social capital of family managers can therefore generate a
substantial positive impact on product diversification behavior. Further, as family
representatives in the TMT increases, top management teams become more homogeneous
(König et al., 2013; Sirmon et al., 2003). Their homogeneous background is argued to be
associated with “local search” (König et al., 2013), thus facilitating the choice of locally
product diversification. In addition, the particularistic and long-term socialization process
of these top family executives within the firm is likely to facilitate the transfer of tacit
knowledge and social capital in family firms (Bammens et al., 2015; Stadler et al., 2018;
Verbeke & Kano, 2012), thus providing extra incentives for them to choose product
rather than international diversification. On the other hand, in family firms, family
executives are likely to spend their entire careers in the firm. Upper echelons research
suggests that executives who have long tenure in the firm are likely to have limited
perspectives towards issues (Hambrick et al., 1984). This would suggest these longtenured family executives probably have restricted knowledge base, which will not be
conducive for addressing problems brought by international diversification that often
involves deregulation (Hambrick et al., 1984; Carpenter et al., 2001).
While the representation of family executives in the TMT is found to have a
significantly positive effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than
international diversification, the effects of the other heterogeneity variables are not
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significant. This may be explained by the literature that suggests differences in the
governance structures in terms of the level of family ownership, family participation in
the TMT and the board have important implications for our understanding of differences
in goals and resources of family firms and their strategic behaviors (e.g., Chrisman et al.,
2013). At the same time, there is also a growing recognition that different governance
structures are likely to influence a family firm behavior differently (e.g., Daspit et al.,
2018). For example, the CEO and the TMT may differ from one another in influencing a
firm behavior, because they possess different power and status (Carpenter & Wade,
2002). The significant finding of family representation in the TMT on a family firm’s
diversification preference provides empirical evidence to support the notion that different
governance structures play different roles and have various levels of importance in
influencing a family firm behavior.
Regarding the insignificant findings in this study, particularly the effect of family
firms on a firm’s relative emphasis on product over international diversification, there are
several alternative explanations. From a goals perspective, both product and international
diversification are considered risky decisions (Lee et al., 2010), and entail the loss of
decision-making control for the family firm. For example, product diversification may
erode family control because of the need to bringing in outside expertise (Gomez-Mejia
et al., 2010). This literature, to a certain extent, explains why family firms have no
stronger preference for product to international diversification. Further, while retaining
family control is considered a dominant goal in family firms’ decision-making
(Chrisman, Chua et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), family firms’ decisions are
likely to be driven by other types of goals such as preserving the business for future
162

generations. Family business owners may be motivated to exploit international
opportunities in order to create employment for themselves and for their offspring,
especially when owners are long-term oriented and view their firm as an asset to pass
onto their descendants (Casson, 1999; Sciascia et al., 2012; Zahra, 2005). Future research
is recommended to study how different types of family firms’ goals interact with one
another and together influence a family firm’s diversification behavior.
From a resource perspective, I have argued product diversification will allow
family firms to transfer sticky resources across the firm and thereby support more
efficient resource orchestration within the family firm (Duran et al., 2016). As such,
family firms are likely to be more attracted to product than international diversification.
Insights drawn from the foreign direct investments literature suggest that international
diversification can be understood from two dimensions―geographic scope (or breadth)
and geographic scale (or depth) (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Lu & Beamish, 2004). The
geographic scope captures the diversity of its international operations, whereas the
geographic scale captures the degree of a firm’s involvement in international markets
(Goerzen et al., 2003; Lu et al., 2004). Family business researchers have shown while
family firms have unique challenges in managing complexity resulting from expanding in
multiple and diverse foreign markets, family firms have fewer challenges in managing
the amount of international scale (Arregle et al., 2017). Future studies are recommended
to take both scope and scale dimensions of internationalization into account to gain an
even better understanding about family firms’ product and international diversification.
This study makes several theoretical contributions to the current literature. First,
while prior literature has shed important insights on the level of diversification in family
163

firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), our knowledge related to which type of diversification
family firms are more likely to choose relative to nonfamily firms remains limited. Thus,
the focus of my study of diversification types in family firms enhances our knowledge of
diversification behavior in family firms. Our finding that a large representation of family
executives suggests a stronger tendency for product rather than international
diversification confirms the combined effects of goals, governance and resources on a
firm’s behavior.
Second, this study contributes to the advancement of a theory of the family
enterprise. Family business scholars have borrowed theories from domains including
management, finance, and economics (Barney, 1991; Cyert et al., 1963; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1975). Although many insights have been derived from the
application and extensions of these theories, there is a need to advance the field of family
businesses through the development of a theory of the family enterprise. Based on
insights drawn upon the goals, governance, and resources framework, this study extends
our knowledge of the application of this framework and improves our knowledge of the
essence of family influence on a firm’s behavior.
Third, this study also contributes to the mainstream diversification literature.
There is a long tradition of investigating the scope of a firm in terms of its international
activities and the product-market in which firms participate (Rumelt, 1974; Sakhartov,
2017). The majority of prior research has investigated these two types of diversification
separately. By considering product and international diversification simultaneously and
assessing the relative extent of these two types of diversification, this study helps to
provide a finer-grained understanding of a firm’s diversification strategies. As such, this
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study advances the current diversification literature, specifically the influence of
dominant collation on a firm’s choice of diversification strategy.
Aside from its contributions, my study has several limitations that represent
opportunities for future research. First, my study uses a convenience sample of publicly
held manufacturing firms drawn from the S&P 1500 index. These firms are quite diverse
particularly with respect to size. Although the restrictions I imposed on my sampling
frame render the assessment of how family involvement affects a firm’s choice of
diversification strategy more reliable, future research using other sampling frames is
warranted since my results may not be generalizable to private firms, smaller firms, firms
outside of the U.S., or firms in other industries. Second, consistent with previous studies
(Berrone et al., 2010; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), I use family
ownership and management as a proxy to capture the pursuit of family goals and the
possession of idiosyncratic familiness. I argue that different levels of family involvement
in the firm lead to differences in the level and type of family goals they pursue and in the
stock of resources. Future research can use other research designs such as a survey
methodology that will allow capturing the essence of family influence, family goals, and
familiness directly. Third, I have adopted a general approach in my discussion of product
diversification and international diversification. Consistent with prior literature (Lee &
Lieberman, 2010), my discussion of product diversification focuses on internal direct
development and acquisitions, and related and unrelated diversification. While in
consideration of other foreign market entry modes, my discussion of international
diversification focuses on exporting activities since exporting is considered the most
prevalent form of international expansion (Shaver, 2011). Future studies are also
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recommended to take a finer-grained approach to discuss the implications of goals,
governance, and resources on the choice of different types of diversification in family and
nonfamily firms.
In conclusion, this study uses the goals, governance, and resources framework to
investigate diversification types in family firms. I theorize and test that family firms are
likely to use product diversification rather than international diversification to a larger
extent than nonfamily firms. The same prediction is made for family firms with a family
CEO, a family board chair, and a large percentage of family ownership, a large
representation of family executives, a large representation of family directors, and family
firms controlled by the founding generation family owners. An empirical analysis of
manufacturing firms drawn from the S&P 1500 between 1998 and 2017 shows family
firms with a large representation of family executives in the TMT have a stronger
tendency to engage in product rather than international diversification; however, other
hypotheses were not supported.
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Table 28

The characteristics of product diversification and international diversification
Product diversification

Resources

International diversification

- requires a firm’s competences and capability
to manage a diversified product portfolio
- can leverage local resources and firm-specific
tacit resources and knowledge
- high levels of transferability of a firm’s
resources can facilitate product diversification,
specifically, internal diversification

Risks

- requires managerial competence and ability to develop
and coordinate across the global web of subsidiaries;
requires external ties, particularly in the international
arena, such as with foreign governments; unlikely to
leverage the advantages of local resources and
connections
- less likely to leverage the benefits associated with high
transferability of existing resources, because the
transferring of resources often necessitates close contact
between transferors and potential recipients

- risks and uncertainty associated with the
- face social, political, and legal risks and unknown
development of new products, technologies, and “rules of engagement” in a foreign country
capabilities
- risk of diluting strategic control over a firm’s decision
- risk of diluting family ownership control of
making, e.g., exporters generally lack in the control of
the firm associated with external diversification market access to a foreign country
due to stock swaps and risk of losing family
- geographically more distant and less familiar to the
control over the strategic-decision due to the
focal firm, which makes it harder to maintain a consistent
hiring of nonfamily managers
reputation for the family firm
- geographically closer to the focal firm and
- risk of know-how being expropriated by their partners
more familiar to the firm, which can facilitate
in the foreign country
the perpetuating of a positive reputation
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Table 29

The perceptions of family firms and nonfamily firms on product diversification and international diversification

Decisionmaking
control

Utilization of
firm-specific
resources

In comparison to nonfamily firms, family firms are more likely to perceive that the loss of decision-making
control associated with international diversification is greater than the loss of decision-making control
associated with product diversification.
- Unlike nonfamily firms, family firms are driven by the goal of remaining and exerting family strategic
control over the firm.
- While product diversification, especially internal diversification, is likely to provide a family firm with
total strategic control of the firm, product diversification may entail the loss of family control over strategic
decision-making due to the employment of nonfamily managers.
- International diversification is likely to dilute the family’s ability to exercise decision-making control of
the firm. For example, the exporting mode generally lacks in providing marketing control for the firm. The
exporter, especially through the distributor, sometimes only has indirect control with export operations
locally in the export market.
- Compared to the type of control loss associated with international diversification, family firms may be less
reluctant to avoid the type of control loss associated with product diversification because the employment of
nonfamily managers is still under the control of the controlling family.
In comparison to nonfamily firms, family firms are more likely to perceive the benefits associated with
product diversification that allows them to utilize the strong local resources.
- Unlike nonfamily firms, family firms are argued to have particularly strong local connections and
resources. Social capital and tacit knowledge of family managers is argued to be particularly effective in
limiting the coordination costs associated with product diversification.
- Product diversification, especially internal diversification, allows family firms to transfer their ‘sticky’
tacit resources such as ideas and resources across departments and thereby support more efficient resource
orchestration within the family firm.
- International diversification often requires foreign assignments of family managers, and the increase of
physical and cultural distance can reduce interactions among family members, thus adding the difficulty of
sustaining the extent of interaction and interdependence required to maintain the advantages of familybased social capital.
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Table 29 (continued)
Risk of
knowledge
expropriation

Risk of
threatening
family image
and reputation

In comparison to nonfamily firms, family firms are likely to perceive the risk of knowledge expropriation
resulting from international diversification to be greater because they have emotional and financial
attachment to the existing resources and assets.
- Unlike nonfamily firms, family firms are argued to have a strong attachment to their existing resources
and assets.
- International diversification is likely to entail the risk of disseminating firm-specific know-how such as
technological and marketing know-how to external parties. For example, while exporters generally need to
acquire new knowledge related to foreign market in order to compete in where they have little or no
previous experience, they often face the risk of reverse engineering by a foreign partner.
- Conversely, product diversification, internal diversification, in particular, can provide safeguards to
protect the value of the existing resources and knowledge of the family firm and thus help keep control of
the firm’s resources.
In comparison to nonfamily firms, family firms are likely to perceive the risk of threatening family image
and reputation as a result of international diversification to be greater because international diversification
might put the reputation of the firm, the family, as well as family members at risk.
- While all firms are concerned with building a positive reputation, family firms are particularly sensitive to
protect and enhance their image and reputation.
- Product diversification is likely to allow family firms to benefit from the exploitation of an established
family “name” and the acceptance in the regional market.
- Firms expanding internationally need to face greater uncertainty and increased risks associated with a less
familiar environment. For example, an untrustworthy partner in an exporting relationship can prevent a firm
from meeting its customers’ demands and thus threaten the family firm’s reputational capital.
- International diversification requires a firm’s norms to be adapted to foreign cultures and thus leads to the
destabilization of social relations within the family, which may dilute a consistent image of the family firm
and the projection of the family owners onto that image.
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Table 30

Summary of variables and measures – Essay 2

Variable
Dependent Variable
Industry-adjusted relative
emphasis on product
diversification over
international
diversification

Definition/Measure
Difference between industry-adjusted product diversification (i.e.,
sales generated from noncore businesses divided by total sales)
and industry-adjusted international diversification (i.e., sales from
foreign markets divided by total sales);
Ratio of industry-adjusted product diversification to industryadjusted international diversification as an alternative measure;
Source: Compustat

Independent Variables
Family Firm

Family Ownership

Family CEO

Family Board Chair

Family firm is a binary variable; 1 indicates presence of family.
Two conditions are required to be considered a family firm: 1) at
least 5% of the firm's equity hold by the family; 2) at least two
family members involved in the firm as insiders (officers or
directors) or large owners;
10% and 20% of the firm’s equity hold by the family as
alternative measures;
Source: Firm Proxy; Mergent Online; Company Web Site.
The total voting share expressed as a percentage of total
outstanding shares owned by the controlling family;
Source: Firm Proxy; Company Web Site.
Family CEO is a binary variable; 1 indicates that any family
member holds the title of chief executive officer (CEO);
The duration of the CEO working in the firm as an alternative
measure;
Source: Firm Proxy.
Family board chair is a binary variable; 1 indicates that any
family member holds the title of chairman of the board;
The duration of the board chair working in the firm as an
alternative measure; Source: Firm proxy.

Family Representation in
the TMT

The number of family executives in the TMT as a percentage of
total number of executive members;
Count variable as an alternative measure;
Source: Firm Proxy.

Family Representation on
the Board

The number of family directors on the board as a percentage of
total number of directors;
Count variable as an alternative measure;
Source: Firm Proxy.

Founding Generation
Family

A binary variable; 1 indicates a family firm with family
member(s) present from the founding generation.
Source: Firm Proxy; Company Web Site; Other public web
source.
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Table 30 (continued)
Control Variables

Definition/Measure

Firm Age

Calculated in years as the difference between the data year and
the firm's founding year;
Source: Firm Proxy; Mergent Online; Company Web Site; Other
public web source.
The natural log of total number of employees of the firm;
The natural log of annual net sales as an alternative measure;
Source: Compustat.
Calculated as the values of total debt divided by the market value
of common equity; Source: Compustat.
Tobin's Q is the ratio of the firm's market value to book value and
is calculated as follows: ((common shares outstanding * calendar
year closing price) + (current liabilities - current assets) + (longterm debt) + (the liquidating value of preferred stock)) divided by
(total assets). Source: Compustat.
Calculated as firm Tobin's Q minus median industry Tobin's Q at
a two digit SIC; Source: Compustat.
ROA is calculated as income before extraordinary items divided
by total assets of the firm. Source: Compustat.
Industry-adjusted relative emphasis on product over international
diversification in year t-1; Source: Compustat.

Firm Size

Debt to Equity Ratio
Tobin's Q

Industry Adjusted Tobin's
Q
Return on Assets (ROA)
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification
Experience
Advertising

Investment

Nonfamily Block Holder
Ownership

Family CEO Duality

Lone Founder

Family Trust Holdings
Family Firm's Fraction of
Sale by Industry

Advertising expense ratio is calculated as advertising expense
divided by total sales. Firms with missing data were coded =0.
Source: Compustat.
Investment ratio is calculated as capital expenditures divided by
plant property and equipment. Firms with missing data were
coded =0. Source: Compustat.
Calculated as the total percentage of shares hold by all nonfamily
block holders. Block holders are individuals or institutions listed
in the firm proxy as beneficial owners of at least 5% of the firm.
Source: Firm Proxy.
A binary variable; 1 indicates when both the CEO and the board
chair positions are assumed by a family member. Source: Firm
Proxy; Company Web Site; Other public source.
Lone founder firm is a binary variable; 1 indicates a lone
founder's involvement. Lone founder firms are defined as those in
which an individual is one of the company's founders with no
other family members involved, and is also an insider (officer or
director) or a large owner (5% or more of the firm's equity).
Source: Firm Proxy; Company Web Site; Other public sources.
A binary variable; 1 indicates family trust or foundations are set
up in the family firm. Source: Firm Proxy.
Calculated as the amount of sales by family firms in a particular
industry divided by the total amount of sales in that industry;
Source: Compustat.
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Table 31

Descriptive statistics and correlation – Essay 2

1. Difference between PD and ID
2. Ratio of PD to ID
3. Industry Adjusted PD
4. Industry Adjusted ID
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO

Mean

S.D.

0.081

0.480

1.000

8.420

-0.019

1.000

0.388

0.720***

0.011

1.000

0.329

-0.603***

0.044***

0.113***

1.000

0.394

-0.051***

-0.032**

-0.073***

-0.011

1.000

17.496

-0.057***

-0.023*

-0.062***

0.009

0.771***

1.000

0.269

0.031**

-0.015

-0.051***

-0.101***

-0.138***

-0.107***

1.000

0.318

-0.048***

-0.026*

-0.098***

-0.043***

0.688***

0.559***

-0.059***

1.000

-0.011

-0.087***

-0.041***

0.720***

0.605***

-0.070***

0.816***

0.055
0.128
0.047
0.193
6.600
0.079
0.114

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9. Family Rep in the TMT

0.039

0.105

-0.042***

10. Family Chair

0.152

0.359

-0.051***

-0.027**

-0.070***

-0.006

0.808***

0.675***

-0.057***

0.808***

11. Family Rep on the Board

0.040

0.093

-0.066***

-0.021*

-0.079***

0.003

0.853***

0.737***

-0.090***

0.714***

12. Founding Generation Family

0.096

0.294

-0.049***

-0.023*

-0.095***

-0.040***

0.597***

0.421***

-0.006

0.573***

13. Family CEO Duality

0.107

0.309

-0.052***

-0.025*

-0.103***

-0.044***

0.677***

0.554***

-0.072***

0.946***

14. Nonfamily Block Holder

4.148

9.726

-0.025*

-0.034***

-0.083***

-0.059***

0.592***

0.306***

-0.058***

0.446***

15. Family Trust Holdings

0.176

0.381

-0.063***

-0.024*

-0.071***

0.010

0.903***

0.733***

-0.069***

0.613***

16. Firm Age

50.805

40.302

0.026*

0.010

0.152***

0.140***

0.071***

0.083***

-0.190***

-0.025*

17. Firm Size (ln)

1.493

1.710

-0.005

0.022*

0.232***

0.277***

-0.058***

-0.013

-0.224***

-0.117***

18. Debt to Equity Ratio

0.269

0.413

0.036***

-0.007

0.074***

0.035***

0.025*

0.029**

-0.066***

0.033**

19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q

0.392

1.512

-0.068***

0.002

-0.131***

-0.053***

-0.044***

-0.030**

0.067***

-0.051***

20. Advertising

0.012

0.028

-0.093***

0.001

-0.027**

0.100***

0.157***

0.234***

-0.006

0.081***

21. Investment
22. FFs’ Sale by Industry

0.107

0.084

-0.080***

-0.011

-0.128***

-0.033**

-0.016

-0.021*

0.141***

0.020

0.136

-0.040***

-0.026**

-0.041***

0.010

0.183***

0.156***

0.023*

0.112***

0.145
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Table 31 (continued)
9
9. Family Representation in the TMT

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

10. Family Chair

1.000
0.808***

11. Family Representation on the Board

0.787***

1.000
0.824***

0.656***

0.657***

1.000
0.616***

13. Family CEO Duality

0.796***

0.807***

0.705***

1.000
0.575***

14. Nonfamily Block Holder

0.419***

0.498***

0.490***

0.438***

1.000
0.425***

15. Family Trust Holdings

0.655***

0.761***

0.812***

0.582***

0.602***

1.000
0.524***

16. Firm Age

-0.035***

0.022*

0.065***

-0.163***

-0.021*

0.023*

1.000
0.079***

17. Firm Size (ln)

-0.130***

-0.090***

-0.090***

-0.135***

-0.116***

-0.105***

-0.04***

1.000
0.440***

0.026*

0.029**

0.014

-0.024*

0.039***

0.0133

0.009

0.070***

19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q

-0.038***

-0.058***

-0.048***

0.011

-0.050***

-0.046***

-0.033**

-0.141***

20. Advertising

0.144***

0.167***

0.168***

0.057***

0.076***

0.058***

0.187***

0.110***

21. Investment
22. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry

0.031**

0.008

0.004

0.056***

0.017

-0.020*

-0.011

-0.262***

0.091***

0.144***

0.158***

0.142***

0.115***

0.107***

0.193***

0.048***

12. Founding Generation Family

18. Debt to Equity Ratio

17
17. Firm Size (ln)

19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q

21

22

22. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry
***

0.117

1.000
-0.280***

***

-0.081

***

0.087***

-0.175

***

***

-0.253

21. Investment

p < 0.01;

20

***

-0.186
0.072

20. Advertising

* p < 0.05;

19

1.000
0.190***

18. Debt to Equity Ratio

**

18

***

***

0.097

p < 0.001
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***

1.000

0.347

-0.016

1.000
0.088***
0.073

***

1.000
0.065***

1.000

Table 32

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: H8
Model 1

Dependent Variable
Sample

Family Firm
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Business (H8)
Lone Founder Firm

Model 2
Difference between
PD and ID
Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms
0.009
0.004

***

Nonfamily Block Holder Ownership

0.044

Firm Age

0.001

Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.071

Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Family Trust Holding

0.204***
−0.050*
0.427
−0.071
3.128***

Family Sales Ratio by Industry

0.675***

***

0.001†
0.006
−0.0002
0.015
−0.002
0.204
−0.043

0.075

0.548***

−2.282***

0.022
−0.279

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

9,508
573
1180.015***

9,508
573

Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience (Difference
Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.317
105.61***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between PD and ID and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 33

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: H9, H10, and H11

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Ownership (H9)
Family CEO (H10)
Family Representation in the
TMT (H11)
Nonfamily Blockholder
Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of
employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience
(Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Difference
between PD
and ID
Family Firms
0.0002

Difference
between PD
and ID
Family Firms

Difference
between PD
and ID
Family Firms

0.051†
0.212*
0.001

0.001

0.001

−0.001
0.024
0.014

−0.042*
0.023
0.011

−0.016
0.026
0.011

0.006
−0.005
−0.392
−0.214†
0.536***

0.007
−0.005
−0.384
−0.209†
0.537***

0.006
−0.006
−0.557
−0.214†
0.533***

0.017
−1.175
Yes
Yes
1,816
136
0.321
33.24***

0.019
−1.138
Yes
Yes
1,816
136
0.321
34.16***

1.00

1.00

0.016
−1.325
Yes
Yes
1,816
136
0.323
32.70***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between PD and ID and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 34

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: H12, H13, and H14

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Board Chair (H12)

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Difference
between PD
and ID
Family Firms
0.066

Difference
between PD
and ID
Family Firms

Difference
between PD
and ID
Family Firms

Family Representation on the Board
(H13)

0.101
−0.016

Founding Generation Family (H14)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience
(Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies

0.001
−0.018
0.023
0.012
0.006
−0.005
−0.400
−0.220*
0.537***

0.001
−0.002
0.026
0.014
0.007
−0.005
−0.383
−0.218†
0.538***

0.001
−0.001
0.021
0.013
0.006
−0.005
−0.367
−0.217†
0.537***

0.017
−1.179
Yes
Yes

0.016
−1.286
Yes
Yes

0.015
−1.033
Yes
Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

1,816
136
0.322
36.30***

1,816
136
0.321
32.61***

1.00

1.00

1,816
136
0.321
33.98***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between PD and ID and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 35

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis testing all the heterogeneity
hypotheses simultaneously
Model 9
Difference between PD
and ID
Family Firms
0.0001
0.054†
0.215*
0.066
0.025
−0.031
0.001
−0.076*
0.021
0.010
0.007
−0.005
−0.595
−0.218†
0.534***

Dependent Variable

Sample
Family Ownership (H9)
Family CEO (H10)
Family Representation in the TMT (H11)
Family Board Chair (H12)
Family Representation on the Board (H13)
Founding Generation Family (H14)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification Experience
(Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
0.021
Constant
−1.119
Industry Dummies
Yes
Year Dummies
Yes
Number of Observations
1,816
Number of Firms
136
Within R-Square
0.325
F-statistics
33.19***
1.00
Power (1- β error prob)
Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between PD and ID and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 36

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H8
Model 10

Model 11

Family Firm

Ratio of PD to ID

Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms
−1.391

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Business (H8)

−0.014

Lone Founder Firm
0.043***

−0.039

0.001

−0.230*

Firm Size (log value of employees)

−0.069***

0.331

Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Family Trust Holding

0.185**
−0.054*
0.343
−0.108
3.102***

−0.021
0.029
−0.538
0.053

Family Sales Ratio by Industry

0.591**

Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Ratio Measure)

−0.006†

Nonfamily Block Holder Ownership
Firm Age

0.110***
−0.864
11.565*

Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant

−2.247

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

9,130
568
1136.238***

9,026
568

Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

***

0.015
1.68*
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the ratio of PD to ID and family firms are measured using
5% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 10
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Table 37

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H9, H10,
and H11

Dependent Variable
Sample
Family Ownership (H9)
Family CEO (H10)
Family Representation in the
TMT (H11)
Nonfamily Blockholder
Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of
employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising
Investment
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience (Ratio
Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
Constant
Industry Dummies
Year Dummies
Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

Model 12

Model 13

Model 14

Ratio of PD to
ID
Family Firms
0.037

Ratio of PD to
ID
Family Firms

Ratio of PD to
ID
Family Firms

0.638
5.631*
0.003

−0.004

−0.007

0.593
3.725
0.501

0.024
3.727
0.284

0.101
3.785
0.247

−0.626
0.201
25.154
−1.296
0.194***

−0.601
0.214
28.776
−1.462
0.196***

−0.629
0.209
23.980
−1.322
0.195***

0.069
−180.128
Yes
Yes

−0.125
−178.536
Yes
Yes

−0.156
−182.148
Yes
Yes

1,674
134
0.050
2.35***

1,674
134
0.048
2.34***

0.99

0.99

1,674
134
0.050
2.45***
0.99

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the ratio of PD to ID and family firms are measured using
5% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 10
179

Table 38

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H12, H13,
and H14
Model 15

Model 16

Model 17

Dependent Variable

Ratio of PD to
ID

Ratio of PD to
ID

Ratio of PD to
ID

Sample

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Firms

Family Board Chair (H12)
Family Representation on the Board
(H13)
Founding Generation Family (H14)

−0.512

Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

−0.005

−0.007

−0.002

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

0.666
3.740
0.313

0.539
3.648
0.243

0.433
4.113
0.284

Debt to Equity Ratio

−0.613

−0.625

−0.644

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

0.211
29.164

0.218
29.425

0.215
29.304

Investment
Industry Adjusted Prior
Diversification Experience
Inverse Mills Ratio

−1.529
0.197***

−1.441
0.196***

−1.234
0.196***

−0.185

−0.213

−0.055

Constant

−178.742

−173.559

−198.258

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

1,674
134

1,674
134

1,674
134

Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

0.048
2.35***

0.049
2.30***

0.99

0.99

0.050
2.29***
0.99

−4.258
2.657

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the ratio of PD to ID and family firms are measured using
5% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 10
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Table 39

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check testing all the
heterogeneity hypotheses simultaneously
Model 18

Dependent Variable

Ratio of PD to ID

Sample
Family Firms
Family Ownership (H9)
0.038
Family CEO (H10)
0.533
Family Representation in the TMT (H11)
5.172†
Family Board Chair (H12)
−0.241
Family Representation on the Board (H13)
−6.890
Founding Generation Family (H14)
2.231
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
0.002
Family CEO Duality
−0.210
Firm Age
3.949
Firm Size (log value of employees)
0.300
Debt to Equity Ratio
−0.700
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
0.204
Advertising
21.547
Investment
−0.613
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification Experience (Ratio
0.191***
Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
0.139
Constant
−191.034
Industry Dummies
Yes
Year Dummies
Yes
Number of Observations
1,674
Number of Firms
134
Within R-Square
0.053
F-statistics
2.26***
0.99
Power (1- β error prob)
Notes:
1. DV is measured using the ratio of PD to ID and family firms are measured using
5% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 10
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Table 40

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H11

Dependent Variable
Sample

Model 19

Model 20

Family Firms

Difference
between PD and
ID

Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Firms
0.238*

Family Representation in the TMT (H11)
0.021***

0.001

0.0005
−0.064***

−0.010
0.133
0.013

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.153**

0.011

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.037†
2.762***

−0.004
−0.245

Investment
Family Trust Holding
Family Sales Ratio by Industry
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

−0.626†
2.688***
0.682***
0.004

−0.254*

Constant

−2.19***

−6.560

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

9,508
573

1,539
130

Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

1495.258***

Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

0.532***
0.078†

0.327
29.04***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between PD and ID and family firms are
measured using 10% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 19
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Table 41

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H11

Dependent Variable
Sample

Model 21

Model 22

Family Firms

Difference
between PD and
ID

Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Firms
0.339*

Family Representation in the TMT (H11)
−0.005*

0.001

−0.0005
−0.062***

−0.002
0.106
−0.012

0.090†

0.009

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.015
4.074***

−0.006
−0.178

Investment
Family Trust Holding
Family Sales Ratio by Industry
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

−0.569†
2.536***
0.819***
0.026

−0.253

Constant

−2.316***

−5.373*

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

9,508
573

1,098
106

Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

1566.080***

Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio

0.546***
0.126***

0.349
36.32***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between PD and ID and family firms are
measured using 20% family ownership threshold
2. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
3. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
4. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
5. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 21
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Table 42

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H11

Dependent Variable
Sample

Model 23

Model 24

Family Firms

Difference
between PD and
ID

Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Firms
0.351**

Family Representation in the TMT (H11)
0.053***

0.0003

Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)

0.001
−0.077*

−0.048
0.066
0.070

Debt to Equity Ratio

0.301**

−0.001

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

−0.093
4.070**

−0.011
−0.807

Investment
Family Trust Holding
Family Sales Ratio by Industry
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

−0.109
3.240***
0.277
0.118

0.087

Constant

−2.326

Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership

**

0.472***
−0.002

***

−3.424

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

5,564
435

853
91

Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

606.654***
0.288
37.53***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between PD and ID and family firms are
measured using 5% family ownership threshold
2. Use a sample with observations that noncore and foreign sale values are missing
and deleted
3. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
4. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
5. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
6. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 23
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Table 43

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H11

Dependent Variable
Sample

Model 25

Model 26

Family Firms

Difference
between PD and
ID

Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Firms
0.429**

Family Representation in the TMT (H11)
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
Family CEO Duality
Firm Age
Firm Size (log value of employees)
Debt to Equity Ratio

0.028***

0.001

−0.001
−0.075**

−0.034
0.207†
0.067

0.181†

0.013

Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
Advertising

†

−0.057
5.760***

−0.008
−0.667

Investment
Family Trust Holding
Family Sales Ratio by Industry
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio

−0.381
2.832***
0.224
0.104

−0.078

Constant

−2.227

0.462***
0.053

***

−10.227†

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Year Dummies

Yes

Yes

Number of Observations
Number of Firms

5,564
435

707
84

Absolute Log Likelihood
Within R-Square
F-statistics
Power (1- β error prob)

704.868***
0.283
29.52***
1.00

Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between PD and ID and family firms are
measured using 10% family ownership threshold
2. Use a sample with observations that noncore and foreign sale values are missing
and deleted
3. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
4. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
5. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
6. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 25
185

Table 44

Fixed-effect longitudinal regression analysis: robustness check on H11

Dependent Variable
Sample

Model 27

Model 28

Family Firms

Difference
between PD and
ID

Family Firms and
Nonfamily Firms

Family Firms

Family Representation in the TMT (H11)
0.624***
Nonfamily Blockholder Ownership
−0.008*
−0.001
Family CEO Duality
−0.019
Firm Age
−0.001
0.175
***
Firm Size (log value of employees)
−0.148
0.065
*
Debt to Equity Ratio
0.252
0.017
Industry Adjusted Tobin's Q
−0.067*
−0.013
Advertising
6.129***
−0.480
Investment
0.209
0.099
Family Trust Holding
2.991***
Family Sales Ratio by Industry
0.240
Industry Adjusted Prior Diversification
0.132
0.461***
Experience (Difference Measure)
Inverse Mills Ratio
0.107***
Constant
−2.445***
−8.773
Industry Dummies
Yes
Yes
Year Dummies
Yes
Yes
Number of Observations
5,564
506
Number of Firms
435
66
***
Absolute Log Likelihood
657.451
Within R-Square
0.316
F-statistics
257.60***
1.00
Power (1- β error prob)
Notes:
1. DV is measured using the difference between PD and ID and family firms are
measured using 20% family ownership threshold
2. Use a sample with observations that noncore and foreign sale values are missing
and deleted
3. PD refers to product diversification; ID refers to international diversification
4. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
5. † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
6. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 27
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Table 45

Descriptive data of family firms and nonfamily firms

Variable
1. Difference between PD and ID
2. Ratio of PD to ID
3. Industry Adjusted PD
4. Industry Adjusted ID
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO
9. Family Representation in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Representation on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Advertising
21. Investment
22. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry

Mean
0.029
-0.503
0.067
0.039
1
34.249
0
0.566

Family Firms
S.D.
Min
0.449
-1.142
9.408
-43.85
0.358
-0.484
0.319
-0.632
0
1
25.332
0
0
0
0.496
0

Max
1.394
42.927
1.376
1.162
1
88.1
0
1

Mean
0.094
0.184
0.143
0.049
0
0
0
0

Nonfamily Firms
S.D.
Min
0.486
-1.142
8.17
-43.85
0.393
-0.484
0.331
-0.632
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0.195
0.752
0.203
0.461
0.54
15.84
0.881
56.471
1.287
0.302
0.253
0.021
0.105
0.201

0.16
0.432
0.106
0.499
0.499
13.482
0.324
37.057
1.546
0.502
1.503
0.04
0.081
0.148

0.5
1
0.429
1
1
42.357
1
160
5.05
2.604
8.483
0.153
0.489
0.547

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
49.452
1.542
0.261
0.425
0.009
0.108
0.132

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40.925
1.743
0.388
1.512
0.024
0.084
0.129
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
-2.865
0
-1.45
0
0.013
0.01

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
-2.865
0
-1.45
0
0.013
0

Max
1.394
42.927
1.376
1.162
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
163
5.05
2.604
8.483
0.153
0.489
0.547

Table 46

Descriptive data of family firms with a family CEO and family firms without a family CEO

Variable
1. Difference between PD and ID
2. Ratio of PD to ID
3. Industry Adjusted PD
4. Industry Adjusted ID
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO
9. Family Representation in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Representation on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Advertising
21. Investment
22. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry

Family Firms with a Family CEO
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
0.011
0.418
-1.142
1.394
-0.602
9.677
-43.85
42.927
0.017
0.335
-0.484
1.376
0.006
0.296
-0.632
1.162
1
0
1
1
35.951
24.893
0
88.1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0.286
0.118
0
0.5
0.977
0.149
0
1
0.233
0.101
0
0.429
0.578
0.494
0
1
0.94
0.238
0
1
16.263
13.544
0
42.357
0.856
0.351
0
1
48.485
31.551
1
140
0.917
1.456
-2.865
5.05
0.329
0.557
0
2.604
0.17
1.597
-1.45
8.483
0.019
0.037
0
0.153
0.111
0.089
0.013
0.489
0.194
0.142
0.013
0.547
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Family Firms without a Family CEO
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
0.052
0.484
-1.142
1.394
-0.379
9.063
-43.85
42.927
0.133
0.376
-0.484
1.376
0.081
0.341
-0.632
1.162
1
0
1
1
32.032
25.74
0
88.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.077
0.128
0
0.5
0.457
0.498
0
1
0.163
0.099
0
0.429
0.308
0.462
0
1
0.019
0.136
0
1
15.289
13.39
0
42.357
0.914
0.281
0
1
66.88
40.935
1
160
1.77
1.526
-2.865
5.05
0.266
0.418
0
2.604
0.362
1.365
-1.45
8.483
0.023
0.042
0
0.153
0.097
0.068
0.013
0.489
0.21
0.156
0.01
0.547

Table 47

Descriptive data of family firms with a family board chair and family firms without a family board chair
Family Firms with a Family Board Chair
Variable

1. Difference between PD and ID
2. Ratio of PD to ID
3. Industry Adjusted PD
4. Industry Adjusted ID
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO
9. Family Representation in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Representation on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Advertising
21. Investment
22. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry

Mean
0.021
-0.68
0.061
0.041
1
36.613
0
0.736
0.246
1
0.226
0.542
0.713
15.384
0.873
53.654
1.166
0.323
0.161
0.023
0.107
0.198

S.D.
0.45
9.604
0.356
0.319
0
25.697
0
0.441
0.141
0
0.098
0.498
0.452
13.328
0.333
34.503
1.577
0.546
1.493
0.043
0.084
0.141
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Min
-1.142
-43.85
-0.484
-0.632
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
-2.865
0
-1.45
0
0.013
0.01

Max
1.394
42.927
1.376
1.162
1
88.1
0
1
0.5
1
0.429
1
1
42.357
1
160
5.05
2.604
8.483
0.153
0.489
0.547

Family Firms without a Family Board
Chair
Mean
S.D.
Min
Max
0.054
0.445
-1.142
1.394
0.009
8.807
-43.85
42.927
0.085
0.364
-0.484
1.376
0.032
0.318
-0.632
1.162
1
0
1
1
27.098
22.772
0
88.1
0
0
0
0
0.052
0.222
0
1
0.041
0.107
0
0.5
0
0
0
0
0.13
0.097
0
0.417
0.215
0.411
0
1
0.017
0.128
0
1
17.219
13.862
0
42.357
0.907
0.291
0
1
64.992
42.813
1
148
1.656
1.385
-2.865
5.05
0.24
0.327
0
2.604
0.532
1.5
-1.45
8.483
0.014
0.027
0
0.116
0.098
0.07
0.015
0.489
0.21
0.169
0.011
0.547

Table 48

Descriptive data of family firms run by founding generation family members and family firms run by later
generation family members
Family Firms run by Founding Generation
Family Members

Variable
1. Difference between PD and ID
2. Ratio of PD to ID
3. Industry Adjusted PD
4. Industry Adjusted ID
5. Family Firm
6. Family Ownership
7. Lone Founder
8. Family CEO
9. Family Representation in the TMT
10. Family Chair
11. Family Representation on the Board
12. Founding Generation Family
13. Family CEO Duality
14. Nonfamily Block Holder
15. Family Trust Holdings
16. Firm Age
17. Firm Size (ln)
18. Debt to Equity Ratio
19. Industry Adjusted Tobin’s Q
20. Advertising
21. Investment
22. FFs’ Fraction of Sale by Industry

Mean
0.011
-0.845
0.015
0.003
1
31.882
0
0.71
0.263
0.884
0.229
1
0.689
17.377
0.866
30.423
0.782
0.276
0.41
0.017
0.119
0.209

S.D.
0.434
9.392
0.357
0.293
0
22.447
0
0.454
0.148
0.32
0.101
0
0.463
13.042
0.341
18.563
1.537
0.545
1.717
0.034
0.094
0.141
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Min
-1.142
-43.85
-0.484
-0.632
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
-2.865
0
-1.45
0
0.013
0.01

Max
1.394
42.927
1.376
1.162
1
88.1
0
1
0.5
1
0.429
1
1
42.357
1
87
4.394
2.604
8.483
0.153
0.489
0.547

Family Firms run by Later Generation
Family Members
Mean
0.044
-0.224
0.112
0.069
1
36.274
0
0.443
0.136
0.638
0.18
0
0.413
14.525
0.894
78.741
1.719
0.324
0.119
0.024
0.092
0.194

S.D.
0.46
9.416
0.353
0.336
0
27.41
0
0.497
0.146
0.481
0.106
0
0.493
13.718
0.308
34.304
1.417
0.461
1.278
0.044
0.065
0.154

Min
-1.142
-43.85
-0.484
-0.632
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
-2.865
0
-1.45
0
0.013
0.02

Max
1.394
42.927
1.376
1.162
1
88.1
0
1
0.5
1
0.429
0
1
42.357
1
160
5.05
2.604
8.483
0.153
0.489
0.547

Figure 3

Theoretical model of hypothesized relationships – Essay 2
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CONCLUSIONS
Drawing upon the goals, governance, and resources framework, this dissertation
aims to investigate diversification behavior in family firms. In Essay 1, I address when
family firms decide to diversify, which mode of diversification in terms of internal versus
external diversification they are more likely to choose relative to nonfamily firms. In
Essay 2, I investigate which type of diversification in terms of product versus
international diversification family firms are more likely to focus on in comparison to
nonfamily firms. Both Essay 1 and Essay 2 also address the heterogeneous nature of
family firms by investigating how various types of family firms differ in their relative
emphasis on the modes/types of diversification. Heterogeneity among family firms is
manifested in terms of the level of family ownership, family participation in the top
management team, the board, and the generation of family members owning and
controlling the family firm.
In Essay 1, in consideration of the goals, governance, and resources of the
dominant coalition in affecting a firm’s choice of entry modes, as well as the advantages
and disadvantages associated with these two modes of diversification (internal and
external diversification), I propose that the strength of preference for internal over
external diversification vary between family and nonfamily firms, as well as among
different types of family firms. In total, I have proposed seven hypotheses. Hypothesis 1
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proposes family firms are likely to have a stronger tendency to engage in internal over
external diversification in comparison to nonfamily firms. Hypotheses 2 through 7
examine variation among various types of family firms. Specifically, I propose that
family firms with a large percentage of family ownership (H2), a family CEO (H3), a
large representation of family executives (H4), a family board chair (H5), a large
representation of family directors (H6), and involvement of founding generation family
members (H7) are likely to have a stronger tendency to engage in internal rather than
external diversification. An empirical analysis of 573 firms representing 9,491 firm-year
observations did not provide support for H1. Moreover, an empirical analysis of 136
family firms representing 1,811 firm-year observations did not provide support for H2
through H7.
In Essay 2, based on insights drawn from the goals, governance, and resources
framework and the benefits and risks associated with the two types of diversification
(product and international diversification), I propose seven hypotheses to capture the
difference between family and nonfamily firms and variation among different types of
family firms with respect to their relative emphasis on these two types of diversification.
I test these hypotheses using a sample drawn from S&P 1500 manufacturing firms.
However, the empirical analysis did not provide support for H8. Consistent with my
prediction, family representation in TMT (H11) was found to have a significantly positive
effect on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than international diversification.
This result is robust across different post-hoc analyses. However, the effects of other
heterogeneity variables are not significant.
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There are a number of explanations for the significant effect of family
representation in the TMT on a firm’s tendency to engage in product rather than
international diversification. First, the upper echelon theory has long emphasized the
importance of top managers in a firm’s strategic decision-making (Finkelstein et al.,
1990; Hambrick et al., 1984). A firm’s decision on scope change is often formulated and
implemented by top managers. The finding that family representation in the TMT has a
positive significant effect on a firm’s relative emphasis on product over international
diversification highlights the importance of top managers in affecting a firm’s strategy.
Second, from a governance perspective, a larger representation of family members in the
TMT is likely to provide the controlling family with higher power and direction to pursue
family-centered goals such as maintaining family control of the firm. I argue that the risk
of diluting decision-making control to external partners in an exporting relationship is
likely to be less compatible with family firms than the risk of diluting decision-making
control to nonfamily managers employed in the firm in the case of product
diversification. Thus, family firms with a large representation of family executives are
more likely to choose product rather than international diversification because they have
more power to maintain family decision-making control of the firm. Third, from a
resource perspective, a large representation of family members in the TMT is likely to
indicate the TMT has deep levels of firm-specific tacit knowledge and local resources,
which can be used to facilitate the choice of product rather than international
diversification.
Several explanations are provided concerning the insignificant hypothesized
relationships, especially the insignificant effect of family firms on a firm’s relative
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emphasis on the modes/types of diversification. In comparison to nonfamily firms, family
firms do not show particular preference for internal over external diversification. Prior
research suggests that family members’ deep level of firm-specific expertise and tacit
knowledge enables the transfer of ideas and resources across departments (Sirmon et al.,
2003), thus facilitating the choice of internal diversification. However, more recent
research shows that family firms’ advantage associated with idiosyncratic resources is
less likely to be observed during the innovation input or R&D investment (Duran et al.,
2016). Specifically, Duran and colleagues (2016) found that family firms’ advantage
associated with idiosyncratic resources are more likely to be shown among innovation
outputs. The insignificant effect of family firms on a firm’s relative emphasis on internal
over external diversification, to a certain extent, can be explained by the fact that my
discussion of internal diversification largely focuses on innovation inputs or R&D
investments.
Second, I also did not find a significant effect of family firms on a firm’s relative
emphasis on product over international diversification. While family firms have unique
challenges in managing complexity resulting from expanding in multiple and diverse
foreign markets (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), they have fewer challenges in managing the
amount of international scale (Arregle et al., 2017). The insignificant effect of family
firms on a firm’s relative emphasis on product over international diversification, to a
certain extent, can be explained by the fact that my discussion of international
diversification largely focuses on international scale.
In spite of these insignificant findings, this dissertation makes several important
contributions to the current family business literature. While prior literature has shed
195

important insights on the level of diversification in family firms, our knowledge related to
how family firms diversify remains limited. Thus, my focus on the relative emphasis on
the modes/types of diversification extends our knowledge of diversification behavior in
family firms. Second, this dissertation advances a theory of family firms by extending the
application of the goals, governance, and resources framework in the study of family
firms and improving our knowledge of the essence of family influence on a firm’s
behavior. Third, this dissertation also represents one of the first few attempts to capture
the different dimensions of the framework, specifically, the resources and governance
dimensions. I used the number of years the CEO/ board chair has worked in the firm as
alternative measures for the presence a family CEO/board chair. Lastly, this study also
contributes to the mainstream diversification literature by providing a finer-grained
understanding of the antecedents a firm’s choice of modes and types of diversification.
Aside from its contributions, this dissertation has several limitations that represent
opportunities for future research. First, I used an involvement approach rather than an
essence approach in defining family firms. This approach limits the possibility to capture
the essence of family influence. For the most part, I did not measure goals and resources
directly. Second, I used a convenience sample of publicly held manufacturing firms
drawn from the S&P 1500 index. While these firms are quite diverse particularly with
respect to size, future research using other sampling frames is warranted since my results
may not be generalizable to private firms, smaller firms, and firms outside of the U.S. or
firms in other industries. Lastly, I adopted a general approach in the discussion of the
types and modes of diversification. Specifically, my discussion of product diversification
focuses on internal direct development and acquisition, and related and unrelated
196

diversification. While in consideration of other foreign market entry modes, my
discussion of international diversification focuses on exporting activities since exporting
is considered the most prevalent form of international expansion.
In sum, this dissertation explores diversification behavior in family and nonfamily
firms, as well as among various types of family firms. The findings drawn from this
dissertation provide family business scholars with a better understanding of how family
firms diversify in terms of the modes (internal versus external diversification) and types
(product and international diversification), as well as enhance our knowledge of goals,
governance, and resources as the essence to distinguish family and nonfamily firms and
different types of family firms.
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